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and mercy to men's bodies than to their minds." And again, "The ideal moment for the unification which Europe has expected from Charlemagne's day to Hitler's, will arrive at the end of this war and it may never come again."

What shall we do about reparations, frontiers, migrants and refugees, disarmament, German industries, re-education? How shall we break through the crust of nationalisms without coming to a spurious and perilous core of supernationalism?

To these questions, who shall reply? "The young are in the army; only their elders can speak." Plain, grave replies are offered in this timely, urgent book.

THE JOHN DAY COMPANY, New York

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*D. Whitlow*

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*Our Settlement With*

# GERMANY


Henry Noel  
H. N. BRAILSFORD

The John Day Company

NEW YORK

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TO  
E. B.  
A GIFT





## *Preface*

WITHOUT encouragement I should have lacked the audacity to write this book. I am not sure that I have any qualification for the task, unless it be that I realise its difficulty. Our settlement with Germany must bring a new cosmos out of moral chaos and physical ruin. That cannot be easy. But the most daunting of the difficulties lie in ourselves. Which of us can purge himself entirely of hatred and fear and set about the work of analysis and construction as if it were a scientific task?

This undertaking, from which I should myself have shrunk, was laid upon me by fellow workers and friends. It was Leonard Woolf, as Chairman of the Fabian International Bureau, who asked me to attempt it. It grew as I worked upon it far beyond the limits he suggested, but it is to him and his colleagues that I owe the original impetus. The friend to whose kindness I owe most is Will Arnold-Forster. He discussed my first rough outline and read my manuscript with alert attention. He brought to these tangled problems a lucid mind, equipped with a long familiarity with Germany. But any errors and perversities in this book are my own.

Though this book was written for English readers, I hope that Americans may find in it something of value. Our troops are fighting side by side: it is vital that in peace as in war we should think in step.

H. N. B.

*London, 1944.*



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## *I: The Spirit of the Settlement*

THROUGHOUT this war, we have all been facing the distant problem of dealing with Germany after the victory we anticipate. To-day the hour is nearer. It is not easy to bring vividly before our eyes the landscape of wreckage and chaos into which our armies will march, nor to imagine the temper in which the defeated nation will receive them. It is harder still to clear our own minds of the passions which this cruel war has engendered. Englishmen cannot forget the year of peril they endured alone, when it seemed possible that an enemy who mocks at law and humanity might deal with them as he dealt with their unfortunate allies. Year after year we have met this enemy only in one capacity, as the conqueror who was reducing the manhood of Europe to slavery. Our memories are heavy with the recollection of his barbarous crimes. It needs a formidable effort to recall what he was before the plague of Nazi corruption infected him, and a still more difficult act of faith to imagine what he may again become, when the Dictator falls.

It is not required of us that we should forget these experiences. What is required of us is that we should bring to bear upon them such social science as we possess. These things happened in an environment which evidently favoured the rise of this anti-social Power. Gangsters do not master a city unless there is something gravely wrong with its municipal life. And in fact, for a decade at least, the disordered world which the Nazis shattered with explosive violence in 1939 had been demonstrating its incapacity to cope either with economic chaos or with military aggression. Before they fell upon it, it was doomed in the great slump and damned in Manchuria and Abyssinia.

The effort in which millions of armed men have been engaged during these bloodstained years had a single aim, the attainment

of security. The first phase of it, as we cast our imagination forward, will be over: the limitless destruction of human life and human work will have reached its end in the Old World, and now the common task must be to build on surer foundations a structure of security solidier than any that Europe has known. It must provide against want as well as fear, for these two spectres march in step. It must plan not merely an organisation that can promise the peoples safety: it must find a social motive that will prompt them to act together when danger threatens. It must, in short, weld into a true international society these many national states which discovered their solidarity only when their rulers met in exile.

In the heart of this Continent, in a situation that provides the strategical key to mastery, this German nation is established, which in obedience to the criminal megalomania of its rulers has all but ruined civilisation. Let us suppose that its defeat is accomplished and its disarmament completed; it still counts its seventy millions, formidable not merely by their numbers but even more by their vigour, their industry, their talent for organisation and that unique habit of thoroughness in work which always carries them far, be it for evil or for good. After defeat, this great mass of men, powerless though it may be for military action, will still impress itself on the Continent and determine the shape and colour of its political and economic life. If it remains, what it has been for ten years, a psychopathic case, it can turn all Europe into a Bedlam. If it does not enter the international organisation which should plan the industrial and agricultural activity of the whole Continent for full employment, Germany's neighbours will be the poorer for lack of her co-operation. In addition, they will have to encircle her, fully armed, closely allied, and for ever on the alert against one form or another of anti-social conduct on this outlaw's part.

Our study will have to cover a period of several years. We have first of all to face the transitional phase, while the broken armies are demobilised, the criminal government and the corrupt party dissolved, the guilty leaders brought to a reckoning. In this phase it is inevitable that the responsibility for all that happens in

Germany should lie with the victorious armies and the United Nations behind them, the Russians no less than the Americans and the British. They will have stern duties to carry out, but even in this phase of the new relationship much can be done to prepare a happier future. As elsewhere in Europe there will be need for medical relief, for the provision of food and above all for the organisation of normal work and the rebuilding of the ruins. In the next phase what we have to consider is the place which Germany is to fill in the European society of the future. Inevitably the two phases overlap. What is done in the early months will affect, for good or ill, all we plan for the after-years. From first to last the governing consideration should be the establishment of a system of general security. The fatal mistake would be to think of Germany as an isolated entity.

The test of a good settlement is that it enables the German people, after a delay that cannot yet be measured in years, to take their place with self-respect within the European community of the future. When this last stage is reached, its constitution must enable them, with all their talents and resources, to collaborate sincerely with their neighbours for the common good and the common safety. It follows that the new order which provides for Europe's peace and liberty must also promise to Germans economic welfare and an opportunity for constructive work. To accept their collaboration and to evoke in them a neighbourly and co-operative spirit may not be easy. The memory of the evil past will raise obstacles in our minds as well as theirs. None the less, for us as for them, safety and happiness can be found in this way and in no other. Germany, if she lacks this spirit of collaboration, is big enough even in defeat to poison the life of the entire Continent. The loss and the peril will be ours as well as hers, if the settlement fails to enlist her as an active member eager and entitled to bring her positive contribution to the common stock.

## SELF-DETERMINATION

**B**EFORE facing the practical questions of policy which are the subject of this essay, we should realise how novel and unprecedented is the task that confronts the United Nations. History records the many ways in which victorious Powers have dealt with a vanquished enemy, but there is no model for this undertaking. It is generally proposed that the victors shall reconstruct Germany and "re-educate" the Germans. Backward and colonial peoples have often been treated in this way, but here we are dealing with a Great Power whose people ranked in happier days among the leaders of our common civilisation. This is a startling and revolutionary innovation. Throughout the nineteenth century and even down to the present day the assumption which governed international life was that nations were in no way concerned with the internal policy or the form of government their neighbours chose to adopt. Statesmen and political thinkers have formulated this rule of non-interference as a fixed and unquestionable principle. It was a commonplace of Liberalism and it has been widely adopted by schools of thought which do not claim to be Liberal. For the average man it has become an axiom. It has even reappeared in the contemporary document which interprets the policy of the United Nations in the present war—the Atlantic Charter. It declares that they "respect the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live"; and that they "wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."

These words are echoes of a philosophy which in action we have already discarded. It is not our intention to respect the right of the Germans to determine the kind of government they shall have. Our major purpose in this war is, on the contrary, to challenge this supposed right. Whatever else we do or leave undone, we shall destroy the government in which they acquiesced for ten years, and in one way or another we shall try to prevent them from setting up in the future another government of a similar



type. No one among us questions our right to act for the general good in this way. But few of us yet realise how far we have departed from the accepted canons that have hitherto governed the intercourse of civilised and sovereign States. Fewer still have faced the question whether this supposed right of a nation "to choose its own governors" (as men put it in the seventeenth century) or to claim "self-determination" (to use the modern phrase) has any validity at all, and if so, within what limits we can recognise it.

In fact, our conduct has not in modern times obeyed the rule of non-interference with any approach to consistency. In periods of crisis, excitement and danger it often broke down. Our grandfathers flung it away when they faced the French Revolution. President Wilson, who believed that "autocracy" will always lead to war, so directed the pressure of our armies and our blockade in the last war, as to induce the defeated Germans to adopt a republican constitution. The memory of our ill-starred intervention in the Russian Civil War is still very much alive. In these three cases the advocates of intervention claimed, with varying degrees of plausibility, that they were acting, in Burke's phrase, against an "armed doctrine"—that is to say, that the ideas embodied in revolutionary France, the militarist autocracy of Prussia and the Soviet Union constituted a threat to the peace and established order of the rest of Europe. In other words, it was argued, justly or otherwise, that these regimes, by reason of the ideology they incarnated, were bound to be aggressive. Intervention was justified by the law of self-preservation.

That is our case against the Nazi State and indeed against any Fascist regime—a case so strong that it would have justified action long before Munich. A State conducted on Hitler's principles could not be a peaceful member of the European family. This absolute national egoism, this claim to racial overlordship, this contempt for law, humanity and good faith, this regimentation under a dictator meant war as certainly as the re-organisation of industry that ran parallel with the moral and political counter-revolution. This State was not organised to further the well-being even of its own citizens, not to mention its neigh-

hours: it was organised to grasp power at the expense of others. The most casual traveller should have been able to read something of the future in the motto which the Italian Fascist Party stencilled on every blank wall: "Believe, obey and fight."

There emerges from our experience and from these reflections at least this conclusion—that we must so far discard the rule of non-intervention, and so far limit the self-determination of nations, as to forbid the erection of any regime which is, by reason of the ideas it embodies, necessarily aggressive.

But if we survey our own actions, it is clear that they implied a more far-reaching principle than this. Neither the Nazis nor the Italian Fascists directly attacked or challenged us. Englishmen assumed, after what had happened to Austrians, Spaniards, Czechs and finally Poles, that the whole Continent was threatened, and not for the first time in their history they accepted as the sovereign purpose of their policy the maintenance of the liberties of Europe. As the war went on, more especially after the Japanese attack, we widened this aim to cover the world. To oppose and prevent aggression is a proper but still a negative aim. But in acting upon it, have we not inevitably advanced to something more positive—a conception of the general good, first of all of Europe and then of mankind? This is implicit throughout the Atlantic Charter, but above all in its conception of the four freedoms and its ideal of a world delivered from want and fear. A picture emerges, however dim it still may be, of a great society of nations united for purposes among which economic security is as prominent as immunity from aggression. In the light of this purpose, which we all acknowledge, the right of intervention in the internal affairs of the defeated enemy States which we propose to exercise acquires a new and positive meaning. One day the jurists may venture to formulate it in precise legal terms. But men commonly act before they define their principles. What the United Nations propose to do is presumably to destroy in Germany and elsewhere regimes which cannot be fitted into any pattern of the common good; regimes which will not co-operate in a framework of law and reciprocity; in a word, anti-social regimes. In fact we are acting as though we already


conceived Europe as an integrated whole. Its unity, its ability to live in accordance with any scheme of co-operation, demands in Germany a government that will conform to this ideal. We can no more allow the Germans to do as they please within their own frontiers, than at the gravest crisis in the history of the United States the North could allow the South to maintain its "peculiar institution." Of Europe we must learn to say what Lincoln said of the American Republic: it cannot endure half slave and half free. History will applaud us under two conditions. In the first place, we must take adequate steps, without undue delay, to constitute in fact the international society which has inspired us as an idea; secondly, we must require from all, not excepting ourselves, the same subordination to the common good that we impose on the Germans.

## GUARANTEES

**I**N YET another respect we have during this war made a salutary advance towards realism in international relations. Our fathers, when they sought to bind a State over to good behaviour for the future, had a very simple way of doing it, which has ceased to satisfy us. They drew up a set of rules, to which the accredited representatives of the various sovereign States then set their signature. Hitler's contempt for promises and treaties was unique in its short-sighted audacity and may have been a trait of his psychopathic condition. But it was more than a personal eccentricity. Japanese and Italian statecraft developed in recent years the same characteristic. It is for that reason unnecessary to examine the suggestion that this disregard for promises was a racial trait peculiar to Germans. It was common to all the Fascist Powers and was manifestly derived from their extravagant nationalism: they acknowledged no duty to any society wider than their own.

The United Nations must continue to build upon treaties, covenants and charters, resolved that they shall be better re-

spected in the future than they were in the past. But we shall not be so naïve as to suppose that a mere signature suffices to ensure the observance of a treaty. In the case of the enemy States, the decision to render them impotent for future aggression by disarming them was announced in the Atlantic Charter. It may



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be intended also to provide sanctions against aggression more adequate than those of the Geneva Covenant. But experience warns us that neither of these expedients may suffice, and few of us would be prepared to rely on them alone. The aggressors are rather numerous, for they include a group of satellite States as well as three Great Powers. It would, moreover, be excessively simple-minded to assume that no State in our own group was, or will in the future be, an aggressor. In its short life of twenty years, the Polish Republic invaded three of its four neighbours without provocation. To trust in measures of police alone, in-

dispensable though they may be, would be both burdensome and precarious. Clearly we must provide the means by which changes and adaptations can be made and grievances redressed by peaceful means. As certainly we should promote the contentment and well-being of the masses in the countries concerned, so that they may be indisposed to back a reckless policy of adventure. But in the last resort, can any guarantee of peace satisfy us, short of a radical change in the character of these dangerous Powers?

## *II: The Character of German Society*

WE HAVE reached in our search for security a conclusion familiar to everyone. External means to ensure our future safety of course we shall adopt. But will they in the long run suffice, without a radical change in the character of the aggressive Powers? If that does not spontaneously occur, we should not scruple to promote it.

Their "character": what do we mean by this vague expression? We can count on no magical change, no sudden conversion, and might be slow to trust it, if it did occur. A big swing in public opinion against the Nazis will certainly occur, if only because their failure will be evident. This may be registered in the first free vote of the German electorate; but changes of this kind, however salutary, may be superficial and transient. Much more is to be hoped from a reform of the whole system of education in Germany, if a plan based on sound social and psychological principles is adopted. But the effect of such a change will at the best be slow, nor will its influence be great, unless the environment, both national and international, in which German youth grows up, confirms the social lessons taught at school. The textbooks of history used under the Weimar Republic were admirable, but their tendency was counteracted by the experience of daily life. Clearly we must push our analysis of German society rather further. What kind of change in its character would give us the assurance we seek?

What, then, was the structure of this society; how far did it differ from that of other countries which have found less difficulty in adapting themselves to a civilised conception of international life? Its structure had much in common with that of other advanced capitalistic societies, but there were some marked differences, which we may attempt to analyse in a summary way.

In the first place, the middle class developed much more slowly in Germany than in other Western countries, never acquired the self-confidence that characterised it in England, Holland and France, and never won that ascendancy which elsewhere enabled it to impose its congenial liberal philosophy upon the State. There was in Germany no successful middle-class revolution as there was in Holland, England and France. The crushing defeat of the masses in the Peasants' War of 1525 confirmed the princes in power, with the land-owning nobility and the conservative Lutheran Church as their supporters. While in the English Civil War and the Whig Revolution the middle and mercantile class assured its influence, Germany was scourged by the Thirty Years' War, which brought with it economic ruin and delayed the growth of this class. The division of German territory among a medley of little principalities had the same retarding effect, even in the nineteenth century. The result was that when their opportunity faced the middle class and the intelligentsia in 1848, they lacked not merely the political experience and self-assurance but also the real economic power necessary for success.

The leadership in the building of modern Germany fell, accordingly, not to the middle liberal stratum in its population, but to the class which history had endowed with all these advantages—the Junkers, under the brilliant guidance of Bismarck. He had the sagacity to arrange a marriage of interests between the old landed ruling class of Prussia and the strongest and—in the technical sense—most progressive section of the young capitalist class, the industrialists. It was a marriage of rye with steel. There resulted a singular combination, without parallel elsewhere, of the modern and scientific outlook of big business with the traditions of an aristocracy which specialised in the military art and in large-scale agriculture. Both understood organisation, but neither of them possessed the Western liberal outlook. The Junker class, which staffed the courts and the civil service as well as the army, had its virtues—its belief in law, its respect for duty and its freedom from venality. But it carried on into modern times some of the habits of thought and some of the values of feudalism. It played the autocrat on its great estates, whose workers were

still serfs when the nineteenth century opened. It defended its ancient privileges; separated itself from the less fortunate classes with an offensive arrogance, and kept alive vestiges of barbarism, like the duel, which conditioned it for war. Both of these classes used the State in many ways, of which tariffs were the most conspicuous, to serve their own economic interests and together they made a common front against the organised workers.

## GUNS FOR BUTTER

**A** CLASS constituted in this way was inevitably militarist, imperialist and expansionist in its outlook. The army was in these Junker families an hereditary profession. Its prestige and its leading rôle in the State were as much a family interest as the preservation intact of their great estates. Soldiers are not necessarily aggressive, but their professional training teaches them to think in terms of military power. Their outlook was accepted with less criticism and less opposition in Prussia than in other European countries, because these families of hereditary soldiers staffed the civil service and the diplomatic corps and gave the tone to the universities.

The new men, the heavy industrialists, who in our day formed the other half of the German ruling class, were aggressive for reasons of another order. The Prussian soldier stood on guard to ensure the safety of a nation so situated that it always had to dread a possible attack on two land-fronts. Inevitably a German army strong enough to stand on both fronts will also be strong enough to dominate Europe. These soldiers demanded, therefore, a supreme army, much as British sailors always called for a supreme navy, and on the same plausible grounds of security. The industrialists, on the other hand, were expansionists for economic reasons. Their attention shifted from fields of investment and sources of raw materials to markets which they meant to "rationalise" and control. The basic fact which has dominated German and, indeed, European history through forty years has



been the phenomenal growth within the framework of monopolist cartels of the highly efficient and progressive steel, machine-tool and chemical industries, based on the coalfield of the Ruhr. The steel and machine industries made capital equipment. Such industries, in every capitalist society, are always linked very much more directly with policies of imperial expansion than the industries which supply consumers' goods. Empires march on steel rails. In addition, these industries make armaments at all times and may have to depend on this highly variable demand in periods of slack trade. That is also true of the third of the great industries based on the Ruhr coalfield, the chemical industry, which makes explosives, drugs, dyes, fertilisers, together with synthetic silk, oil and rubber. The defeat of 1918 did not retard the growth of these industries. On the contrary, since the exports of the steel industry were the chief asset on which Germany depended for the payment of the indemnity imposed on her, it was helped by Wall Street and the City to develop its productive capacity, until it towered over Europe like a volcano which must one day erupt and fling far and wide its rivers of molten metal. That disaster happened in due course for reasons not peculiar to Germany.

With this inordinate capacity to produce, there went no parallel development of mass consumption. Every one knows how the great slump aggravated, by mounting tariffs and restrictive quotas, the difficulties that faced every big exporting industry. Foreign markets were more than ever dependent on political bargains, and therefore in the last resort on power. But in Germany, even more than in other capitalist countries, the home market failed to expand by reason of the faulty distribution of the product of labour. Had there been a rapidly expanding home market this mighty industry could have supplied it with constructional steel for dwellings, cheap cars and electrical conveniences for the home. But the effective demand of the German masses remained stagnant. In a revealing calculation, the *Economic Journal* (April, 1943) showed that in Great Britain the ratio of wages to the value of industrial output fell throughout the period 1924 to 1938, but at the end of it still stood at the relatively high figure of 48 per cent. In the U.S.A. it rose during the New Deal period

from 35 per cent. to 40 per cent. In Germany it fell during the slump to 31 per cent., and at that level it remained under the Nazi regime. In other words, labour was exploited in Germany at a higher rate than in any capitalist country of a comparable stage of development.\*

Because the wage-earning masses could buy back less than a third of the value they produced, German heavy industry had to be expansionist and aggressive. The steel which could not be used to serve the well-being of the German population had fatally to go into cannon and tanks. These figures, if we know how to interpret them, may go further than any speculations about the innate wickedness of the German character to explain why a country cursed with this particular ruling class took to aggression on a colossal scale.†

## THE WORKERS

**A**FTER this brief account of the composition of the German ruling class, half of it feudal and militarist, half of it industrial and expansionist, let us now look at the organisation of the workers. They absorbed socialist thinking and created a powerful political party earlier than their comrades in Great Britain or

\* In absolute figures the contrast between German and British conditions was even more startling. At the end of the boom (1929) the real income per head of the working class population was in Britain \$1,133, as against \$660 in Germany. (These are gold dollars, "international units".) See Colin Clark, *Conditions of Economic Progress*.

† The Nazis and their tame economist, Dr. Schacht, were perfectly aware that under-consumption meant militarism and eventually war. That is the meaning of Goering's classical slogan "Guns instead of Butter". Dr. Schacht put the same thing in more technical language when he said in an address to the economic section of the German Academy on November 28, 1938: "The less the people consume, the more work can be done on armament production. The standard of living and the scale of armament production must move in opposite directions." (Quoted in *The Economics of Barbarism*, by J. Kuczynski and M. Witt.)

France. That followed from the conditions we have described. No German Liberal group could ever attract and hold the workers as Gladstonian Liberalism and in a less degree French Radicalism did. The class structure of the Prussian State, with its famous three-class franchise which endured up to the last war, compelled the masses to wage a bitter struggle for the most elementary of political rights, which were conceded much earlier in Great Britain and in France. The Junker half of the ruling class was incomparably more stubborn in a stone-walling defence of its privileges than were the British or French middle classes. The result was that German Social Democracy adopted an attitude of fundamental opposition to the State and even to the Monarchy. Above all, it was anti-militarist, and up to 1914 its powerful and disciplined party in the Reichstag never cast a vote for military and naval estimates in any Budget of the Reich. It behaved with conspicuous courage during the Franco-Prussian war. The Social Democratic Party refused to vote for the war-credits and tabled a motion after the decisive victory of Sedan, calling for the conclusion of a speedy peace with the French Republic and condemning any annexation of French territory. Bebel denounced the annexation of Alsace as "a stain on Germany history." For an alleged "act of treason" Bebel and Liebknecht were tried and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. Their conduct and that of the party especially deserves our admiration, because in this war against the Second Empire, Louis Napoleon's responsibility was at least as heavy as Bismarck's, and on the facts available at the time it looked much heavier.

This unflinching opposition to the whole tradition of Prussianism the party maintained with steady consistency right up to 1914. The remarkable thing is that the party grew and that the German electorate continued to rally to it even in the years of crisis and danger which preceded the last war. In the elections for the Reichstag in 1912 it polled 4,250,000 votes out of a total of 12,000,000—more than a third of the German nation. In theory and phraseology the party retained its original Marxist position, but in practice its interest had come to centre in political and social reform. Trade union leaders were prominent in its upper

ranks, and its chief weakness lay in the fact that it was too exclusively the party of the organised industrial workers. This was part of its Marxist heritage. It had little success in its rather half-hearted efforts to reach the peasants of the South and the landless rural labourers of the North. Even more unlucky was its aloofness from the millions of salaried workers who belonged to the lower middle class, notably the clerks and technicians. These fell a ready prey to the Nazis in later years. The party realised too late how much the social stratification of all advanced capitalist States has changed since 1847, when Marx first based his entire strategy upon the industrial proletariat.

There is yet another reason why this Socialist Party, which went so far, could go no farther. The population of Germany is sharply divided by religion: a third of it is Catholic, two-thirds Protestant. The Catholics were organised for political purposes in the Centre Party, which had a steady voting strength second only to that of the Social Democrats. It was a mixed party which included men of all classes and many shades of opinion. In numbers the peasants and workers predominated, but a reactionary landlord like von Papen could at times secure a decisive influence within it. It was, on the whole, under the Republic a force for peace and it usually supported moderate social reforms. But it kept its workers and peasants apart from the main body of their class and even maintained separate Catholic Trade Unions. This division greatly weakened the Republic, even when Socialists and Catholics formed a coalition.

What the Social Democratic Party did in 1870 it could not repeat in 1914. With its success it had lost much of its revolutionary ardour. The immense number of its adherents placed a far heavier responsibility on its shoulders, yet it was powerless to influence the hidden forces which fatally plunged Europe into war. By a considerable majority, as every one remembers, the party decided to vote for the war-credits in the Reichstag. Had it then turned militarist and compromised with the Prussian tradition? That would be a harsh verdict. Majorities of the British and French parties also supported the war, though both of them had opposed the policies which led up to it, as the German Social

Democrats had also done. But whatever the origin of the war might be, for both French and German workers the fact which dominated all others was that their country stood in physical danger of invasion. That was the tragedy which overtook all European Socialists. All of them realised, more or less clearly, that this war had its origin in imperial rivalries bred by a capitalist economy, yet none of them could disobey the first imperious call to defend the Fatherland.

In 1914 the war wore two very different aspects, according as one viewed it from the longitude of London or that of Berlin. The average English worker saw only the unprovoked attack on neutral Belgium. But all that the average German worker clearly understood was that Russia precipitated the struggle by her general mobilisation. He realised that the Tsar's armies might invade Eastern Germany, as in fact they presently did. The Russian steam-roller was on the move. German Socialists saw in this brutal and reactionary Power, as Marx and Engels did in their day, the worst of the perils which threatened the future of the workers' movement. Had it not drowned the first stirrings of its own workers in blood?

In every country Socialists were entangled in a hopeless and insoluble contradiction, and nowhere did they emerge from it untarnished. What may fairly be said of the Germans is that after this first deplorable decision, the opposition to the war steadily gained strength in their ranks and had its influence also on the conduct of the majority, which never accepted the war-aims of the imperialist ruling class. No one ought to forget that the ablest members of the movement belonged to the Opposition: in Germany, Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Mehring, Kautsky, Haase, Hilferding, Bernstein, Breitscheid, Ledebour and Kurt Eisner; in Austria, Friedrich Adler, Robert Danneberg, Otto Bauer. In January 1917, that is to say while German armies were everywhere victorious, the Social Democratic members of the Prussian Diet introduced a finely conceived resolution in which they called for the renunciation of all annexations, the unrestricted restoration of Belgium's independence with redress for her wrongs, and a peace offer on this basis. "Nowhere," they declared, "has this

war been willed by the peoples. Everywhere the masses are demanding the end of this horrible carnage." The party was now split, and the Independents used their freedom boldly. The sailors of the Fleet joined the new party in large numbers in spite of mass arrests and mass trials. A strike movement with openly political aims had already begun in the summer of 1916, and it broke out again in April 1917 on a still larger scale. But it was in the winter that the militant peace movement among the German workers reached its full height. In the field the Kaiser's armies were still everywhere victorious. Russia had gone out of the war and Italy was prostrate. In December 1917, at Brest-Litovsk, Trotsky faced the doom which Ludendorff designed for the Soviets and made his first appeal to the German masses against the greed and insolence of their rulers. Their response came in January 1918 in a series of strikes that swept every city where German was spoken, from the Prussian capital to Vienna. Sober chroniclers have stated that a million men and women struck for a week in Berlin alone. The German workers fought when they believed that the war was one of defence and downed tools when they grasped its imperialist aims.

The revolution which ended the Empire in November 1918 was not solely the consequence of defeat: it was the culmination of a revolt against the war itself which began in the atmosphere of victory.

## THE RULING CLASS SURVIVES

THIS DIGRESSION into forgotten history may have served the purpose of revealing the normal working of the peculiar class structure of the German Reich. The facts are known. We can distinguish what each stratum of this society thought and did. It was not a totalitarian State, and even in war-time each class could and did act for itself. There was considerable freedom of discussion and a party of opposition could be openly formed. Not even of the ruling class can it be said that it marched unhesitat-

ingly into the first World War. In Mr. Lloyd George's phrase it "staggered and stumbled" into it. Even the Kaiser, a vain and impulsive romantic, made an effort to avert it: the decisive push came from the Junker High Command, which also gave to the war what seemed to us in that comparatively civilised era its peculiarly ruthless character.\* The other half of the ruling class, Big Business, prescribed the war-aims, which did not lack a sinister intelligence. From France it wanted the good iron-ore of Briey: from Russia the black earth and minerals of the Ukraine; but chiefly it wished to organise the greater part of the Continent, *Mittleuropa*, as the economic sphere of interest of its cartels.

A revolution followed that war and then, after an interval of fourteen years, a counter-revolution. Startling changes have transformed nearly every aspect of German society. But has there been any fundamental change in its class-structure? The middle class, as we saw, was always weak and diffident. It grew weaker still, because it lost its savings and lowered its standards during the ruinous period of inflation. The organised workers gained a considerable influence under the Republic, which they totally lost when their votes and their rights of association vanished under the Nazi dictatorship. But the Junkers still retained their great estates and commanded the army, while Big Business remained in control of the heavy industries. The Nazi party belonged by the origin of its leaders to neither of these social strata: it lacked all the better moral and intellectual elements of the aristocratic tradition: its specialty was a demagogic technique that broke with all the decencies and restraints of the older Germany. It was capable of assassinating a general and driving a millionaire into exile with a ruthlessness that taught everyone to bow to its omnipotence. None the less, in its own reckless and ugly way, it was serving the purposes of both halves of the ruling class, whose marriage it did not dissolve. It modernised the army, but the generals were still drawn, with few exceptions,

\*For a full and scrupulously impartial study of German behaviour in the last war, see *Need Germany Survive?* by Julius Braunthal (Gollancz).

from the Junker caste, though those who rose to the top and stayed there had adopted Nazi ideology. While Hitler himself disdained economics, pursued power for its own sake and thought of himself as the restorer of the Holy Roman Empire of the Middle Ages, he was in fact realising on a bigger scale and at a demonic tempo the aims which Big Business imposed on the Reich during the first World War. His New European Order was merely an inflated and reckless version of *Mittleuropa*. This ruling class used the Nazis for its own permanent ends, much as it had used the Hohenzollerns.

It would be tempting to discuss in detail the causes of the failure of the Weimar Republic. They were complex, while our brief analysis must risk the mistakes of over-simplification. Born in defeat, loaded with the war-guilt of the Emperor it had overthrown and banished, burdened with the ruinous stupidities of an impossible indemnity, provoked by the harsh militarism of M. Poincaré in the Rhineland and the Ruhr, and excluded for six years from the League of Nations, this Republic never had a chance. After fighting a war to make the world safe for democracy, the victors loaded the dice against this democratic experiment. They allowed it no success. It failed in all its efforts to secure a revision of the Treaty of Versailles by persuasion. But what the victors would not give to Hermann Müller and Stresemann, they conceded to von Papen and allowed Hitler to snatch. At every turn they justified his cynical thesis that nothing succeeds in this world like force and "brutality"—his favourite word.

Weimar failed, however, primarily because it was not what anyone wanted. This Liberal Republic would satisfy neither the workers whose ideal was some form of Socialism, nor the Conservatives, who cherished the Prussian tradition. The genuine Liberals were a small and dwindling minority. But few of us do justice to the positive achievements of Weimar. It has to its credit much admirable social legislation. It created Works' Councils; it made the eight hour day universal; it did much for the emancipation of women; it evolved a model medical service based on health insurance. But the political leaders who shaped it were, on the whole, second-rate and its parties lacked experience. The ablest of



these leaders, Stresemann, died when he was most needed, and assassination decimated the democratic ranks. Erzberger, Rathenau, Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Haase and Kurt Eisner were only the most conspicuous victims, for every city suffered, and the local leaders murdered in the Weimar period have been reckoned at over three hundred. From first to last, the working class was split and all but neutralised by the ruinous feud between Social Democrats and Communists. For almost three years before the end, the constitution had ceased to function normally and the last republican Chancellor had to govern by emergency decrees, much as Daladier did in the twilight of the Third Republic in France. Liberal democracy in Germany foundered in the World Slump. The elections that punctuated and measured its decline prove that Germans were losing faith in it long before Hitler ventured to occupy the dejected citadel; it knew that it was beaten before the battle was joined.

The decisive fact, if we are considering the "character" of German society, yesterday, to-day and to-morrow, is that the revolution of 1918 left its class structure substantially unchanged. That explains, in part at least, why the Republic made so poor a fight against the Nazis: it went into the battle with all the vital strategical positions in the enemy's hands. It also explains, in part at least, why it failed so lamentably to cope with the slump that fell upon it at the end of 1929. It could not react as the New Dealers did in America. It did not "prime the pump." It shrank from any big programme of public works. It deflated with harsh consistency and had no expedient save to cut wages, salaries and "the dole," thereby intensifying the misery and the panic. When the final crisis began in 1932 with von Papen as Chancellor, and everyone knew, or should have known, that the triumph of the Nazis was imminent, the balance of power—which is not the same thing as the counting of heads—was seen to be loaded against democracy.

Let us see how the balance of power stood. The President was Hindenburg, a typical Junker, who lived for the army. When in July 1932 he allowed von Papen to overthrow the Socialist Ministers of Prussia, Braun and Severing, who might have held the

fort against the Nazis—for they still held office in the Diet against a divided Opposition and controlled a loyal police-force—the doubtful constitutionality of his action had to be tested in a Supreme Court on which there sat not a single judge of republican principles. Next, when the Left had to decide whether it would call out the young workers and fight the Nazi storm-troops, or whether it should risk a general strike, it was paralysed by the knowledge that the Reichswehr under Junker leadership would obey Hindenburg; if it did not fraternise with the Nazis, it would not oppose them. Finally, during the fatal years of the slump, the Nazis owed much of their success to the lavish subsidies they drew from Thyssen, Kirdorf, Vögler, Schröder and other captains of heavy industry and banking. Allow what you will for Hitler's oratory, Goebbels' flair for propaganda, and the appeal of their heady doctrine to the more ignorant sections of the younger generation; they could not have won their way without the money that enabled them to run costly popular newspapers, dress their young men in showy uniforms and feed the unemployed in their soup-kitchens. They bought and yelled their way to power. Why heavy industry used them to crush the pacific and democratic republic is clear. It wanted to destroy the trade unions and to recover its prosperity by rearmament. So we face the fact that the revolution doomed its own work, its own faith and the class that made it, because it left the Junker half of the ruling class in possession of its estates and in control of the army and the courts, while monopolistic Big Business retained its real economic power through the ownership of its swollen productive apparatus.

It is hardly relevant to our present purpose to enquire why the leaders of the moderate "majority" Social Democrats failed. But at one of the reasons that led them to shrink from any revolutionary transformation we must glance. Early in 1919 I talked the matter over with Hermann Müller, who afterwards became Chancellor of the Reich. When I put the case to him, as I saw it, for breaking the power of the two leading sections of the old ruling class by socialising the Junker estates and the coal mines, he replied that any "bolshevik" departure of this kind would incur

the severe displeasure of the victor Powers, which at that time held Germany tightly in their grip under the still existing blockade. Further, he doubted whether socialised industries would be efficient enough to keep up the flow of exports required for reparations. This was an excuse; these leaders felt no urge to risk a policy of socialisation, but it was none the less a valid excuse. I learned enough in Vienna and Budapest, early in 1919, to realise that the victors did use precisely such methods of economic pressure as Müller anticipated to stave off any "red" developments in Central Europe. This precedent should serve us as a warning for the future. Nor was the German Government a free agent in dealing with the army. It had imposed on it by the Versailles Treaty a long-service professional army. Such a force could hardly fail to be reactionary. It is arguable that a Home Guard or a Militia of the Swiss type might have presented fewer dangers to German democracy and the peace of Europe. There can be little doubt that the victors saw in this professional Reichswehr a safeguard for property and a dyke against the red flood they dreaded. This matter also I talked over with Hermann Müller. I reminded him that the Austrians had created their own socialist militia, the *Volkswehr*, under socialist commanders. I put it to him that his party might call on its own young men to enlist in the Reichswehr. He replied that its young men hated barrack life and all the associations of a standing army; they could not be induced to enlist. What he did not say, I must supply: these moderate Social Democratic leaders found the ruthless Junker soldiers useful for the bloody suppression of the extreme Left Wing. The sinister Noske turned his back while they murdered the bravest of the radical leaders. And so it came about that the army was abandoned to the militarists and the enemies of the Republic.

Among the ill effects that followed, we must reckon the persistent work of the High Command in evading the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty. It is not easy to measure exactly what was achieved in this way. There was, of course, no open or general re-armament. That came only after Hitler's rise to power, and even then two years elapsed before he adopted conscription

and publicly paraded his tanks and military planes. Under the Republic, plans for the future were quietly worked out. After the Treaty of Rapallo, the High Command took advantage of its close relations with the Red Army—so close that some observers suspected a secret military alliance—to experiment with new types of arms, which were manufactured and tested under its supervision in Russian factories. The staff continued its studies and training for a future war—as all staffs do. The training and period of service of the non-commissioned officers and men was so manipulated that large numbers were qualified to serve as the cadres of a much bigger force—obviously a preliminary to the eventual expansion of the Reichswehr into a conscript army. In short, the Junkers, without openly defying the Treaty, worked for the future, much as their forefathers had done when Napoleon disarmed Prussia. Some arms certainly were hidden, but not on a scale that could matter in a modern war. There were also several “para-military” formations, notably the *Stahlhelm*, a legion of veterans with a youth contingent, which paraded in uniform though without arms. More important were the Nazi storm-troopers, but even they were armed chiefly with rubber truncheons, hand grenades and revolvers. These forces were raised for the internal class-war. The record of the Republic in this matter is far from clean. But when all is said, the outstanding fact still is, that until it was overthrown, Germany had no air force, no submarines and no mechanised army.

## HITLER'S RISE TO POWER

**I**T WAS the fatal balance of class power which doomed the Republic and gave the Nazis mastery not merely of the German State but of all Germany's resources. None the less, we have to face the fact that they were confirmed in office by a vote of the electorate. What did this mean? Did it, to put the question more precisely, confer on Hitler a mandate for the policy which culminated in the second World War?

No one who lived through the crisis which ended in Hitler's assumption of power in the opening of 1933 could doubt that one single absorbing issue preoccupied the German people—the Slump. The dictated peace was not the first thing in their thoughts. The occupation of the Rhineland had come to an end. The Lausanne Conference had recognised that reparations could no longer be imposed. It is true that one survival of Versailles still galled the Germans—their unequal status. I doubt whether at this time the average German wished to be heavily armed, but he resented the discrimination which allowed all his neighbours to arm and denied to him even the means of defence. Conservatives felt this hotly and so did the younger generation of the middle class. This grievance—a sense of imposed inferiority—may have swelled the Nazi poll. But the tests furnished by the numerous elections of these years point to another explanation. Up to 1929 the Nazis were a nuisance but hardly a danger to the Republic. Suddenly in that year, as the slump set in, their following began to grow and went on growing with alarming rapidity, until they were the biggest party in the electorate. They grew as despair gripped the German people. The world-wide depression hit Germany, a country with no reserves of economic strength, with a fury that had no parallel elsewhere. Industrial production, measured against the level of 1929 (100 per cent.), fell in Britain to 83.5 per cent., in Germany to 53.3 per cent. The wholly unemployed in 1932 numbered in Germany 6,750,000, which means 34 per cent. of the non-agricultural population. The corresponding figure in Great Britain was 16.8 per cent. But such figures fail to measure the catastrophe. Most of those who remained in work were on part-time, and their wage-rates were also cut, as were salaries and benefits. During the winter of 1932 less than a quarter of the membership of the labor unions was fully employed, while wages had been cut by two-fifths, measured against the level of 1929. The fall of agricultural prices struck down the peasants, while the plight of the shopkeeper reflected the general ruin. No one knew what to do. The orthodox economists were manifestly helpless. Neither of the workers' parties had any positive policy in this crisis: still less could they agree on a policy. Their feud

had exhausted them and deprived them of the initiative. To turn to the Reichstag was useless; it had become so difficult to manage that few blamed Dr. Brüning when he used the emergency clauses of the Constitution and summoned it only at long intervals. For the mass of Germans the Republic was still an experiment: it had no proud traditions and no reserves of loyalty on which to draw: it was assailed, moreover, as much by the Communists on the Left as by the Nazis on the Right. The general mood was one of panic, and the neurotic depression revealed itself in a lack of balance that took many forms: some of them tragic and some ridiculous. Every sort of Messiah, cheap-jack and charlatan could collect a following. There were continual political murders and bloody riots in the streets, for the tactics of the Nazis were by every conceivable means to raise the temperature of the fever-stricken patient. In January 1933, Hindenburg, acting for the Junkers, conferred power on Hitler, who formed a government with the participation of their party, the German Nationalists, though he had as yet no majority. The Reichstag was then dissolved. On the eve of the fatal general election in March, Goering redoubled the panic by burning down the Reichstag, which was, he declared, the signal prearranged by the Communists for a world-wide revolution. Needless to say, the election held in this Bedlam was not free. The Nazis monopolised the wireless and intimidated the Press. Before the poll they arrested all the Communist candidates and many of the Socialists and started their tactics of terror by beating up the more courageous of their opponents. In spite of all this, they did not secure a majority: they polled 44 per cent. of the votes cast—if we may trust their figures and their counting. They had, however, the support of the German National Party and the combined poll of both parties amounted to 51.7 per cent. That majority of 1.7 per cent. put Hitler into power beyond recall. These German Nationals were die-hard Conservatives, Junkers, Lutheran pastors, civil servants, professors and industrialists, often monarchists, always extreme nationalists with a contempt for the pacific Republic; but they were not Nazis. The astonishing thing was that the working

class vote, taking Socialists and Communists together, still totalled twelve millions.

The positive significance of the poll was that since no one else could cure unemployment, a bare majority decided to give Hitler his chance, for he said he had a plan. In fact he had; and it worked to perfection. In a few months all Germany was busy—so busy that, as the years went on, foreign labour had to be called in. The plan was rearmament.

That Hitler ruled by terror everyone knows, suppressing every whisper of opposition in private as in public; while every form of free association was destroyed. On the Press and the radio Goebbels played, as he once boasted, as he plays on his piano. But that is not the whole explanation of the permanence of the new regime. It did bring the workers security and even freedom from want. The standard of life remained stagnant at the low level to which it dropped during the slump, but there was no more unemployment, and the epidemic of bankruptcies ceased. There was much else that was popular and some few innovations were good. There were the splendid motor roads. The astonishingly cheap holidays and foreign excursions, organised by *Kraft durch Freude*, opened a new and dazzling world to the masses. They had never travelled abroad before; but now, as they visited Norway and Italy, they lost something of their old sense of inferiority against the more privileged classes. There was much building, though the housing schemes were dropped in favour of vast spectacular erections for sport and public business. The swindler's promise of a cheap car, the *Volkswagen*, for every family in the Reich was alluring, and it took long before the simple workers discovered that all the cars made in Germany were designed, like the roads, for war. Something was done to break down the old-world lines of class. In their place, however, was erected a hierarchy, based on each man's grade in the omnipotent party, which behaved with an offensive arrogance incomparably worse than anything Germans had endured in the past. But everything succeeded that Hitler attempted, and Germans had the satisfaction of feeling, after fourteen years of humiliation and restraint, that their country was again a Great Power, which

could extort respect and was even courted. The era of impotence and frustration was over. The fetters of Versailles were struck off and the whole German family re-united within the Reich. It is not surprising that the mass of average men were dazzled for a time by an achievement so astonishing, even if the wiser few realised that much of priceless value had been lost.

The character of the Nazi regime changed abruptly in June 1934, when Hitler murdered such leaders of his Left Wing as Roehm and Heines with many hundreds of their followers. After this purge he announced that the revolutionary period had come to an end. The radical items in his programme were silently dropped. At this time, and for another year or two, he probably had the mass of the German nation behind him. But after 1935 many of the workers who had rallied to him must have begun to desert him, for the Labour Front no longer allowed the Works Councils in the factories to be chosen by election. From 1936 onwards it is doubtful whether the mass of the nation retained its confidence in the Party: the more intelligent part of it felt a growing anxiety and a stifling fear. But still the average man acquiesced in the dictatorship of the omnipotent Führer.

Must we conclude, then, that this same average mass acquiesced in the fatal drive towards war? By no means. Very slowly and gradually it learnt much, though by no means all, about the war-like preparations. But it believed that Hitler could always measure the risks to a nicety and gain his ends by bluff and a bloodless parade of force. That technique succeeded perfectly in the Rhineland and in Austria, at Munich and even in the seizure of Prague. Nor should it be forgotten that in nearly all his innumerable speeches, on the eve of his capture of power and for years after it, Hitler talked peace like any Quaker. The thing was done with a skill and even with a pathos that might well deceive the Germans, as it deceived most British Tories. How often did he describe the misery in the trenches; how often did he promise that no German mother should wear mourning by his act; how often did he vow "never again"? What he himself really intended we can only guess. Of course he meant to fight the Poles, unless they yielded—a short and easy enterprise. Doubtless from the first



he meant one day to fight the Russians, whom he grossly underestimated. But it is probable that he never believed that war with Britain and France was inevitable, and he may have been as sincere as his twisted nature can ever be in his offers of an alliance to England. But unlimited power and the overlordship over Europe—that assuredly, at any cost in blood, ruin and misery, he meant to win. For that purpose the ruling classes were ready to back him.

But the question whether the average, decent German acquiesced is really meaningless. There was nothing else he could do. In that last election of 1933 the die was cast: once the dictatorship was established there could be no turning back. Few of us, unless we have chanced to live for a time under an efficient tyranny, can grasp the complete helplessness of the individual citizen. Every possibility of acting with his fellows is closed to him. No group of like-minded men, party comrades, trade unionist brothers or members of his church, stand around him to protect him or second him. He is a lonely atom, isolated in space.\* A pervasive organisation has him in its grip: he cannot question it or argue with it: it is everywhere and all-powerful; it alone can act. It spies on him even in his home: listens to his talk in workshop, pub and café; reads his letters; forces him to realise that there is no one he can trust, neither relative, neighbour nor stranger. That he cannot act is serious; but as time goes on, he loses even the capacity to think. He does not know what is happening in the world, nor what other men are thinking

\*To illustrate how this atomisation of society worked, I may give this experience of my own in Italy, where conditions were similar but far less severe. I spent a day with a manufacturer, the head of an old family business in a small town. I pressed him to tell me what the attitude of its population was towards Mussolini's regime. He declared that he did not know. So I asked him what his close friends and relatives thought of it. He replied that he had a large circle of friends and relatives, who met every Sunday evening in his house; but he did not know their political views and never tried to discover them. He did not even know his brother's views. And this had gone on for many years. To me he was frank: he was still a Liberal and detested the Fascist regime.

in Germany or abroad. He has no picture of contemporary history he can trust. He knows or suspects that all the news and views served out to him are lies, half-truths or interested distortions. How then in this twilight can he act? He ends by acquiescing in his own helplessness, abandons public affairs to the omnipotent Party and consoles himself with music, chess and family life, until war wrecks that also.

This average man in the street knows very little of the worst iniquities the dictatorship is perpetrating.\* He might learn something by talking to his former Socialist or Jewish friends; but that is far too dangerous, if he wishes to keep his job and avoid a beating—if, indeed, he wishes to keep his life. He is aware of what happens to those who know too much. Individual lives under the Nazis have no value. To take an actual case of which I have knowledge: a young dressmaker, who had no interest in politics, was last seen in the company of her betrothed, an S.S. man, in one of the cafés of her home town. Her mother's inquiries could discover no trace of her. A week later a casket was brought to the mother's door by a young man in uniform, with the words: "the ashes of your daughter, Mrs. M." The casket bore a number drawn with chalk. That was all; not even an inquest. Friends guessed that the girl may have heard one of the secrets of the S.S. From this Nazi world the very conception of right has vanished. But security from actual want there is, for those who obey in silence.

\* The authors of the Chatham House Report, *The Problem of Germany*, quote (p. 65) a "qualified observer" as follows: "A study of German propaganda during the war shows that these horrors are carefully concealed from the German people, and that they are consistently told that the German authorities behave with humanity and strictly observe the principles of international law."

There is some evidence to the same effect in *This is the Enemy*, edited by F. Oechsner, a joint production of five American journalists who worked in Berlin up to the attack on Pearl Harbour. They write (p. 118) "The persecution of the Jews was never actually popular with the great mass of the German people, but they did nothing to try to stop it. The fearful mass slaughters of Jews in the occupied Eastern territories were almost unknown in the Reich itself."

The astonishing thing is not that the majority of Germans under such a tyranny are helpless, obedient and silent. The miracle is that so many have risked not merely imprisonment but torture and the block. Only Himmler knows how many have dared to say or do something which led to their incarceration in a concentration camp. Two well-informed organisations friendly to the underground movement estimated the figure as it stood before the war at two millions. A hostile expert put it at 1,500,000. The total must be several times greater now. In no country would a larger number of men and women face not merely death but torture voluntarily, in loneliness, under conditions when any action at all must seem a useless and disreputable form of suicide. The average man faces death of his own free will only when he does it in uniform and in step with his fellows, for his country which will honour him as a hero. Yet at the rate of about two thousand men and women every year Germans are going to the block for an idea.\*

Underground agitation has gone on all the time, albeit on a small scale. Illegal literature was smuggled into Germany and circulated with great ingenuity and at a terrible risk. Sabotage was organised. For long this was the work of former Socialists and Communists. But in the spring of 1943 a widespread movement, led by Hans and Sophia Scholl, was discovered among the students of Munich University, which had its ramifications elsewhere. Six

\*Again we do not know the figures, but by searching the files of the Nazi press we can get some idea of their scale. Thus in a single week, from September 18, 1942, thirty-six persons were executed on various political charges, mostly high treason or active work for the Communist Party. During October and November 1942, according to the same sources, 364 persons were executed for these and similar offences. Ten of them were high Bavarian Civil Servants. At this rate over two thousand would be hanged in a year. I have taken these figures from *Was wird aus Deutschland?* by Paul Merker (pp. 39-40).

Another sober estimate has been made by Fritz Kramer, a leader of the German Railwaymen's Trade Union. (Supplement to *The Left News*, October 1943). He states that about 1½ million "Left oppositionists" have passed through the Gestapo's hands in "preventive custody", while over 12,000 members of the Opposition have been executed.

students and Professor Huber were executed; many more were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. The available evidence suggests that most of their fellow-students were in sympathy with them. They organised sabotage and in their leaflets called not only for a restoration of freedom and civilised morality in Germany but also for the liberation of Europe from Nazi slavery. Youth is often brave and sometimes rash: perhaps these students were as far ahead of their elders in their thinking as they were in their courage. But I have seen evidence which convinced me that the older workers, who had their training in the Socialist and Communist movements and voted solidly against the Nazis even in the terror of 1933, have not forgotten all they once held true—at all events in the more advanced cities.\* It is probable that the majority of the German people would wish to throw off the Nazi yoke, if they knew how to do it. What deters them is not merely

\* A Jewish engineer who escaped from Germany related his experiences during the winter of 1941-42 to members of the underground organisation, *Neu-Beginnen*. He was sent to work in a big engineering plant in Hamburg. The men went out of their way to show him kindness because he was a Jew. Many gave him presents of fruit which Jews may not buy. They soon talked freely to him, because he was a Jew and an outlaw, who could not denounce them, and he gradually realised that virtually all the men in one of the biggest concerns of its kind were opposed to the Nazis. The atmosphere was eased because all the younger men, many of whom were Nazis, had been mobilised. Later he was one of a team which had to travel daily to do some work at a distance for the army. In the bus they openly abused not only the Nazi Party but Hitler and expressed their violent opposition to the war, of which they always spoke as "their war", i.e., the Nazis' war. At their destination the soldiers on guard, also middle-aged men, went out of their way to be friendly to a Jew. It should be said that Hamburg was always the most progressive of German towns, but Berlin and the Ruhr towns were not far behind it.

A much more recent account came in April 1944 through the International Transport Workers' Federation from a foreigner, known to it, who worked two years in Berlin. In a factory where he was employed, the 40 German workers included 2 Nazis, 2 Communists and 3 Social Democrats. All the rest were opposed to the Nazi regime but "did not want to hear of the old parties." Scanty though this evidence is, it may give a true impression of working-class opinion.

the fear of a ruthless and omnipotent tyranny, nor solely the difficulty of finding leaders and improvising an organisation. They await some assurance from the United Nations that if they do break the national unity, they may count on a tolerable future for a transformed Germany.

The reader, familiar all his days with life in a free country, may still feel sceptical on one point at least, which concerns us all vitally. Could Hitler have waged this war for so long with such success, unless he had had the mass of the German people behind him? The evidence about the state of mind of the civilian population does not bear that out. During the mobilisation at the Munich crisis the more experienced newspaper correspondents described the general gloom and dejection. From several similar reports \* on public feeling when this war began with the march into Poland, we may pick out the emphatic evidence of that able American journalist, William Shirer, who wrote in his *Berlin Diary* that the reaction of the population of the capital to the war "...has been the most striking demonstration against war I've ever seen." That is not how wars begin when the mass of a nation is bent on aggression. Opinion in Germany is largely determined by a man's age. An intelligence officer, whose duty it was to examine German prisoners early in this war, reported that most of the men below twenty-seven had a Nazi outlook, but few above that age showed signs of it. Certainly the picked troops of the mechanised forces, the airmen, with the crews of the tanks and the U-boats were usually arrogant and decided Nazis. They had been conditioned for aggressive war in mind and body by their training in the Hitler Youth, even before they entered the army. Many, perhaps most of them, swallowed the whole Nazi doctrine of racial ascendancy and Nordic brutality. But there is some evidence that the youngest group, lads round about twenty, have begun to react decidedly against the whole Nazi ideology, as the Munich students are doing. That young men

\* The observers on the spot were on this point unanimous. See Chatham House report, *The Problem Of Germany*, p. 26.

of a virile nation fight well, when they are actually up against the enemy, does not necessarily mean that they approve of the war, still less that they willed it. Armies possess a corporate consciousness of their own and good soldiers know that it is actually safer to fight steadily than to run.

Unwilling recruits can be drilled into fighting. In the later years of this war Polish and Czech conscripts have been used in considerable numbers in mixed combatant units on the Eastern Front. As for the men and women who make munitions, they will starve if they don't. Even the French workers have had to do that.

It is well that we should realise how scanty and one-sided the material was on which even the intelligent German citizen had to form his opinion on the merits and origins of this war. For months before the wanton attack on Poland, he read daily accounts in hectic language of frontier incidents in which the Poles were always presented as the aggressors. Then came lurid stories of atrocities on a large scale practised by the Poles on the German minority in Poland. On the eve of the attack the German government published a surprisingly reasonable set of terms for the solution of all the outstanding problems. Germans were led to believe that the Poles rejected this fair offer or refused to discuss it. In point of fact it never reached Warsaw. Finally, it was reported that the Poles began the attack. What could the average citizen make of all this? Even if he felt sceptical, no questions, no debate, and assuredly no protest would have been tolerated or could have been organised.

The clearest evidence that a big and growing proportion of the German people is not behind the Nazi war is that the means of repression have had to be strengthened, while Hitler himself in public speeches has had to threaten harsher measures and call for severer penalties. Would Himmler require a formidable army of his own, the Waffen S.S., amounting to 350,000 men, equipped with tanks and artillery, if in fact all Germany were solidly behind the Führer? The political police, with the armed party formations, employed in coercing the civilian population in the German homeland is thought on a sober estimate to number

900,000 men; this figure does not include the ordinary police.\* This big force of active men in the prime of life was kept in Germany even in the later phases of the war, when all the manpower that could be mustered was needed on the Russian front. There is a simple way of measuring the significance of these figures. If Americans were to discover that it took, say half-a-million armed specialists in addition to the army, the Home Guard and the police, to keep Englishmen outwardly loyal in their island, would anyone in his senses argue that they were faithful to Mr. Churchill and that they approved of the war?

\*The details justifying this estimate will be found in a careful and well-informed book, *German Home Front*, by Dr. W. W. Schütz. The machine of coercion on the home front comprises 250,000 S. S. troops, 400,000 S. A. militia, and 250,000 special Gestapo police—all volunteers and party members. The Waffen S.S. of 350,000 men is chiefly on the Russian front.

### III: *The Transition from War to Peace*

**W**E HAVE made our diagnosis; what political conclusion follows?

If a radical change in her class structure is necessary before Germany can become a loyal member of the European family, are we to use our military power to dictate it? It would be easy to justify such a surgical operation by the law of self-preservation.

There are, however, reasons which tell against dictation. Nationalism is a barbaric anachronism in this modern world; but it is not yet a spent force. If measures of socialisation were imposed on German heavy industry by external force, they would provoke a reaction fierce enough to wreck them. To convince the Germans that a good motive inspired them would be difficult, so long as the British ruling class remains in possession of its broad acres and key industries. A revolutionary army which swept across Europe preaching its own ideas as it marched, could do this thing. The men of 1793 did it to the tune of the *Marseillaise*, but they had first deposed their feudal class at home. Armies which fight to preserve "traditional England" and "the American way of life" cannot do it.

But this argument is superfluous. The architects of British and American policy mean to destroy the Nazi system and the Nazi Party, but it will be no part of their purpose to further any change in the German class-structure, and still less to impose it. The stress will be laid in all they can do on the maintenance of law and order. In so far as they intervene in German internal affairs, their influence is likely to be conservative. The inspiring idea of the elaborate military administration which is to govern Europe during the period of transition from war to peace is that revolution must be prevented at any cost. It is significant that a leading banker of the City of London, Lord Rennell of Rodd, was chosen



as its head in Italy. His two lieutenants held between them directorships in seventeen companies.

What we may expect in Germany and elsewhere is, then, that the right of the peoples to self-determination will be recognised in formal terms, subject to the reservation that the restoration of a regime of the Nazi type would not be tolerated. With this exception, their freedom of choice will not be limited. But when this has been said, any realistic survey of the future will start from the fact that throughout the transitional period, if for no longer, the victorious Great Powers will have in their hands the means of influencing the popular decision. Freely though men may vote, it cannot be in a vacuum. During the military occupation representatives of London, Washington and Moscow will together wield dictatorial powers. At some stage they will have to recognise a provisional German government. This means, within certain limits, that they will select a government by rejecting any administration of which they disapprove. They can, again within certain limits, determine the character of this government by adjusting the peace terms to its complexion. At every stage they can exert pressure by dealing out raw materials and credits with a liberal or niggardly hand. They can in this way grant or deny the right to work; which means that, for a time at least, they can shape a starving and helpless Continent as they please. This looks like omnipotence, until we notice that the Creator is a Trinity. It is easy to forecast the main tendencies of Anglo-American policy. Russia has as yet disclosed her policy only in certain details affecting war-criminals and indemnities. Whether she has decided views affecting other aspects of the German settlement we do not yet know. It is reasonably certain that she has no thought of promoting a communistic revolution.

The probability is, then, that the forces most strongly entrenched in London and Washington will try to preserve the class-structure of Germany, and indeed of Europe, much as it was. This is a fatal policy, which will once again, after a restless interval of uncertain length, set going the *perpetuum mobile* of war. How far the democratic parties can bias the policy of the occupation and the settlement in their own sense is a delicate

tactical question, which cannot be decided in advance. But one thing must be said now and with emphasis: it is the duty of the Labour Movements of Britain and America to use all their influence, in public and behind the scenes, singly, jointly and in concert with the Russians, to prevent the use of these tremendous powers against those Germans who may strive to bring about a healthier balance of forces in their own country. A social revolution in Germany is the indispensable condition of European peace. If the Left is not strong enough to impose on the Allied Governments a positively helpful attitude towards the struggling pioneers of renovation, then let it use all its strength to remove hindrances from their path.

The purpose of this essay is to discuss the policy which should guide the United Nations in the transition from war to peace. But the war in Europe is still raging and the enemy may still be capable of a bitter resistance. The military conduct of the struggle does not concern us here. What does concern us, however, is the use of the political weapon. This has been unduly neglected. It may be that the man-power and industrial resources of the United Nations are equal to the task of ending Germany's resistance by the sheer weight of the metal and explosives they can hurl upon her cities and her armies. It is necessary that the defeat of this evil Fascist Power should be indubitable and complete. But no civilised mind can contemplate with complacency the prolongation of the struggle by a single unnecessary day: the cost to ourselves and the Russians in gallant lives has first to be reckoned, together with the material burden of debt. More painful still is the cost which the populations of occupied Europe must bear in privations, oppressions and humiliations. The effect of our blockade, in combination with the enemy's ruthlessness, is to sap the stamina and the physical basis of resistance of the adults, while the children perish in great numbers; or, if they survive, grow up with physical defects and mental abnormalities from which they may never wholly recover. The sufferings of these years will lower the vitality of all European peoples throughout the life of this afflicted generation and far beyond it. The longer the ordeal lasts, the less will be the capacity of the liber-

ated peoples to handle the complex tasks that face them. The destruction of Germany's resources by any needless prolongation of the war must delay the recovery of the rest of the Continent. Her equipment should have its uses in rebuilding devastated Russia. If the war is fought out to the bitter end, will it necessarily be the worst Germans who will die in the last ditch? It is commonly the best and most public-spirited of a nation's young men who fight with the greatest stubbornness, if honourable terms of capitulation are refused. It is the meaner types who manage to survive in a funk-hole.

It is the policy of the United Nations, as Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt announced at Casablanca, to insist on the unconditional surrender of the enemy. This unfortunate phrase stands in need of interpretation. If it means that the Allies will not negotiate either with Hitler or his lieutenants, all of us are agreed. Our concern is not for them, nor for that corrupt part of the German people which shared their creed and served their ambitions. Our concern is solely for the better elements which gladly would throw off their yoke, if an honourable way were open to them. To negotiate with these elements may be impossible, for they are not yet in control of the enemy's armies or territory, and it cannot be assumed that they will be able to carry out, now or hereafter, a successful revolution. None the less, it may be in their power to undermine the hold of the Nazis over the armies and the civil population, to lessen their capacity to fight on—perhaps by strikes, sabotage, mutinies and desertions, but at least by creating a state of mind unfavourable to a stubborn resistance.

This they will do only if they believe that the victory of the United Nations can prepare the way for a tolerable future. It is, of course, the business of the enemy's propaganda to spread the contrary conviction. In this task it is easy for him to quote or misquote utterances of influential persons and organisations among the United Nations which admirably serve his ends. Some of these propose to dismember Germany's territory or to destroy her industries and in general to prepare for her people a future so dark that no German who respected himself and loved his children would accept it, while he had the strength to fight on. A

manly people will surrender unconditionally only if it is reduced to the last crust and the last cartridge, or if it has reason to trust the fair intentions of its enemies.

Is it really beneath our dignity to define our intentions? If we do not intend to carve up and alienate territory which unquestionably is German, is there any reason why this should not be said with authority? If it is not our purpose to exclude the German people from the economic future summed up in the phrase "freedom from want," which we have in view for the rest of mankind, ought we not to say so? If we propose to disarm the Germans permanently, must they be left to draw the inference that they will always be a subject people which must submit without appeal to the dictation of our armed empires? To us these may seem unnecessary questions: we may feel sure that the leaders of our democracies will act in accordance with the political sagacity that belongs to our tradition. But Germans who have been subjected through ten years to an intensive propaganda which vilified our leaders, our national character, our past history and our present policy will feel less sure. The Versailles Treaty was not an ideal compilation of wisdom, justice and economic sense, and Germans have been taught to think it worse than it was. It would be unwise at this stage to issue any detailed programme; what is required is a statement in general terms, yet definite enough and plain enough to dissipate the graver fears that will induce not the worst but the best Germans to prolong the struggle to the last round. It is not wise to leave any people, even if it be our enemy, without hope.

### AMGOT OR REVOLUTION?

**W**E HAVE now to face the difficult questions that hinge on the Armistice and the Occupation. Much turns on whether the armies that invade Germany advance simultaneously from more than one quarter. Will the victorious Red Army play the major part in the invasion and the Occupation; if so, will the

three Allied Governments and their High Commands act harmoniously on principles accepted by all of them in advance?

When the certainty of defeat faces the Germans, they will break into several sections, which will react each in its own way. The Nazis have intensified the terror, with Himmler in the seat of authority. In the last months of crisis the strategical keys to German politics will be in his hands, so long as he commands the Pretorian Guard, the S.S. There can be no revolution of the masses while its ranks hold together. A revolution, whatever its colour, can begin only after the regular Reichswehr, which has always disliked the Party's Gendarmerie, has destroyed it in pitched battles. This will not be easy, for the Waffen S.S. is a picked, mechanised force, with its Panzer division. The paradox follows that if ever the Germans are to win democracy by their own efforts, the army, while it is still a disciplined force, must strike the first blow under some of its generals. If that were to happen, the floodgates would be open and the masses might regain the capacity to act. The risks in this procedure are obvious: the generals might cling to power. But this is the only possible way to begin.

With a keener desire to shorten the war than is felt in Washington or London, Moscow, which understands the technique of revolution and does not fear it, has done its best to utilise any chance there may be of promoting it. That is the clue to the remarkable manifesto published with startling prominence in *Pravda* on July 21st, 1943. That the Soviet Union is behind it is clear. The Red Army's planes scattered copies of it over the German lines, and the Moscow wireless followed it up with propaganda which filled several hours of broadcasting time daily. The manifesto, over some thirty-three signatures of German soldiers and civilians, was addressed to every section of the German nation. It showed no traces of Communist ideology. It called for a moderate democratic revolution and promised respect for "legally acquired property" as well as for the interests of the workers and the small middle-class. But the first and chief appeal of this skilful document was to the army. After proposing that it should march back to German territory, it recalled the precedent of the

Napoleonic wars, when from Russian soil men who bore the honoured names of Stein, Arndt and Clausewitz appealed for action to the German people, over the head of Prussia's unworthy king. Among the prisoners of war who supported the manifesto were three generals and an airman, Graf von Einsiedel, who is Bismarck's great-grandson. Over the air he has since recalled his ancestor's policy of Russo-German collaboration. This echo of an old tradition may conceivably reach a section of the High Command, which was in close touch with the Red Army under the Weimar Republic and even during the first years of the Nazi regime. Whether the Reichswehr will at any stage before the final collapse turn its arms against the Nazi dictatorship it would be rash to guess. But we may feel reasonably sure that many of the governing class will make ready to turn their coats. It will be the more traditional of the Junkers who incline to listen to the Russians. The Moscow Manifesto bade every soldier choose between the destruction of Germany if they followed Hitler to the end, and a peace, won by revolution, which will restore her to an equal place among the nations. The more adaptable of the Junkers, with their allies of heavy industry, will on the other hand prefer, if the chance is open to them, to make their surrender to the Western Powers. These people, in the days of appeasement, could find their way about the City, nor were they strangers in Whitehall. If they are capable of action they may attempt a *coup d'état* on the model of Badoglio's palace revolution.

I do not pretend that I am yet able to see the policy of the Soviet Union towards Germany as a consistent whole. Since the Moscow Conference Marshal Stalin's tactics have changed abruptly.

We are left reflecting, after his independent essay, on the vastly greater chance there would have been of a successful revolution, if Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt had acted with him. However sceptical we may feel about its prospects, it would be the only satisfactory ending of the war. If the improbable should happen, the duty of every democratic movement is clear. Here would lie the surest hope of a social transformation. To protect it and ensure it every chance of success is at once the most anxious and the

most welcome task that could fall to us. The alternative to a revolution is the direct government of Germany by a military administration of the Allies. But she presents problems, above all economic problems, so complex that inevitably help and advice will have to be sought from some Germans. Which Germans?

## MILITARY ADMINISTRATION

ON THE assumption that no revolutionary movement succeeds, the invading armies, as the power of the Nazis collapses, will enter a country in which no alternative centre of social cohesion exists. The omnipotent Party controlled everything and ran everything, from the ministries in the capital down to the food-rationing office in every village. Nothing was non-political. Everything was staffed with Nazis or with persons wholly subservient to them and everything, including the Code and the Courts of Law, was impregnated with Nazi ideas. This vast and intricate machine, centralised as never before, rested not at all on the respect it commanded, but on the terror its apparatus of coercion inspired, aided by propaganda. When it collapses amid the execrations of its victims, it will not be easy to avert chaos. What organisations can step in to give cohesion, confidence and discipline to the people? Labor Unions there are none, nor elected municipalities. Whatever foreign soldiers may be able to do, they cannot supply leadership.

How the Russians will act if they invade Germany we do not know. The Sicilian precedent offers a working model of the plan which AMGOT, the Anglo-American Military Administration, will follow when it occupies German territory. The Nazi Party will be dissolved—probably a superfluous step, for many of those who adorned it will now disavow it, if they are not in hiding or in flight. In Sicily, most of the officials, including the nominated prefects and mayors, all of them leading fascists, were continued in office. It would be difficult to run the technical services in any other way, for a short time at least. But it is unthinkable that

the political officials, trained through ten years in the arts of brutality and trickery, should exercise any power whatever, even under supervision. In Sicily, the existing legislation remained in force, subject to exceptions. The Nazis have introduced into the criminal and civil codes and the legal procedure, especially in the higher courts, their own conception of Nordic Justice. Every self-respecting German will wish to sweep their work away. Finally in Sicily, all political activities were forbidden, a measure which could not be justified indefinitely, or for long after the fighting has ceased.

What, then, can be suggested? The Weimar Republic left behind it a civilised body of legislation and a humane criminal code. It is not seriously out of date and is familiar to all but the youngest generation. Subject to any necessary exceptions or temporary modifications, it should be restored as the law of the land, until a free Germany can work out a new Constitution. To make of Germany once more a *Rechtsstaat*, a state founded on law, is the chief service we can render to her citizens. This, we may feel sure, is their most ardent wish.

The more difficult problem remains of discovering honest and public-spirited men, free from the stains of the past decade, who can supply leadership and act as political officials under the military authority. Many such men were in prisons or concentration camps, and some of them may still be alive and capable of active service. It should be unnecessary to insist that the camps and prisons must be emptied at once of all political offenders; but seven months passed in North Africa before this first work of liberation was completed. Unless the population is more cowed and exhausted than seems likely, it is probable that the bolder sections of it may have begun to form active organised groups, even before our armies march into a town. In the more radical centres it is fairly certain that in the factories and workshops councils will have been formed. Unless our officers suppress them, these Works' Councils will soon link up, as they did in 1918, to form an *Arbeiter-Rat*, a Workers' Council for the city, which the Commandant should recognise and consult. With his encouragement, various middle-class groups, such as the Chambers of Com-



merce, the professional organisations and perhaps the Churches, might also come together and choose their spokesmen. They will not choose Nazis. Catholics usually improvise an organisation with comparative ease. In this way, within a week or two, a Commandant who wished to win the confidence of the people could get together a provisional municipality, which would be sufficiently representative to act for some time as a City Council, subject to his veto. In constituting it, the results of the last free elections of the Weimar period would give him some guidance. It could then submit to him names of persons suitable for the chief official posts, from Bürgermeister downwards. A similar procedure might be followed in rural districts.

There should be no long delay in lifting the ban on political activities. It cannot be justified after fighting has wholly ceased, if, as is probable, the vast mass of the population is well-disposed towards the army of occupation, or at least tranquil under its administration. If such a prohibition were seriously enforced, we should have to create an elaborate spy system and we should soon be flinging into prison not the Nazis but their opponents. The Nazis will not rally again, until the crimes and disasters they have caused are a distant memory; nor will they do so then, unless the Peace has failed to bring some hope to the German people.

What is to be dreaded is not frank and public opposition, but secret conspiracy. Execrated by most of the workers and by the saner part of the middle class, the Nazis will organise underground. They will have at their disposal most of their old members and a high proportion of the fanatical young men they have educated. A tightly organised minority of determined men can do much to sway opinion, even if it has to rely on whispered talks and a hidden press. Its chief weapon will be terror—sudden assaults in the dark, torture, assassination and blackmail. An organisation of this kind becomes dangerous and even irresistible only when the flabby mass of public opinion swings to it and supports it. That will eventually happen if we leave the former enemy peoples to face the future without hope.

Our first purpose should be to restore the functions normal in

human society. These atoms must come together again, find each other and take their bearings afresh in a world that will be strange to them. The first step is that they should learn what actually has happened and what their rulers have done during the last ten years. This can be achieved by objective wireless talks, books, pamphlets, lectures, films, preferably by Germans. It is perhaps the chief service the exiles can render: the suitable men among them should be helped to return promptly. The most questionable of all the Anglo-American policies applied in the early days to Italy was the ban laid on the return of the refugees. After the unimaginable process of repression Germans have undergone, their first psychological need will be to talk—freely and safely. If we try to check this instinct of expression and fellowship we shall only aggravate the deep neurosis the Nazis have caused. What this sick nation will need is not a policeman but a psychiatrist. The next phase in recovery is that Germans should come together to consider how they will build up their shattered society anew. Only out of free debate can there arise groups and parties capable of constructive action. The most precious gift the Occupation can bring with it will be the right of association and discussion, and this must cover the formation of trade unions no less than of political parties and educational groups.

What restrictions, if any, may be necessary? A military censorship is, of course, inevitable; but after the fighting has ceased, it is unimportant and should be unobtrusive. Its chief function is to deal with anything that could be fairly construed as an incitement to disorder or to the breach of regulations. It ought not to censor expressions of opinion: if that were recognised as any part of its duty, it might come to mean, in practice, chiefly the suppression of Socialist thought. It may be objected that under a regime of freedom Germany will be flooded with Nazi propaganda. How could that come about? The party will be suppressed, its funds confiscated, its press organisations broken up and its leaders under arrest or in flight. Its public activities will have come to an end. But as discussion proceeds, its dupes, if it has any left, ought still to be free to state a case, answer arguments and ask questions. It would be no less unworthy to ram

our own version of recent history into German ears without the right of reply. What Germany most sorely needs is the restoration of her old respect for objectivity and scientific truth, which the Nazis laboured hard to destroy.

## A LONG OCCUPATION?

**H**OW LONG should the Occupation last? By what steps can a National Government emerge from it?

If a genuine democratic revolution should prosper, there would be no need for an occupation at all: AMGOT, at least, would be superfluous, even if some strategic points were held. The revolutionary government would itself undo the past and deal with the Nazis more effectively than we can do. That we ourselves should derive a brief emotional satisfaction from an occupation is not a good reason for insisting on it. But failing a successful revolution, it will be unavoidable. If we manage it as well as we did in the Cologne region after the last war, it will leave no bitter memories behind it: on the contrary, it may do good. But in 1918 the problem was comparably simpler since there was then no need to destroy the existing local administration. But the longer it lasts, the less salutary will be its effects. It is obvious that the withdrawal of a considerable army of men from productive work will delay our own recovery. There will be work enough for every keen soldier in the Far East. What the Germans can pay would be better spent in repairing the ruin they have caused in Russia than in maintaining an idle Army of Occupation. It is, moreover, obvious that as long as we refuse responsibility and freedom of movement to the Germans they cannot recover the use of their atrophied faculties. They can re-educate themselves only by activity. All this is on the assumption that the Occupation works well. A thousand officers, of whom many spoke no word of German until the other day and never saw Germany, will now take it upon them to govern her. Is government such an easy art?

The Occupation should not be prolonged after its indispensable

objects have been achieved, or may safely be delegated to a German authority. These objects may be enumerated thus:

(1) To ensure tranquillity and to create a provisional local administration capable of maintaining order.

(2) To destroy the Nazi regime or make sure that the Germans have destroyed it, and to liberate all political prisoners.

(3) To control demobilisation and disarmament: to organise and expedite the return to their homes of all prisoners of war of the United Nations and of all foreign workers; to arrange for the return of German prisoners of war: to deal with the displacements of population caused by the demands of war industry, the destruction by bombing of German towns and the migrations dictated by Nazi policy. There is no need to urge that the French and other allied victims should have precedence: that will be readily granted. But the return of German prisoners should not be unduly delayed, as it was after the last war, with much embitterment as a consequence.

(4) To secure the surrender of war-criminals.

(5) To ensure the food supplies of the population.

(6) To further as rapidly as possible the resumption of normal work and the return to a peace-time economy.

(7) To effect any necessary modifications of frontiers.

(8) To prepare the transition from military administration to national self-government and self-determination.

So soon as there is a provisional government in sight which can run a civilised administration and carry out the work of self-determination with honesty and good sense, the occupation should cease. When the first period of chaos and danger is over, it should suffice to hold the chief strategical keys—railway-junctions, air-fields and arsenals. A mobile force should be available, some of it air-borne, capable of rapid action where it may be needed.

Some may argue that Germany must be occupied for an indefinite time, in order to enforce obedience to the peace-settlement. Will it be so unreasonable, then, that only force can maintain it? This school of thought forgets that the victors will still have in their hands a monopoly of sea and air power. They could at choice reduce a recalcitrant Germany—slowly by block-

ade, promptly by bombing her cities. Would she be much more helpless if she were occupied for ever?

How long, in terms of months or years, the Occupation so defined need last, no one can estimate in advance. Its duration will depend as much on the tact of the military authorities as on the responsiveness of the Germans. If all went well, need the period exceed two years? If it must be prolonged beyond that limit, need it mean more than the retention of a very few strategical points? If it is conceived as a punitive measure and prolonged for that purpose, it will not serve our interests. After it ends, commissions of inspection and control can still be maintained.

We have to consider how in a country deprived of all social cohesion a provisional government can be erected out of nothing. It is doubtful whether there are among the exiles many capable of strong leadership, though there are many who could do good educational work and some who understand organisation. Exiles of Jewish origin should not seek conspicuous positions, until they can be freely elected. The key to this difficulty may be found by starting at the bottom in the many provincial cities. Germany was, before the Nazis came to power, much less centralised than England and France. She had an active tradition of municipal life, and the government of her cities was enlightened and progressive even under the Empire. If the problem is to find men whom their fellow citizens will respect, it will be easier to discover them in their own home-towns than on the national stage. Let us suppose that municipal councils have been constituted, in the way suggested, and that they have worked well for two or three months. The next obvious step is to form provincial Councils in each *Gau* by election from the town and rural district councils. After another short interval, it would be easy to summon a National Council, composed of representatives chosen by the provincial Councils. Let it sit for a time in a consultative capacity dealing with questions submitted to it by the Military Authority, to which in turn it might address memoranda or resolutions. From the first some executive power should be transferred to it, for example over education. It is the proper body to nominate the executive heads

of the various ministries under the Military Administration. A commission, which it appoints, works out meanwhile a draft for the new Constitution. No less important than the Constitution will be its economic plan governing the whole work of reconstruction. Finally, a Cabinet responsible to it should be chosen on a coalition basis, to act as a provisional National Government and preside over the election of a Constituent Assembly. Before the peace terms assume anything like their final shape, the spokesmen of the National Council should be invited to discuss the draft settlement with representatives of the United Nations. How rapidly this gradual delegation of authority can proceed will depend in part on the ability of the groups and parties in process of formation to work together. But much also will depend on the character of the peace the United Nations intend to impose. If it is punitive in conception, or if the Germans are left too long in doubt, it is vain to expect from them either much readiness to collaborate with the victors or that mood of resolution and hope in which men build boldly and well.

It should be understood that anything this first National Government does can only be provisional. The final decision of all the bigger organic questions on which the future of Germany turns must fall to a directly elected assembly, which can do useful work only after a period devoted to the free discussion of known facts and clearly thought out plans. That it will meet in a creative and revolutionary mood is the best hope we can entertain.

## A CHANCE FOR DEMOCRACY

**I**T MAY be well, before we leave this subject, to make rather more explicit the assumptions on which these suggestions for the transition are based. There are, broadly, only two possible ways of proceeding, if no revolutionary Government has established itself before the German armies capitulate. The victorious Allies, the Russians in the East and the Anglo-Americans in the West, can at a moment of their own choosing nominate Germans

to whom they will entrust the administration under their supervision. That means, for a time at least, the breaking of Germany in two. The alternative plan is to allow Germans, by some such method as that outlined in this chapter, to choose their own provisional government—a single administration for the whole Reich.

The objections to the former course are overwhelming. Even if the Allies were to discover the best men available—a task of immense difficulty—would these men ever succeed in winning the confidence and loyalty of their fellow-countrymen? They might be, in fact, honest and patriotic citizens, but they would look like quislings. Their authority would rest on foreign bayonets and on nothing more. They would have to collaborate with the Occupation in many tasks which must offend the self-respect of Germans. On their heads would recoil the unpopularity which these measures, however necessary they may be, are bound to provoke. If these men are merely our nominees who can claim no representative capacity, they can be of little use to us. Their advice would not be of much value, nor would they wield any moral authority in dealing with the masses.

There is another danger in this plan which we ought to ponder. Let us suppose that we do succeed in finding men of high character and enlightened opinions willing to serve under us. The result might well be that when the Occupation ended, not only these individuals but the groups and parties to which they belonged would be hopelessly discredited. Germans would end by feeling towards them much as Frenchmen feel towards the Men of Vichy who collaborated with the German Occupation. But it is doubtful whether self-respecting Germans will be eager to serve under the conquerors of their country. Numerous Germans will do it, but they will be, as a rule, the meaner types, the careerists, the opportunists, who will always in any country sell themselves for a job and a little brief authority. The less we rely on men of that type the better.

The task of collaborating with the conquerors cannot be welcome to any normally-constituted German citizen. It is better, therefore, that it should be laid upon him as a duty by his fellows. They know, as we cannot, whom they can trust and respect.

Only if they are freely chosen, albeit by rough and ready methods, will their advice be of much use to us, or to the Russians.

There are, to be sure, Englishmen who should know Germany well who take a contrary view. Germans, they tell us, are a peculiarly docile people, who are happy only when they are regimented. If we govern them firmly, of course with good intentions, and tell them plainly what they must do, they will obey with perfect submission and even with servility. This is an illusion which Englishmen of the governing class are apt to cherish about other peoples. The same arguments were used to justify coercion in Ireland and the denial of self-government to Indians. The generalisation that Germans are peculiarly docile may mislead us. They have on occasion resisted their own most powerful and popular leaders with success. Bismarck was twice defeated by the steady and unyielding resistance of two big bodies of Germans—the Catholics in the *Kulturkampf*, and the workers in their struggle against the exceptional laws directed against the Social Democrats.

It may be true that Germans do accept discipline rather more readily than we should, when their own native rulers require it of them for the good of the nation. It does not follow that they will be equally obedient to foreign rulers, or to quislings. They assumed that a Bismarck and even a Hitler had in view only the interests of the German people. They may not attribute to us the same intentions. They may think that our chief purpose is to weaken them—as in the matter of military strength it is. They may even suspect that we are influenced by commercial rivalry. To the Russians they will attribute the motive of revenge. When the French occupied the Ruhr, their reply was the most formidable essay in passive resistance that history records. If the Occupation is prolonged, as some influential experts propose, for twenty-five or thirty years, we must reckon on bitter resistance, not all of it passive. German nationalists are addicted to murder.

There is another argument against a prolonged occupation which deserves at least equal weight. It is, presumably, the purpose of all of us, whether we are Conservatives or Socialists, to promote in Germany the establishment of a truly civilised gov-



ernment, which will renounce a warlike policy and collaborate with its neighbours for the good of Europe. The instant that any government of that character emerges, whatever its political colour may be, we should, if we act logically, promote its popularity and success by every reasonable means. If it is to thrive and win the loyalty of the German people, it must be respected, abroad and at home. The fate of the Weimar Republic should be a warning here. We allowed it no successes, however modest. We cold-shouldered it in every possible way. We paid it none of the courtesies customary between friendly Powers. I think it is a literally correct statement that during its fourteen years of life only one member of a British Cabinet paid an official visit to Germany. When Hitler rose to power he was visited first by Mr. Eden and Sir John Simon, and then by Mr. Chamberlain. These things are not trifles, nor are the Germans the only people who are sensitive to them.

Seen in this light a prolonged Occupation would be fatal. So long as the armies of her conquerors remain in Germany, no German government will command respect, either at home or abroad. It will not be sovereign or independent, and still less will it seem so. It will look like our puppet, subject in everything to our will and dictation. Even if our High Commissioner is in fact very slow to use his powers of dictation, very courteous, very forbearing, no German will ever forget that this Russian or American—or will he be an Englishman?—has the means at his command to overrule the national will at any moment. A Chancellor who tried to govern Germany under these conditions would soon be for Germans what Darlan was and Laval is for Frenchmen. If, as most of us assume, it is the democratic groups which are likely to form the early post-war administrations, our Occupation will soon discredit them. After a few years the nationalist parties will revive and may win their way to power. If we sincerely wish that a pacific form of democracy shall take root in Germany, it would be folly to impose on it the penalties and humiliations which the Nazis have so richly deserved. The only rational course is to promote its prestige and its popularity by treating it with respect. There lurks no peril in this prescription. Germany after

this war will be so near to total ruin that nothing is to be feared from her power for ten or twenty years to come. On grounds of safety there is no need for a prolonged Occupation. The danger, invisible yet predictable, lurks in the mass-mind of this nation which cannot work healthily in fetters.

## FOOD SUPPLIES

WITH THE two subjects of food supply and war-criminals we may conveniently deal here, while postponing frontier revision, disarmament and the resumption of work to later chapters.

The feeding of the German population in a period of political confusion, with the transport system in chaos, will raise complicated technical problems. Last time there was a German government; but between the armistice and the signature of peace, it was subject to our blockade.\* The British army in the Rhineland, unable to endure the sight of the misery round it, raised its voice in protest. Only then, after five months' delay, did the first food-ships arrive. This time the whole responsibility and most of the work of organisation will fall on the United Nations.

We assume that the feeding of Europe will be treated as a single problem: that all the supplies and stores of food available on the Continent and all the means of transport will be pooled. If, as is possible, Germany still has reserves, looted from her victims, these will be made generally available, a principle which should apply also to her rolling stock, motor and air transport, ships and barges, also in part looted.

But when these elementary requirements of justice are satisfied, what principle should guide us? Civilised men can give only one answer. The food we control and import must be distributed impartially over the whole Continent in accordance with the

\* The story is as complex as it is tragic. Part of the responsibility for the delay falls on the German government: See *The Blockade*, by W. Arnold-Forster, p. 34 (Oxford Pamphlets).

physiological needs of its inhabitants.\* Our survey may and doubtless will reveal the fact that the needs of the Germans are less urgent than those of most of their victims. The Greeks and Belgians in particular have been more gravely undernourished and for a longer period than the Germans. That establishes for them in the timing and measuring of our supplies a prior claim. Unbiased statistical tests of relative need should be furnished by our medical services. The same principle applies, of course, to medical relief and the special care designed for children and mothers. A doctor does not allow his political principles or moral judgments to influence him in attending to his patients. Our task is to feed the whole of war-stricken Europe back into health. Neither vengeance, partisanship nor fear should bias our scales as we measure out the rations of the helpless or subject peoples committed to our charge. It is necessary to say this with emphasis, because after the last war Mr. Hoover's Relief Organisation used food on a great scale as a means of political pressure against "the Reds" and boasted that it had done so.† Of that risk public

\* Since this was written, U.N.R.R.A. has thrown over the criterion of need and substituted for it ability to pay. Germany is required to pay in full for all she receives: other States are to pay only in the measure of their capacity.

† Part of the story was told by Mr. T. T. C. Gregory, the head of the Hoover Organisation in Central Europe, in three articles which appeared in *The World's Work* in April, May, June, 1921. The Editor, who described Mr. Gregory as one of the "new race of constructive American lawyers that has brought so much of genius and imagination to big business," summarised his articles thus:—

"The relief commission became involved in a hand-to-hand battle with the Red Movement. Using economic pressure—the lever of food—as its only weapon, it defeated Bolshevism and saved Central and South-Eastern Europe to Civilisation." Mr. Gregory claims that he brought down Bela Kun's Soviet government by refusing food to Hungary. His narrative is neither accurate nor modest, but we must believe him when he describes how he double-crossed both the Bolsheviks and the Socialists of Budapest. My own recollection of this period includes a talk with the British member of the Allied Commission in Vienna early in 1919. He said that "the red flood" might well submerge all Europe up to the Rhine, and he believed that in Vienna he had to hold the most vital strategical position. He had,

opinion must be made aware: all that is decent among us will revolt against it. To use starvation as "an instrument of policy" is as barbarous as the use of war for that purpose. A plain appeal to morality should suffice, but I will reinforce it with another. A people suffering from prolonged undernourishment becomes mentally and morally abnormal. Part of it may be apathetic, but among Germans, as I observed after the last war, a high proportion became excitable, intractable, over-emotional and inclined to extremes in one direction or the other, in sentiment, theory or action. A well-nourished people might have emerged with less damage from the crisis of the armistice period, and again from that of the slump. A nation in a subnormal physical condition is apt to choose leaders even more neurotic than the average citizen.

## THE WAR CRIMINALS

THE UNITED NATIONS, silent about much else, have emphasised their determination to punish war-criminals. The word "punishment" has associations and traditions which civilised men, gradually humanising their criminal justice, are trying to discard. Nothing is to be gained from retaliation, and little, in dealing with types so perverted as the more hardened Nazis, can be hoped from

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he told me, warned the moderate evolutionary Socialist government that if it took a single step in the direction of social revolution, he would stop the food trains on which starving Vienna depended. Dr. Otto Bauer, who was Foreign Secretary, describes in quiet words in his history of this period the pressure to which he was subjected (*The Austrian Revolution*, English transl., p. 19):—

"The Entente Powers... were determined not to allow the revolution to develop beyond the limits of democracy. Had the 'peace and order' which they desiderated been destroyed, they would have stopped the food trains and the coal trains and thus brought famine upon the whole industrial district."

It should be added that in detecting the approach of "red" revolution the colour sense of some of the Entente Powers, but especially of the Americans, was remarkably sensitive over a wide range of the spectrum.

remedial treatment. But the case for drastic action on a considerable scale is clear to all of us. These brutes are a peril to society and it is unthinkable that we should leave at large men schooled in every form of sadistic indulgence. But the difficulties are obvious. The Nazis have many hostages in their power, among them such men as Herriot, Léon Blum, Breitscheid, Thälmann, Matchek and thousands of less celebrated prisoners. Again, their leaders may take refuge in neutral territory. Finally, there is the notorious difficulty of singling out those personally responsible from those who acted, perhaps unwillingly, under orders.

Under a dictatorship all responsibility centres at the top. Individual commanding officers transmitted the orders to massacre Jews, slaughter hostages and torture political prisoners. They cannot go scot-free. But the real authors of this orgy of crime were Hitler and the gang that created the Nazi party. Again, their crime was not so much that they ordered barbarities, or even that they made this war. Their real crime was that they abolished morality and rooted it out in the mighty State they controlled. Everything else flowed from that.

But to reverse the moral values of civilised men is not a crime known to international law. Neither is the levying of aggressive war technically a crime, nor even the breach of treaties. An unwritten law there may be, but the Powers have never drawn up an international criminal code, nor set up an international criminal tribunal. It may be that we shall one day fill this gap in our institutions; but if we proceed by improvisation now, we cannot make the jurisdiction of a new Court and a new Code retrospective. To do so would be to bring the whole idea of law into contempt. To build up the fundamental concepts of justice was the work of many centuries: are we to sweep them away in the heat of war? As little dare we pretend that enemies can fairly try an enemy. Our fathers made all these mistakes when they tried their enemy, King Charles, before an improvised court on a charge unknown to English law. Whatever we do, then, with Hitler and his fellow political criminals, we ought not to try them.

If we permit the Germans to make a revolution, the new government will know how to deal with its internal enemies. In that

case we must leave its actions free. The Germans have an even heavier account to settle with Hitler than we have.

Failing a German revolution, what should we do? History has given us a useful precedent. Napoleon was a less ignoble criminal than Hitler, but once again St. Helena or some equally remote island might serve our purpose. Hitler and all the heads of his party should be interned without trial, by an administrative act, in some isolated spot for the rest of their lives, under conditions worthy rather of our self-respect than of their deserts. Among these internees we would include all the higher ranks of the party—the experts in propaganda and the heads of the Gestapo and the S.S. as well as the Ministers and political chiefs. The worst that could happen for the future relationship of our two peoples would be that Hitler, canonised by too many German romantics while he prospered, should die with a halo of martyrdom around him. Mr. Churchill, pleading as a young man for clemency towards the Cape rebels during the Boer War, coined a memorable aphorism: “Grass grows quickly over the battlefield: over the scaffold never.”

The Germans will have to consider whether and when they dare admit the rest of this perverted and guilty Party to exercise the rights of citizens. The Party had, at the height of its power, if we are correctly informed, about three million members. Of these a fairly high proportion may have joined it for safety or because they had to live, rather than from any deep conviction: but to balance these there are the thugs of the S.S. and the Gestapo. Would it not be a wise precaution to debar this whole mass membership from voting, at all events at the first election? It is more important that all who held offices of any sort in the Party should be debarred for life from holding any political offices whatever, national or municipal, in the German State. Germans will also wish to confiscate these men's property, swollen as it commonly is by graft and extortion. Into these details we do not propose to enter, for they are the concern of the German nation. But its conduct in taking such measures will influence our future attitude towards it.

It remains to consider the case of the war-criminals proper—

the officers, that is to say, guilty of conspicuous atrocities in the conduct of the war or in the policing of the occupied countries. To these men the considerations we have urged in the case of the politicians do not apply. There is a recognised code of military law to which Germany subscribed. There are precedents dating from 1919, ill-managed though they were, for the trial of such cases. A very few of the uglier offenders were then tried by a German court. The sentences, however, were light and some of the culprits escaped from prison. But again, we should not overrate the effect of punishment as a deterrent in future wars. A Power deliberately makes war only if it expects to win: in that event its brutalities will go unpunished. The number of Germans guilty of war crimes, in one degree or another, may run into hundreds of thousands. We do not want a blood-bath. If it were to rain brimstone from Heaven upon these wicked men, the earth next day would be a happier habitation for us all. But we cannot achieve that result with machine-guns. If we were to do it, those who carried out and ordered or permitted the massacre would be for the rest of their lives the worse for what they had done: the experience would either break them or harden them. To suggest life-long imprisonment on such a scale is equally impossible: it would amount to a return to slavery as an institution. It would be wise, therefore, to pick out the worst offenders, guilty of the most conspicuous crimes, which can be established by the clearest evidence. Little will be gained, unless we convince the German public that our measures are inspired by worthy motives. A Court-Martial drawn from all the United Nations would be the fairest tribunal. Judges drawn from the State in which the crime was committed would find it hard to be impartial. Soldiers should try soldiers. The trials should be public, with every facility for the defence and should take place as promptly as possible: we cannot go on shooting our former enemies long after hostilities have ceased. That is what Franco did, to the disgust of us all.

But it may now be too late to make suggestions about the trial of the war-criminals. Decisions were reached by the Conference of the three chief Allies in Moscow and published. It is laid down

that all the accused men shall be returned to the country in which their crimes were committed, to be "judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged . . . according to the laws of these liberated countries." It is easy to understand the sentiments that inspired this decision. It is much harder to grasp this conception of law and judicial procedure. In cold blood, after the lapse of a generation, historians may describe it as vengeance. The crimes these men committed were not offences against the municipal laws of the lands they invaded. They were offences against the rules of war laid down in the Hague Convention. Under that code they should be tried. On reflection we may regret this decision. Happily our two countries will seldom be involved in these trials.

On a careful reading it is clear that this decision is not confined to conspicuous criminals. It applies to "men" as well as officers and also to "members of the Nazi party." It covers not only those who were "responsible" for atrocities, massacres and executions, but also those who "have taken a consenting part in them." From other sources it is possible to guess what the Russians have in mind. They drew up at an earlier stage of this war a list of criminals containing 36,000 names. The intention may be to employ these men in rebuilding the devastated regions of Russia. To try such numbers will be impossible, but it may be argued that anyone who served in the S.S. took at least a consenting part in cruelties. The total may expand to a big figure.

This idea, however novel it may seem to us, rests on precedent. During the sharp civil struggle in Russia, when collective agriculture was introduced, the *kulaks* and other peasants who resisted were deported from their villages and set to forced labour on the construction of the White Sea Canal. Immense numbers were used in this way. The mortality was heavy: the survivors, we are assured, underwent a moral reformation. The same claim is made by Franco for his forced-labour camps.

Viewed as a plan for rebuilding Russia this is not a happy invention. How much do these criminals understand of the construction of bridges, dams and houses? Slave labour is never efficient. Slave-driving, moreover, demoralises the drivers as well



as the slaves. On the other hand, it would be a gain to Germany to remove these men from her soil.

Further, the Russians demand that a German labour-force be raised by conscription to rebuild their devastated areas. Two million men, it is said, are to be embodied in this way over a period of five years. Little is known about this scheme. Are the conscripts to be veterans who have already served a full term in the Army: or are they to be young lads, to whom no guilt can be ascribed? For how many years is each conscript to serve? How closely will the prisoners be confined? Will they enjoy any liberty of movement and any contact with the civilian population? Will they have any opportunities for recreation and education? Is it proposed that they shall enjoy the standards observed in the Red Army for food, clothing and shelter? The plan offends our instincts, even if any idea of punishment and reprisal is excluded. Given the hatred which the Nazis have provoked by their cruelties, to create a happy atmosphere will be impossible. Young lads, recruited round about the age of eighteen, can easily be broken for life by a harsh experience. The plan might be so administered as to destroy for ever any hope there may be of bridging the gulf between these two peoples. In any event, since this army must start work without skill or experience, the scheme does not promise rapid or efficient results. It is one of the threats that tend to prolong German resistance.

The first indispensable step in approaching the question of rebuilding the ruins is to banish all thought of punishment. Instead of asking how we can set guilty men to perform arduous tasks, should we not enquire how far machinery can help us? It is reasonable to demand from the Germans all sorts of machines required for digging, the clearing of sites and construction. The next step is to organise the manufacture of pre-fabricated buildings and the mass-production of fittings and furniture. If we mean to organise the peoples of Europe as a working team, here is our chance. The whole scheme could be planned on an international scale: each people, friends and enemies alike, should contribute the special resources and skills it possesses—the steel, the machines, the plastics, the timber. The scheme should be so devised

as to assist rebuilding in Germany and Italy as well as in Allied lands, albeit it is fair that the Germans should make the maximum contribution towards it. The real test of our civilisation is that we plan the rebuilding of Europe impartially all round and do it with the minimum of painful labour. It is in the general interest that our enemies should recover as quickly and completely as our friends. All of us, in the economic field, are interdependent.

It is right that German hands should build up what German hands tore down. This they can do by making machines and fittings in their own factories. But is this all they should do? After the last war, shortly before his assassination, Kurt Eisner, who led the brief but spirited revolution in Bavaria, made a memorable speech, which I heard, on the theme that the devastated cities of Belgium and France should be rebuilt by German labour. He offered to recruit and lead a corps of volunteer workers, who would undo the evil past, with their hands, in a Socialist spirit of fellowship. Had this plan been accepted, it would have done much to reconcile former enemies. The proposal was afterwards adopted by the German Government, which offered to do the rebuilding with German labour and materials. It even drew up some detailed plans. The offer was refused by the French and Belgian Governments. French contractors wanted their profits, while French workers dreaded unemployment. It is only in a few rare cases that the idea might be acceptable in Western and Central Europe.

Russia alone could welcome a team of German workers without the dread of unemployment. But they should go as free men, who can claim in this Workers' and Peasants' Republic the right as workers to be treated with respect. They should serve under their own foremen and architects and under the rules of their restored Trade Unions. The Russians would have to supply them on an agreed scale with food and shelter, while the German Republic would maintain their families and give them deferred pay on their return. There are in the Todt organisation hundreds of thousands of skilled and experienced builders and engineers, accustomed to working in a team, who would do the work of reconstruction better, more rapidly and with fewer hands than any body of

criminals or conscripts. They would be glad to escape the unemployment that may descend on Germany. Meeting the Russians as fellow workers, they might succeed in lessening the hate the Nazis engendered. In their turn they would discover how lovable the Russians are.

It remains to consider what should be done with the S.S. men, hardened as they have been by the practice of every species of brutality. Left to their own devices, they will form terroristic gangs, half criminal, half political, like the "Free Corps" recruited after the last war. If these take to intimidation and assassination they can render a return to normal political life well nigh impossible. This is one of those desperate problems that admit of no good solution. To exterminate these men or to enslave them would be to betray our own standards of civilisation. It would be good to get them out of Germany. Are there any undeveloped countries that would allow them to start life again as pioneers on its soil? Failing that unlikely solution, should they be set to work in Germany, despite of their lack of training and skill? In that case these troops should be disarmed but not demobilised. They should be employed under strict discipline and subject to inspection by representatives of the Allies, as a pioneer corps, to rebuild the German towns shattered by our bombers. This is useful work which should appeal to their patriotism—in some of them a genuine but misdirected and unbalanced sentiment. With their work some process of education might be blended—skilfully, without pedantry, by teachers who possess some psychological insight. The Nazis made criminals by their perverted system of education. Are there no better men and women with the wit to undo their work?

## *IV: Frontiers and Migrants*

TERRITORIAL questions have lost for our generation the absorbing interest they possessed for the men who made the Versailles Peace. Progressive opinion has even come to regard frontiers as relatively unimportant. They will become so in proportion as we succeed in making an integrated Europe. By that we mean that it should plan its economic activity as a coherent and organic whole, aim at raising the level of life of its backward agricultural regions up to that of the industrial peoples, and realise everywhere certain minimum standards of health, education and working conditions. It must organise its military security as a single problem. If we can also make sure that minorities, as well as majorities, enjoy full civic and cultural rights, need frontiers concern us deeply?

To this question two answers deserve attention. In the first place, to believe that Europe will after this war be fully integrated in this way requires a bold exercise of faith. In the second place, the territorial changes which some propose to make at Germany's expense have their origin in a state of mind that has nothing in common with a constructive international outlook. The politicians who wish to dismember Germany are not planning an integrated Europe. They are playing the old ruinous game of the balance of power.

The only respectable motive that can be avowed for dismemberment is our imperative need for security. We have outgrown the old delusion which too many of us once entertained that this island can attain security in isolation. Our strategical problem is soluble only in continental terms—only, indeed, within an ordered world. But, it may be said with a show of reason, Germans are so numerous that they will always dominate the European Continent, even if we disarm them. They were dis-

armed by the Versailles Peace, but we failed to keep them disarmed. It is, therefore, necessary to weaken them in every way consistent with a not too exacting standard of humanity. No one proposes to exterminate them or even to keep them permanently at starvation level. But proposals have been made, with influential backing, to dismember the Reich and in addition, or as an alternative, to destroy its heavy industry for ever.

That Germany's overwhelming strength presents us with the most anxious problem of modern times, no one disputes. It can be solved only by harnessing the German people in team work for the common good—after disarmament. But Germany's strength was overwhelming only because the rest of Europe was culpably and needlessly weak by reason of its divisions. When the challenge came in 1933, the League failed to keep Germany disarmed, because it had lost all capacity for action. The solution of dismemberment is equally precarious. Germany could be kept dismembered only if the other Powers remained vigilant, united and ready for action. On that assumption, however, dismemberment is unnecessary. The rest of Europe, including Britain and Russia, could always deal even with an armed Germany, if it were united and prepared. It could have dealt with Hitler easily enough, when he challenged it by re-militarising the Rhineland in 1936, had it been united. His rearmament, then only in the initial stage, was still inferior to the equipment of France and Britain, while the reserve strength of Russia could have been called up at need.

The real problem, then, is not so much German strength as European disunion. Under that, as the Spanish War revealed, lies a latent class conflict. That explains why British Conservatives, cherishing still a deep dislike and distrust of Russia, not only allowed but, in the Naval Treaty, authorised Hitler to rearm. Right up to the outbreak of this war, Hitler was drawing his immense reserves of oil and strategic metals mainly from the Powers which soon had to face him in mortal combat. If we relapse into that condition after this war, neither disarmament nor dismemberment will avail to save us; for sooner or later, in the criss-cross struggle of the Balance of Power, complicated by

the class struggle, one side or the other will call in Germany's aid.

Those who take a pessimistic view of Germany's strength are apt to forget that her population forms only a small minority among the European peoples. If we include the whole Eurasian region placed under Mr. Churchill's Council of Europe, the Germans number only some seventy-odd millions against the 450 millions of other races. Even if we leave out Great Britain and the Soviet Union, there are still in this smaller continental area some 230 million Europeans to balance the seventy million Germans. Even this reckoning is fallacious. Unless they are welded together by a totalitarian State, Germans do not think or act or vote as a solid mass. They group themselves as workers, as peasants, as Socialists, Liberals, Catholics, Conservatives and what not. Each of these groups has interests and ideas that link it with similar groups beyond the frontiers of the Reich. The artificial unity which Hitler imposed for a decade will not outlast his dictatorship, unless we in our turn insist on regarding Germans from a racial standpoint.

## DISMEMBERMENT

SEVERAL schemes of dismemberment have been advocated. The more extravagant of these plans call for no close study. Germany will not again be broken into the hundreds of petty States which boasted their independence in the eighteenth century. The clock will not be put back as far as that. Another proposal much favoured by Catholics is to separate the South from Prussia and the Protestant North and link it with Austria. This idea is often associated with the restoration of the Habsburg dynasty. That project will be broken by the unbending opposition of the former subjects of the Dual Monarchy, more especially the Czechs. Nor will the Russians tolerate it. Others, again, aim at weakening specifically Prussia, by lopping off from it the Rhineland and Ruhr and also East Prussia. Another school of thought stops short of literal dismemberment, but would impose on the Reich a fed-

eral constitution so loose that it would carry with it the same consequences. The subtlest of these proposals is to dismember Germany to-day with some intention of incorporating her fragments within a future United States of Europe.

In reviewing these schemes it may be conceded that if Germany must still be conceived primarily as a focus of military power, there is no reason why other Europeans should respect its integrity. On the contrary, in that regard its conduct in this war has sealed its doom. But from this standpoint the appropriate policy is not to dismember Germany but to disarm her. That done, we dare not forget that the Reich is much more than a military Power. It is a workshop, in which seventy millions of men and women have to gain their bread. This in the modern world demands economic planning, which can be effective only over a wide area. A central authority this immense and populous territory must possess, capable of directing its economic life, with the aim of ensuring production at a high level and full employment. To this end there must be a national Budget and a national legislature. The "Balkanisation" of Central Europe after the last war meant confusion, waste and the permanent lowering of its standard of life. The economic consequences of Balkanising Germany would be no happier.

The plan that finds most favour is to break the Reich into three or four independent states, while handing its eastern provinces to the Poles. If dismemberment is not forcibly imposed, the same result may be achieved by fostering with inducements or threats any separatist tendencies that may exist. Save under irresistible pressure, it is unthinkable that Germans should consent to all this or acquiesce in it for long. The reader may reply that the conduct of Germans during the last ten years has been so unpardonable that their wishes and preferences are for us a matter of indifference: if dismemberment would make for the general safety, then dismembered they must be. There are conclusive answers to this reasoning. In the first place, the cost of maintaining a dictated settlement, which no German, however peacefully inclined, accepts without perpetual coercion, will lie heavy on our own shoulders. Always heavily armed, we shall have

to steel ourselves against every argument for revision. This will involve a change in our national habits and eventually in our national character, which few of us would welcome in cold blood.

It needs no difficult effort of the imagination to foresee the reaction of the Germans to dismemberment. They would behave as the Irish or the Czechs behaved, while they were struggling for their national existence. They would refuse to think of anything else. They would affirm their unity in spite of us, by demonstrations and excursions across the frontiers that divided them. They would standardise their legislation and their institutions, so that as few differences as possible should exist between one German State and another. So far from weakening the idea of nationality by this device, we should strengthen it, until Pan-Germanism became an obsession. Worst of all, while Germans schemed and organised to achieve re-union, they would never give their minds to the constructive tasks that should occupy civilised men.

Those who shrink from dismemberment as a needlessly drastic policy suggest as an alternative that a loose federal constitution should be imposed. Left to their own devices, it is uncertain what type of constitution the Germans will wish to adopt. It cannot be assumed that they will wish to rebuild the Reich as a federation. Hitler made it a unitary State, like France or the United Kingdom. It was in the past always the more progressive parties, notably the Social Democrats, who favoured unity. Particularism was the attitude of the more backward and reactionary groups, more especially in the Catholic and traditional South. It happens that all the exiles with whom I have discussed this question are in favour of a unitary solution, chiefly because it would facilitate economic planning. But the swing of the pendulum against the Nazis and all their works may be so strong that in some form—if Germans are free to choose—the federal model will be restored.

But will they be free to choose? It is suggested that experts of the United Nations shall draft a constitution for Germany, which shall be imposed upon her without discussion in the Peace Treaty. It is usually stipulated that the constitution so imposed shall be a federation of a very loose type, if, indeed, it deserves



that name at all. The leading expert associated with this school of thought proposes to "reduce the central power to a shadow, with little but advisory and possibly some judicial functions." \* Under this formula a planned economy over any area wider than a province is ruled out. This is a very thin disguise for dismemberment. The purpose of it is so plainly to keep Germany weak and hamper her economic development that few Germans would accept it, save as a harsh dictate to which they must temporarily submit. With all their familiar ingenuity and determination they would set to work to circumvent it and achieve effective unity in spite of it. Under any imposed constitution Germany will be a turbulent focus of unrest. Our problem in dealing with her is to wean her from her excessive nationalism. To dictate to her the structure of the house she shall inhabit is the way to turn even the more liberal and broadminded Germans into defiant nationalists. These schemes will expose us hereafter, if we adopt them, to the just charge that we have broken faith and violated our own promise to "respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live."

A subtler case for dismembering Germany has been stated by some advocates of European federation. The Reich, they argue, is much too big to make a convenient unit in a true federal union. If it were broken up, would not federation be easier to achieve? That might be true if a federation could be constructed, like a mosaic, by piecing fragments of territory together. But politics is the art of dealing with men. What we have to ensure, when we federate Europe, is that its peoples shall enter the Union in a co-operative frame of mind. If we begin by carving up their Fatherland, that might not be their mood. Major operations of this kind have to be performed without anaesthetics. A big but friendly Reich might be a more reliable partner in a Federation than a dozen sore and angry German States. If what is feared is the weight of the German vote, should we escape this inconvenience by dismemberment? The separated States would still be capable of forming an Opposition Block in Congress. That will not happen

\* *Future Germany*, by Colonel T. H. Minshall (p. 136). Colonel Minshall also proposes to raze Potsdam to the ground (p. 118).

unless Germans are united by some lapse from sagacity on our part. Unless they are unified in that way they will vote, as other Europeans normally do, not in a solid national block, but as their diverse opinions and class interests dictate. Federations do, after all, manage to cohere, which fail to satisfy the test of symmetry. In the United States, Texas is much too big and New York much too populous to serve as ideal units. It might even be asked whether, if Germany is too big, the United Kingdom is exactly the right size. It need not be assumed, then, that a big Germany would render a European Federation unworkable.

Before embarking on this painful dissection, a preliminary question has to be answered. Are we really determined after this war to create a European Federation? I wish we were, but I do not feel that the wind is blowing that way—neither the Zephyr from London nor the Boreas from Moscow. Mr. Churchill's Council of Europe has none of the characteristics of a federation. If that is so, what this school of thought really proposes is to dismember Germany to-day and keep her dismembered by force, on the dim chance that at some remote date in the future we may all be ready to federate. That is not a wise proposal: is it even a plausible tactic?

## THE CHARACTER OF PRUSSIA

**B**UT IF dismemberment is worthless as a general solution, a case may still be made out for several amputations, taken singly or together. Its advocates usually argue from the premise that Prussia always was and still is the source of all evil in Germany. That was broadly true up to 1918: the dynasty was Prussian: the Chancellor of the Reich was also the head of the Prussian State, and the High Command was drawn chiefly from the Junker caste. The three-class franchise by which the Diet was elected made Prussia a narrow oligarchy. But after 1918, under universal franchise, the character of the Prussian State changed profoundly. With the most highly developed modern industry,

it had also the most radical working class in Germany. Hamburg (technically a Free City), Berlin and most of the Ruhr towns voted steadily Left—indeed, as early as 1912, all five of the constituencies into which Berlin was divided elected Social Democrats (under manhood suffrage) to the Reichstag. The result was that Prussia remained under predominantly Social Democratic Cabinets throughout the Weimar period. The defeat of the Republic was decided by the dismissal of its Socialist Ministers, Braun and Severing, in 1932. So long as votes could settle anything, Prussia and not the South, with its largely Catholic peasantry, was the democratic stronghold. The cradle of the Nazi movement was Munich, and it is an interesting fact that only one of the prominent Nazi leaders, Bormann, is a Prussian. Hitler is an Austrian; Goering and Himmler are Bavarians. Hess was brought up in Egypt, and Rosenberg is a Balt; while Goebbels, as a Rhinelander, is only nominally Prussian. It is not obvious that anything could be gained for democracy by weakening Prussia and favouring the South: those who take this view are a generation out of date. The solution of the Prussian problem must be sought on other lines: what must be done is to end or lessen the power within Prussia of an anti-social ruling class, the Junkers and heavy industrialists.

It is, however, reasonable to argue, on other grounds, that if Germany again adopts a federal constitution, Prussia is too big and too heterogeneous to make a suitable unit and might with advantage be subdivided. This is, however, a question which Germans should be free to settle for themselves. To my thinking, nothing would be gained, either for democracy or peace, by restoring the former German States. They were dynastic units, each grouped round a prince. They bore no relation at all to the economic facts of daily life. The Third Reich was divided for administrative purposes into 33 *Gaue*, corresponding to English counties or French departments. When Germans build up from the foundations a democratic system of local self-government, it is possible that they may prefer to erect it rather on this ground plan than on the old kingdoms and duchies. In this war our enemy is not Prussia but Fascism.

## THE RHINELAND

THE POWERFUL British Conservative group over which Sir John Wardlaw-Milne presides, proposes to erect the Rhineland and Ruhr into an "independent German state." Others advocate its annexation by France. This idea originated in French imperialist propaganda, which is now entirely out of date. It was argued that the Rhine was the proper strategical frontier for France. For that purpose it is useless. Experience in this war has proved that much greater rivers than the Rhine, the Dnieper and Don for example, cannot for long delay a well-equipped modern army. To render their strategical demands more plausible, it was the habit of French reactionaries to maintain that the Rhinelanders are not properly Germans at all and that they wish to be annexed to France. This is dishonest nonsense. No part of the Reich is more solidly Germanic. The original population is Saxon in the North, Frank in the Centre and Swabian in the South, but large numbers of immigrants have come in from other parts of the Reich. In temperament and outlook the genial Rhinelanders differ from the more rigid Prussians. Regional variations of this kind are as marked in Germany as they are in France and even in our little island. The West and the South have the older and mellower civilisation which goes back to Roman times and beyond them. The Rhine and the Danube were for countless centuries the channels that carried the ideas, the technique and the wealth of the more civilised South and East to the Germanic peoples. That was a salient fact during Renaissance and Reformation, as it was in the Iron Age. The North has poorer soil and a harsher climate, but it was chiefly distance, forests and the lack of natural highways that accounted for a relative backwardness, which persisted into the last century. That Prussia was subjected more thoroughly first to Protestant ethics and then to military discipline is also part of the explanation. Of the two stocks, the Prussians, diluted as they are by Baltic or Slavonic elements, are the less solidly Germanic.

The legend that the Rhinelanders are French in their political sympathies goes back to the Kingdom of Westphalia, which Napoleon created in 1806 for his brother Jerome, who had by all accounts an attractive personality. At the beginning of his brief reign of seven years he was decidedly popular. The more progressive Germans, like the younger generation of Italians, welcomed the armies of revolutionary France, because they brought with them a creative idea. The Rhineland had been unfortunate, since much of it had always been ruled by its archbishops. These great Princes of the Church were usually reactionaries, though they often cherished the arts. Under King Jerome clericalism was overcome; the Jews were emancipated and feudalism was smashed by the liberation of the serfs. But even before the charming king was deposed, French rule was detested. It awakened the slumbering nationalism of the German people, and the youth of the Rhineland, roused by the first thinkers and poets of the day, flung itself into the war of liberation. The reader will remember that Beethoven, a Rhinelander and a radical, wrote his Heroic Symphony in honour of Napoleon, but tore up the dedication when the First Consul made himself Emperor.

In recent times the Rhineland played a leading part in German politics. Its capitalistic upper stratum were Bismarck's staunchest supporters. The workers of the Ruhr were resolute in their fidelity to the Socialist and Communist parties. Rhenish Catholics, who usually belonged to its progressive wing, were active in the Centre Party of the Reich. There was never a spontaneous separatist movement. When the French, who made themselves deeply unpopular during the occupation after the last war, bribed a handful of gangsters and adventurers to proclaim a Rhineland Republic, it perished instantly, in spite of their armed support, amid the anger and contempt of the entire people. When they invaded the Ruhr in 1923 the French encountered the passive resistance of the whole population, which endured poverty and semi-starvation because it would not bend to a foreign yoke. The Rhineland is, in short, as German as Lancashire is English. It wants neither separation nor annexation. There is no reason to

suppose that the Free French cherish these imperialist ambitions which the underground Socialist Party has flatly rejected.\*

The reasons which induce British and American spokesmen for Monopoly Capital to favour the separation of the Rhineland from the Reich are of a wholly different order. Their aim is to secure for Anglo-American Big Business control over the great industries of this once wealthy region. This is the wrong way to solve the crucial problem of German heavy industry. Proposals for its organisation within an international structure are set out in a later chapter.

Another claim bearing on Germany's western frontiers must be heard with sympathy. The Dutch suffered a heavy wrong when the Germans, as a precaution against an Allied invasion, flooded with salt water a considerable area of arable land. To restore its fertility will be the work of years, and some say that it can never be fully won back. It is proposed, therefore, that an area of German territory of equal extent shall be ceded to Holland by way of compensation—without its inhabitants. The first step in this case is to secure a disinterested expert's report upon the damage. No one will question the right of Holland to compensation in full. It would be reasonable, though it might not be wise, to demand the lease of a stretch of German territory for a term of years. But to demand the possession of this land for all time is to ask for more than a just judge would award in a civil suit.

## POLISH CLAIMS

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER disclaimed on behalf of the United Nations any designs of territorial conquest. Its first and second clauses are as emphatic as they well could be: "their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other ... they desire

\* In the official Belgian monthly, *Message* (May 1943), the President of the Belgian Senate, M. Robert Gillon, has, however, proposed to evict the entire population of the Rhineland and settle it in Siberia.

to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned."

The Poles have forgotten this declaration, for General Sikorski, shortly before his death, outlined a sweeping set of territorial demands and these have been endorsed by the rival Communist group based on Moscow. They propose to annex the whole of East Prussia, both provinces of Silesia, the Republic of Danzig and the greater part of Pomerania, up to the river Oder, while of course recovering the Corridor. The Russians, it is said, will annex to the Soviet Union the easternmost region of East Prussia, up to and including Königsberg.

The reader may remind me that Mr. Churchill has excluded the enemy peoples from the benefits of the Charter. If they surrender unconditionally, it follows that they have no legal grounds for any appeal against such terms as the Allies may impose. But the Charter was not addressed to them: it was addressed to the American and British peoples in response to their demand for a definition of the Allies' peace aims. It was an undertaking, which we citizens of the United Nations have the right to invoke, that the settlement shall be based on the principles it outlined. It is we who have the right to insist that the Allies shall neither seek territorial aggrandisement nor find it. If that declaration did not apply to the enemy countries, to whom did it apply? Did anyone suspect us of an intention to annex Switzerland or Sweden? The undertaking that any territorial changes shall accord with the will of the inhabitants is an inevitable consequence of our democratic principles. A people cannot choose its governors, if it is placed against its will under an alien yoke. It is unnecessary to argue that this principle applies to the enemy peoples: it lies at the root of our conception of good government. If it is violated, if populations are transferred against their wishes from one flag to another, infallibly we perpetuate the reign of force, which it is the purpose of the United Nations to bring to an end. There may be cases where overwhelming considerations based on the general safety justify some departure from the principle of self-determination. This is not one of them. It is a cynical application of the opportunist rule of compensation. Because the Poles are losing

certain provinces they snatched by force, they are to grab others which they covet.

Assuredly the Poles must be compensated in every suitable way, by generous economic assistance from the Allies and by restitution in kind from the Germans, for the cruel sufferings and crippling losses they have undergone. But this is not a suitable way. Because the Russians will take from Poland a slice of territory to which she has slender ethnographic claims, it does not follow that she ought to take from the Germans territory to which she has none at all. The whole of the new area she wishes to annex is solidly German. It has always been a weakness of the Polish Republic that it included a dangerously high proportion of unwilling subjects, whom notoriously it failed to reconcile to their lot. If many additional millions of Germans were placed under Polish rule they would be, if they remained, a disloyal and restless minority and a source of danger to Poland. But it is not the intention of the Poles that they shall remain: they will either be driven out or frozen out.

If the United Nations were to support these extravagant claims, the congested population of the Reich would at last cry out for *Lebensraum* with good reason. The threatened populations add up to a considerable figure. Taking the pre-Nazi census of 1925, it stands thus:

Danzig State .....	385,000
East Prussia .....	2,229,000
West Prussia .....	327,000
Lower Silesia .....	2,988,000
Upper Silesia .....	1,299,000
Part of Pomerania .....	1,000,000
	<hr/>
	8,228,000

To this we may add most of the three and a half million Germans of Czechoslovakia, also menaced with expulsion, and an unknown figure covering the German minorities driven from other countries—a grand total of anything from ten to twelve millions. Austria also is threatened by the Yugoslavs with the loss of the whole province of Styria, including the city of Graz. Given the



atrocious record of the Germans in Poland and the traditions of the Polish Republic, it would be useless to suggest that these Germans could live under Polish rule, even if equal civil rights were promised them. A high proportion of these Germans are farmers, for whom it would be difficult to find land or agricultural work within the Reich. Could a revolutionary agitator ask for more congenial material than these refugees will offer, as they crowd into the towns?

Polish claims at Germany's expense were carefully weighed at Versailles and received ample satisfaction. Lower Silesia, with Breslau and its half-million inhabitants, has an indisputably German population. Poland, after a plebiscite, was allotted at least her fair share of Upper Silesia. There is a small Polish minority in German Upper Silesia, but it was balanced by an even larger German minority in the portion that was assigned to Poland when the province was divided. How unimportant this Polish minority is may be judged from the composition of the provincial Diet under the Weimar Republic, when voting under a system of proportional representation was free. The Polish parties never won more than three out of 55 seats. Over Pomerania no argument is necessary: its population includes only a negligible number of Poles.

One fact alone suffices to dispose of these Polish claims. These provinces were all so solidly German, that not one of them, not even East Prussia or Upper Silesia, ever returned to the Reichstag during the Republican era, in spite of proportional representation, a single Member for a Polish party.

East Prussia is also solidly German. There are, it is true, two districts round Allenstein in East Prussia and Marienwerder in West Prussia which contain a population indisputably Polish by origin. It is bilingual and uses as its home language the Masurian dialect. But most of it became Lutheran at the Reformation and is by culture and choice decidedly German. This was tested by the plebiscite which the League of Nations conducted with all the customary guarantees in 1920. These districts were garrisoned by British and Italian troops. The result was a vote of 98 per cent. for Germany in the Allenstein district and 92 per cent. in

the Marienwerder area. In Eastern Europe nationality always tends to follow religion: in these regions Protestants are Germans; Catholics are Poles; the Orthodox are Russians. This alien element is numerically very small. In the census of 1925, some 20,500 persons (0.9 per cent.) returned their home language as Polish; 41,400 spoke Masurian at home (1.8 per cent.) and 2,700 (0.1) spoke Lithuanian—less, all told, than 3 per cent.

East Prussia has a peculiar character of its own. It was conquered and colonised by the Teutonic Knights in the thirteenth century and was always a frontier province which led a somewhat insular existence. As in other frontier regions, national sentiment was keener than in secure inland districts. It became solidly Protestant in 1525, and thanks to the Lutheran Church and good schools the population, closely akin to the neighbouring Lithuanians, was thoroughly assimilated. The Poles were later settlers. Königsberg, which was, like Danzig, a Hansa town, with a university at which Kant taught and Herder studied, has many proud memories and associations. It was a window open to the wider world and through it penetrated many liberalising influences from overseas: Kant himself was of Scottish descent. Throughout the greater part of the nineteenth century the province was liberal in its politics and gave several leaders to the progressive forces in Germany, notably von Schön, a pupil of Adam Smith and von Simson, who presided over the Frankfurt Parliament. During the last generation, however, the rural districts went solidly conservative while Königsberg remained a Social-Democratic stronghold. The Nazis met with stubborn resistance both in this province and in Danzig. Königsberg is a considerable though not a first-rate port, with a population of over a quarter of a million. The province has few industries and lives by farming and horse-breeding. While the agricultural population of Germany amounts only to 23 per cent. of the whole, that of East Prussia is over 45 per cent.

As elsewhere in North Germany there are many large estates in the hands of Junkers, but it is a mistake to regard East Prussia as in any special sense the headquarters of this caste. Most of their estates in this remote province are encumbered by debt

and in the past generation they have had to depend on the subsidies of the *Osthilfe*. The strongholds of the Junkers are to be sought rather in Mecklenburg and Pomerania. The mass of the agricultural population in East Prussia consists not of these squires and big farmers, but of peasants and smallholders. The number of these small farms and holdings, with an acreage below 50 acres, now totals 230,662. Of these roughly one half are of less than  $1\frac{1}{4}$  acres in extent. The farmers with a medium acreage, ranging from 50 to 250 acres, number 19,449. Of large farmers and "Junkers," holding anything over 250 acres, there are 3,440. These Junkers form only 1.3 of the cultivators of East Prussia, but they hold nearly 40 per cent. of the land.\*

The small farmers and peasant-owners are deeply attached to the soil which their families have tilled for seven centuries. They are by reputation a sociable, kindly and humorous people. The population is relatively sparse: 158 per square mile as against 347 in the Reich generally; but these figures convey a misleading impression. A great part of the surface is covered by the long chains of the Masurian lakes and by sand dunes and forests. Though some of the soil is fertile, this province was always relatively poor and its young people have always migrated in great numbers to Western Germany. It has no mineral wealth, while its available markets are remote. Annexation to Poland would not solve its economic difficulties, since that Republic is well supplied with everything East Prussia can produce. The expulsion of these yeomen and peasants would be a peculiarly harsh measure. They could find land nowhere else, either in Germany or overseas. The agricultural labourers would be equally helpless. To glance at a map is not the way to decide this question: if we do our duty, we shall face these families of workers and peasants before we cast our vote for the annexation of this province to Poland.

We must, however, face our duty to the Poles as well. Fortunately this is easy, for our sympathies are deeply engaged on

\* More detailed figures will be found in *East Prussia*, by R. Machray, p. 86. I have reckoned the hectare as roughly  $2\frac{1}{2}$  acres.

behalf of this gallant and sorely-trying nation. No one ought to forget the tragic story of the thrice partitioned Republic. Their poverty is a reproach to Europe, for it meant that while we did help them twenty years ago to regain their political independence, we did very little to lift them out of their economic misery. The peasants are only just emerging from a condition akin to serfdom. It was still usual, only a few years ago, for a peasant to doff his cap and bend to the ground when he met his landlord. I shall not readily forget my own memories of such a landlord's magnificent stable of brick, perfectly drained and lit with electric light. His peasants inhabited mud huts without sanitation and made shift with candles. These Polish Junkers were as grasping as their Prussian counterparts and much less efficient in the management of their great estates. They cherish, moreover, a reckless and romantic brand of militarism. If they continue to dominate the Republic, territorial gains will bring small benefit to the masses. Much was done in the earlier years of the Republic, before it entered its quasi-Fascist phase, to provide land for the peasants, but a great proportion of their holdings are too small to yield a subsistence for their families and they lack the capital for intensive cultivation. Far too many are working on the land and the output of their largely wasted effort is pitifully small. On every hundred acres of farm land in Poland there are over 15 workers active in agriculture: in Denmark, France and Sweden the number ranges from 6 to 9, while in the United Kingdom less than six active workers can cultivate the same area. Worse still, in Poland each of these active workers produces a net output of less than £30 a year, as against something over £120 in the United Kingdom and Denmark.\* The weekly wages of the agricultural labourer reflect the poverty of the land: in Poland they ranged in 1937 from 7s. to 10s.; in Germany from 18s. to 23s., and in the United Kingdom from 30s. to 36s. Better cultivation demands a great increase in the use of fertilisers, more machinery and improved live-stock. In some districts drainage would add to

\* *Food and Farming in Post-War Europe*, by P. Lamartine Yates and D. Warriner (Oxford University Press), p. 39.

the cultivable land and in others irrigation. There are available new varieties of grass suited to the relatively dry climate, which would render dairy-farming profitable. The roads are miserable and motor transport only just coming into use. Education, also, is backward.

The only adequate remedy for the poverty and underemployment of the Polish village is to introduce suitable industries. Three raw materials Poland possesses in abundance: coal, iron and wood. Of these a much greater and more varied use could be made if capital, skill and science were available, for example in making plastics. Textiles have for long been established in and around Lodz. But other light and processing industries could be greatly expanded, for the capacity of the peasants to buy will increase with their capacity to produce. The reader will not expect a detailed economic programme for Poland; what concerns us is that the cure for Polish poverty lies rather in the better utilisation of the acres and manpower she possesses than in territorial expansion. From the Germans, by way of reparation, she has every right to claim considerable help in kind for her development, in the form of fertilisers, agricultural machinery and industrial equipment. In fact the Germans have during the war done much that will benefit her, by developing the heavy industries of Polish Upper Silesia. But there are many claimants to divide what the Germans can furnish, nor will their devastated towns be an El Dorado on which we can draw indefinitely. America and Britain must also be prepared to do their share in restoring Poland to something more than her former level of prosperity. This we should do on Lend-Lease terms: that is to say, without charging interest. Our responsibility for the future peace of Europe obliges us to restrain Polish ambition. We shall do it with a better moral right if we compensate her from our own resources for the disproportionate sacrifice she has endured.

We have still to consider Poland's claim for access to the sea. Ample provision was made for this in the Versailles Settlement. She got the great river highway of the Vistula, adequate railway facilities, her own new port of Gdynia and the full use of Danzig under the League's control. The famous "Corridor" is much more

than a channel of communication: it is a province which once included in its population a big German minority. All this, with any modifications experience may suggest, Poland will recover. If for commercial reasons she requires addition outlets, it is easy to provide her with docks at Königsberg, Pillau or Memel, under a lease which also confers running powers over the connecting railways. The Czechs, completely land-locked though they are, are content with similar facilities for their trade, which carry with them no territorial rights.

But is this all? The Poles require access to the sea. They may also wish to consolidate their territory, so that it shall stretch without a break from their central homelands to the Baltic shores. But their chief reason for claiming East Prussia is strategical. The map drawn at Versailles made a difficult problem for their soldiers. Their Republic has no natural frontiers. Northern Europe is a nearly featureless plain, broken only by rivers and low hills. Neither rivers nor hills marched with their frontiers. The Corridor is far too narrow for a successful defence. East Prussia outflanks Poland on the north, and was used in 1939 as a base by the Nazi armies. The easy German victory was due to an immense superiority in mechanisation, air-power and man-power. But the Poles are entitled, none the less, to draw attention to the unfavourable strategical situation of their territory.

Then does their safety demand the annexation of East Prussia? The answer is simple. The United Nations are determined to disarm Germany and to keep her disarmed. If she has no army and no weapons fit for an attack, it is superfluous to provide against an outflanking movement on her part. Once Germany is disarmed, East Prussia ceases to be a threat to Poland. It becomes a hostage.

A plan has been suggested by which Poland's wishes could be met by an exchange of territory. Let Poland take East Prussia; but in return let her restore the Corridor and Danzig to Germany. She might still retain her rights of navigation over the Vistula and the use of docks at Gdynia and Danzig. This solution would give her a continuous territory, which would not be exposed to an encircling attack. It deserves consideration; but to my mind

the advantages it promises are balanced by the loss and suffering it would inflict on the East Prussian population.

There is yet another way out, which to my thinking is the best. Let us return to the map drawn at Versailles, with such minor adjustments as experience suggests. But East Prussia should be demilitarised, as the Rhineland was. In addition, a mixed military force drawn from the United Nations should be permanently stationed in it. It should include a Russian with a British and possibly a French contingent. This garrison need not be burdensomely large; nor need it become an obtrusive fact in the life of the province. In course of time, if ever an International Force comes into existence, some units of it would replace these mixed contingents.

No juggling with frontiers can add much to Poland's safety. Her future will depend chiefly on her ability to live on friendly terms with the Soviet Union. For her defence she will have to rely on the measures of collective security which the Council of Europe must provide. It cannot help her to antagonise the German nation for ever. The uncompensated loss of a province so indisputably Germanic as East Prussia would never be forgotten.

## SUDETENS AND AUSTRIANS

**I**T IS unnecessary to argue that Czechoslovakia should recover the territory that was hers before Munich. The Sudetenland was assigned to her subject to conditions which ensured the cultural and civic rights of its German population—rights which the Czechs on the whole respected. But in spite of this relative liberality, they never treated the Germans as equal partners in the Republic. The promise their statesmen made at Versailles, that they would build their mixed State on the Swiss model, was never fulfilled. To the less numerous and very backward Slovaks and Ruthenians they granted autonomy, which they refused to the Germans. It is disturbing, though it may not be surprising, that

Czech statesmen now propose to expel the major part of this German population and to refuse cultural rights to such parts of it as may remain. They suggest, however, a slight revision of the old frontier in Germany's favour. This abandonment of the liberal policy which Masaryk and Benesh followed is, let us hope, a passing reaction to the savage provocations the Czechs have received. They have forgotten the stubborn courage shown in resisting the Nazis by German workers in the Sudeten Socialist Party, which included, with its Youth Group, a quarter of a million men and women. Twenty thousand of them were flung into Nazi prisons. It would, of course, be proper to punish or expel any native Sudetens who shared in the crimes of the Nazis. It would be advisable to give all the native Germans of this Republic the option of choosing either Czech or German citizenship. Those who choose the latter should be required and assisted to quit: those who choose the former bound to loyalty. But their cultural rights must be respected, notably their right to use their own language and manage their own schools.

The annexation of Austria to the German Reich will, of course, be annulled. That is the decision of the Moscow Conference. Automatically she reverts to her former status. After an interval for calm discussion and negotiation she should be free to determine her own future, either by plebiscite or by the vote of a Constituent Assembly. It is improbable that many Austrians will now wish, as Austrians with virtual unanimity wished in 1918, to rejoin Germany, even if she again becomes a democratic and federal republic. But that solution ought not to be closed to Austria, nor ought she to be debarred, once again, from concluding a customs union with Germany. The problem of the existence of this dwarf State has never yet been solved. Its internal discords were largely due to the negligence in economic matters of the victors, who broke up the workable economic unity of the Dual Monarchy and devised nothing to take its place. "Independence" can be, in Austria's case, only an ironical fiction. Whether within an integrated Europe, a Danubian Federation or a federal German Reich, Austria can live only as a member of a larger whole. Her



noble gifts to European culture entitle her to something more helpful than sympathy: what she must have is her due place in a planned international economy.

The difficult territorial question of the South Tyrol should be submitted to the decision of neutrals. Italy oppressed its Austrian population, but Hitler transferred some of it to parts of the Reich, where it cannot remain.

## MINORITIES AND MIGRANTS

**A**FTER THIS brief survey of some details in our problem, we may sum up our positive proposals thus:

(a) At the armistice, if not before, Germany must withdraw all her troops and officials to her own territories. These are those assigned to her in the Versailles Treaty and the subsequent plebiscites. This should be the *datum* line for all subsequent negotiations; there are no good reasons for any substantial departure from it. Alsace and Lorraine will of course automatically return to France.

(b) Where in the opinion of the Allied governments a *prima facie* case exists for an alteration in Germany's frontiers, it should be submitted to third party judgment, i.e. to a neutral commission, which will arrive at a decision after hearing both sides and taking, in suitable cases, a plebiscite.

(c) Strategical considerations should be treated as secondary. Aerial warfare and modern engineering have made nearly obsolete the barriers on which the defence used to rely. Safety must be ensured by collective organisation rather than by geographical obstacles.

(d) It will be necessary in some cases to provide for the migration of populations. German minorities from countries which the Nazis have oppressed may find the prospect of their return unattractive: those still there may not wish to stay. Such cases call for an International Commission. If transfers are inevitable, they can be arranged with a minimum of hardship and loss. Hitler

transferred to Alsace-Lorraine and to Polish territory in the Corridor and round Lodz German populations from the Balkans, the Baltic States and South Tyrol. They cannot remain where they are now. But there were long-established German colonies in Eastern Europe, which must be distinguished from those which the Nazis planted. They consisted of peaceful settlers, often fugitives from religious persecution, who brought an older culture with them to a backward region. Their disappearance will involve some loss. Wholesale migration is always a painful process, and though it may be inevitable, it registers a defeat for civilisation: two peoples have failed in the effort to live together in a co-operative spirit. In the case of the Germans the phrase "exchange of populations" is a misleading term. There are in Germany no compact resident groups of alien race who could be, or would wish to be, transferred. The Polish miners in Westphalia have no land and present no problem. There are no Polish peasants settled on the land in Germany to-day. The settlers planted by the Nazis in Poland must of course withdraw: they are likely, indeed, to scuttle back. If possible, their return should be organised in an orderly way, with a minimum of murder.

(e) Looking to the future, when the normal life of Europe is restored, a voluntary movement of its working population may be resumed on a considerable scale. Workers from the agricultural countries, Poland, the Balkans and Italy, may be drawn to Western industrial regions, even if the industrial development of Eastern Europe is encouraged on a big scale. Under fair and kindly conditions such migrations may confer both cultural and economic benefits. They call, however, first for study and then for international regulation. The temporary migrant should be required to enter the Union of his trade and should share all the benefits, rights and standards that belong to natives. Might not some form of adult education be made available to him? After a term of years, naturalisation should be open to him.

(f) A charter guaranteeing to racial or religious minorities equal civic and cultural rights must be adopted for all Europe and enforced. The case of the Jews is in everyone's mind, but other communities also suffered from harsh and even brutal treat-

ment, notably in the Balkans. The provision made under the League of Nations for appeals and investigations was wholly inadequate. But the chief defect of the League's work for minorities was that it applied only to the so-called Succession States. No Great Power was subject to it. The Czechs, who treated their minorities well, submitted to the League. The Poles, who treated theirs ill, rebelled against it. The Italians, with a shocking record in the South Tyrol and in their Slav districts, escaped any international supervision. This invidious discrimination between the greater and lesser Powers eventually wrecked this first attempt at international control. When we try again, as we must, that mistake should be avoided. The Great Powers, the victors at their head, must volunteer to submit themselves to international control. No one has ever accused Britain or France (until Marshal Pétain dishonoured her tradition) of persecuting either their Jews or their Welsh and Gaelic, their Breton and Basque citizens. Precisely because their record is clean, let them be the first to sign the charter and submit themselves to control.

## V: Re-education

THE CONDUCT of the German people, since the Nazis took charge of them, has presented the world with a nearly insoluble problem in mass psychology. As we watched them, incredulity gave way to horror and horror to an implacable anger. We have to believe the evidence; but I for one am still bewildered and a long way from the scientific attitude which a physician must attain before he dares to prescribe. I think I can grasp the historic conditions, especially the economic conditions, which gave the Nazis their chance. But the cruelty, the ruthlessness, the total disregard of the claims and rights of others, the barely sane exaggeration of nationalism—is all this a permanent characteristic of this people?

The cruelty—massive, systematic and without a parallel in the records of civilised peoples—how are we to explain it? There may be some exaggeration in the news that reaches us from Poland and Russia; but I think we must believe much of it, perhaps most of it. Why should we doubt it? I have with my own ears heard Hitler exalting *Brutalität* as a virtue; as he pronounced the word, it was as if he had bludgeoned me over the head. Yet I have never felt in Germany that I was among a cruel people. Cats and dogs do not shrink from a stranger as they do in Spain; Germans cherish no cruel sports: they do not ill-use their horses as the Latins too often do: in one respect—their rejection of flogging as a punishment—they were formerly in advance of Englishmen. What, then, has happened to them?

We may discover a clue if we note that their behaviour in this war has varied greatly in different countries. When they fought against British troops, it was correct: with few exceptions they observed the rules of war. In Norway, Holland and France, if their conduct was often brutal, at least it was much better than

in Eastern Europe. It is only in dealing with races whom they consider "subhuman," the Jews and the Slavs, that they have flung away all restraint, exterminated harmless and helpless populations in tens and hundreds of thousands, and treated human beings as if they were noxious animals. The inference is, I think, that their cruelty is not instinctive and congenital. They do not act in this monstrous way merely because they enjoy it. They are obeying a theory: they are even carrying out a duty.

This is to the English mind barely comprehensible. Some Englishmen dislike Jews and even attribute to them a large share in corrupting the modern world. When an Englishman holds such views, what does he do? He avoids Jews in social life and may be rude to them: he smiles indulgently at anti-Semitic excesses: he will not go out of his way to rescue persecuted Jews or open our gates to the fugitives: he nods assent when the Colonial Office checks the development of Zionism in Palestine. But he does not demand Nuremberg decrees, or dream of exterminating the Jews. A German, on the other hand, carries out his syllogism in action. "The Jews are engaged in the systematic corruption of Aryan society: therefore all Jews should be exterminated." And he proceeds to do it. This is a terrifying excess of rationalism. Does any sane man put his faith so absolutely in logic? The road in the German mind from thought to action may be shorter and straighter than with us. We walk warily among ideas. We rarely trust ourselves to apply them boldly. This trait in the mind of Germans may be a source of strength, when they are free to examine and discuss the ideas they adopt as their guide in action. It makes them a terror to mankind when, under coercion, their nation adopts a set of ideas imposed on it, as the Nazi creed was, without examination or discussion.

The conduct of Germans in the last decade has been governed by the belief that they have a mission to act as a *Herrenvolk*, so incomparably superior to others that no concern for the rights and interests of these immeasurably inferior people should deter Nordics from using and exploiting them. This attitude is not new, nor is it peculiar to Germans. Milton coined the phrase "God's Englishmen" and Mr. Baldwin used it to justify their

claim to play providence to India. But I think it is fair to say that even in their more arrogant poses they remember that *noblesse oblige* and recognise, as the *Herrenvolk* do not, that they owe a duty to "the breeds without the law."

In the last decade nationalism, based on the pseudo-science of racial biology, has become an obsession for the Germans. In the speeches of their leaders the words "German" or "Germany" recur in every other sentence. Advertisements use them with the same humourless monotony. It was not always so. When I first lived among Germans as a young student, towards the close of the last century, I was aware of two sharply contrasted attitudes. Some, of my acquaintances, women among them, would lecture me, with an offensiveness that still stings, about the iniquities and greed of Englishmen. This was the epoch between the Jameson Raid and the Boer War. I sensed the envy of our Empire that lay beneath this moral condemnation. On the other hand, I noted a lively and friendly interest in the cultural life of other peoples. Scandinavian plays and Russian novels were in those days translated much earlier than with us. The enviably cheap Reclam series made the literature of every other people familiar. Even children were at home in the world of the oriental imagination. German nationalism is strident, assertive and egoistic, where English or French nationalism is assured, easy-going and relatively well-mannered. German nationalists have to shout, exaggerate and organise, where Englishmen hint, understate and take for granted—because nationalism was in Germany, until the other day, a weaker as it was a more recent growth than with us. Only lately has it become a fixed and widespread passion. But the older cosmopolitan attitude which inspired Schiller's *Hymn to Joy* was still alive, even ten years ago.

To understand the nature of German nationalism it must be realised that it is a reaction against memories and experiences of impotence, division and humiliation. How often during two centuries did foreign armies, French, Russian, Swedish and even English, trample German fields and hold German cities to ransom? If Hitler must march on Moscow, was it not to prove that a German also can play Napoleon? No German can forget that his

country was once broken into three hundred and sixty-six petty States, whose princes tried to forget their native tongue, wrote French verses and aped the glitter of Versailles. When power came to them, after their belated achievement of unity in 1871, they over-valued it and used it with the clumsy roughness of parvenus. Then, in 1918, came defeat and the humiliations of the Settlement.

This time their reaction betrayed the deep neurosis under which many of them had been suffering. Degraded to an unequal status among European Powers, they would demonstrate their superiority at any cost to others and even to themselves. Economic causes drove them into Imperialism, as they have driven others. When Britain expanded, she had the Seven Seas to do it in. When they erupted, they had to do it in a confined space and the explosion was, therefore, peculiarly violent. They were not content, as Englishmen were, to take the colonies they wanted, as opportunity beckoned. They conditioned themselves consciously for the struggle with German thoroughness and evolved for the purpose a new code of morals and a new system of education.

If we put this case to a psychologist, could he offer us any hope? He would probably prescribe a long period of mental rest and freedom. He would look about for constructive activities, in which to employ the patient, as his strength returned. He might soothe the diseased vanity of the sufferer by reminding him steadily of his real contributions to the general good, in science, music and the world of thought. In this way he would also restore him to a civilised hierarchy of values and undo the Nazi schooling in vulgarity. He might point out that this reckless German interest in ideas offers a good teacher his chance. "This ignorant but intelligent young man really believes that Russians are barbarian and sub-human. Very well, then, let him hear some Russian music. Let him read some Russian novels. Let him grasp from films the miracles of creative planning these Russians have achieved." Finally, the doctor might enquire how recently the patient was sane. It was not so long ago.

## TEN YEARS AGO

WE ARE apt to forget that there is ebb and flow in the German world of ideas, as in every other. During the decade that followed the last war the prevailing tone of German literature was in violent contrast both to the older nationalist attitude and its later exaggeration in the Nazi creed. Some of the outstanding books of this period became familiar to us also. Everyone read Remarque's *All Quiet on the Western Front* and Arnold Zweig's *Sergeant Grischa*. These were merely the most successful specimens among a dozen similar novels, all of them popular and some of them of equal merit. The prevailing notes of creative literature were humanity and a revolt, bitter and passionate, against brutality and oppression. Much of it was frankly pacifist, socialist and anti-militarist. On the stage, the leading playwright was Ernst Toller, and he again had rivals and imitators who wrote in the same vein. Among the "best-sellers" of this period were several volumes of collected letters by soldiers, which all breathed the same hatred of war and the same longing for a society devoted to peaceful creation. The leading novelist, however posterity may rank him, was Thomas Mann, a courageous liberal in his outlook. High above all these stood Rilke, surely the most sensitive and humane among the greater poets of our age, and he was studied and idolised as few poets are while they live. This was a period, moreover, of eager experiment and progress, not merely in the arts but in education and psychology, which were both seeking out new ways for helping men to live happily together in society. In short, if we are looking for "the other Germany" there is no need to go back to the classics of the last century. Ten years ago it was mentally alive, fertile and popular.

The most characteristic social phenomenon of this decade was the Youth Movement. The lads and lasses who went out into the woods to sing and dance and talk over all the problems of life had a new set of values. They had broken with the rigidity of the old order: they questioned everything: they were not disciplined



sheep, nor were they overawed by the State. It is hard to generalise about them, but in its early phases the movement was certainly individualistic. It was, however, so important and formative that the political parties and the churches fell upon it and to some extent captured it. Youth which had begun to think freely for itself was flung back into nationalism. After the first decade came struggle, hotter even for youth than for its elders. Twelve years ago, amid the slump which terrified the young men of the middle and professional classes, because they saw only a slender hope of employment at the end of their studies, the Nazis had won the ear of the younger generation. They came to it as the Party of Youth: it is significant that in the Reichstag of 1930 the average age of their deputies was 28, while that of the Social Democrats was 45.

Little can be learned, even if we could do it in war-time with scrupulous fairness, by cataloguing ideas and tendencies which we suppose to be peculiarly German. Ideas do not flourish in a vacuum. They are embodied in institutions. They may owe their ascendancy to deliberate and conscious pressure and organisation. The Prussian State fostered a nationalist outlook by its control of the higher schools and universities. History, which was in England dominated by the Liberal school, was in Prussia written chiefly by realists and nationalists. In its turn this State reflected a peculiar class-structure which the Weimar Republic left intact. During a decade under a liberal constitution, German minds worked and responded to their environment with a new spontaneity and freedom. But again, after 1933, the State took charge of ideas. Power, organised military power, with a tyrannous apparatus of coercion behind it, standardised the nation's thinking. The old class-structure was still there. The now silenced middle-class and the crushed working-class lay helpless under the Junkers and industrialists who had found their instrument of propaganda and regimentation in a party which threw over all that deserved respect in the old traditions. This party, with the single aim of power before it, set to work to mould the character of the rising generation in its own image. With the resources of a closely knit

State and of modern science in its hands, it brought to its work of corruption the older arts of the gangster, the bought journalist and the whore.

## NAZI EDUCATION

THE NAZIS had a perfectly conscious purpose in their handling of youth and they carried it out with a thoroughness of which only Germans are capable. No modern State, unless it be the Soviet Union, has ever cared so much and done so much for youth. Nothing was too good for the children: their meeting places, sports-grounds and hostels were splendid, even luxurious, and set in beautiful surroundings. Here they could enjoy such sports as riding and yachting, reserved elsewhere for the privileged classes. Whatever we condemn in the system, at least it taught children to recognise their social duties in life. The girls learned to think of motherhood as a high vocation. Always, however perverted by national arrogance this Nazi teaching might be, it did appeal to the idealism of the young and their genius for devotion. Unhappily they learned to give to their race "what was meant for mankind"; it was race in this narrow prison they worshipped. There was no lack of colour and glamour in the life these children led in their hostels and in journeys far afield. They were intoxicated when they felt their importance within the State. The home was paralysed and obliterated as an influence. Boys and girls turned away from its dullness and transferred all their respect and affection to the fanatical young romantics who led them in the Hitler-Youth. But all this, even what was good in it, was animated by a sinister purpose. The Nazis saw life only as a struggle in which the German race must win mastery by a combination of idealism and discipline with brutality. They despised the intellect and the scientist's attitude of objectivity and lowered the old standards of education, while they set to work to develop in youth the type of character suited to a war for domination. From the more promising material they reared a caste of leaders.

Since they despised humanity and mercy as weakness and decadence, they broke down all the principles, scruples and instincts that make a civilised man. They aimed at obliterating in the lads every individual reaction. To inculcate brutality and unflinching obedience they were even commanded to bite living rats. The lessons youth learned in blinkers behind an impenetrable screen were repeated visibly and audibly by their daily environment. The schools taught Nazi; the hostels acted Nazi; the stage and the film talked Nazi; the streets looked Nazi; the Courts judged Nazi, and a typical lesson in cruelty lay in wait for youth whenever it met an outcast Jew. Power, irresistible power, was behind the new immorality. It succeeded; it worked.

To exaggerate the wickedness of this schooling would be impossible; but it may be that we do exaggerate its lasting effects. It rested on power. When that power crumbles; when it is evident that brutality and blind obedience no longer succeed as a system, will not the numbed minds, even of the younger generation, begin to work again, as among the students they already do? The lesson of military defeat is necessary: the battlefield has proved that even the most despised "sub-human" people, the Russians, are stronger than the *Herrenvolk*. But what is most essential of all is that the internal structure of power should crumble visibly and lie in wreckage. Unless it is pulled down by German hands, the lesson will be imperfect and it may not be lasting.

In the effort to visualise this relationship of ideas and power, a crude picture may help us. In this war and in the domestic struggles that will follow it, armies and populations are fighting and will go on fighting, as it were, for a single objective—the possession of a broadcasting station and a printing press. The battle is not won till these are stormed. Our part is to take them from the Nazis and give them to the Common Man. But the best would be that in the last round the storming party should consist of Germans. In one vital matter the metaphor stands in need of interpretation. When the Common Man in a democracy controls the press and the wireless, it would be fatal that any one party should again monopolise them. If there is to be a return to the rationalistic civilisation of the West, they must be used not to

impose a new set of dogmas but to stimulate free discussion and objective thinking. That will be re-education.

If a revolution takes place, our task is to give it any help it may welcome in this branch of its work, as in others. But we have to prepare for the worse alternative—that no revolution has succeeded and that a military administration must at the start govern Germany. What, then, should it do with the universities and schools? We should not in the early days take this task too heavily. Little good and not much harm can be done in the first months. In the confusion and excitement of an invasion how much at the best will children learn? The universities and higher schools can have few students. The depleted teaching staffs consist largely of women and older men, rarely Nazi at heart. We need not fear much from Nazi influence: the Party will have been suppressed, if it did not first collapse, and the average unheroic man among the teachers will be anxious to disavow any connection with it. The text-books, however, are impregnated with Nazi doctrines. The teaching of history and the social sciences should be suspended, while text-books in use under the Republic are reprinted. A purge of the more notorious Nazis among the teachers is necessary even at this stage. If a provisional local administration has been set up, on some such lines as we have suggested (p. 45) it could undertake the first emergency measures to reorganise the teaching staffs, with the approval of the Commandant. The control of the military administration over education should be confined to a minimum and it should be negative. It must forbid Nazi teaching in the schools: but that is as much as it should attempt to do. It cannot undertake the positive work of creation: that Germans must do for themselves, at their own pace.

### GERMANS MUST DO IT

**A**NOTHER VIEW has been put forward by influential experts which seems to me profoundly mistaken—that we, the United Nations, must ourselves assume responsibility for the re-education of the Germans and give it under our sole direction

a positive shape which conforms to our own ideas.\* The plan is, in brief, that the Allies shall appoint their own High Commissioner for German Education, assisted by a Commission that shall include no German. The nationality of this gentleman is not specified: no one suggests, I notice, that he should be a Russian. He is to wield, for an undefined period, absolute power over the whole field of education, from primary school to university, dismissing and appointing whom he will, dictating the curriculum and controlling the entire system so absolutely that he may even, if he sees fit, re-establish confessional schools. Further, he is to control the entire intellectual life of the country, since he will be empowered to censor or suppress books and newspapers, films and broadcasts, if these contain what he regards as "anti-social doctrines." His positive functions are to include

\*The plan to which we refer, entitled *Education and the United Nations*, is the report of a joint commission of the London International Assembly and Council for Education in World Citizenship. The above is an accurate summary of its proposals. It contains, however, much else that is wise and well said. Two hands were obviously at work upon it. One of them wrote:

"In our view they (the German people) must re-educate themselves.

No one else can bring about that change of feeling and of purpose that alone can enable them to become loyal and trusted members of the community of nations. Certainly such a spiritual change cannot be dictated by conquering powers."

The other hand then sketched the plan by which these Conquering Powers shall do this very thing, through a High Commissioner "assisted by a Commission whose members would be chosen from the Allied or neutral countries."

Elsewhere the two hands collaborated in such curious passages as this:

"There has been enough burning of the books, and censorship is repugnant to us, but we shall be dealing with a very sick people and exceptional measures will be necessary for a time. We believe, therefore, that it would be wise—and a rough measure of retribution—for the High Commissioner to arrange for all copies of *Mein Kampf*, and other canonical writings of the Nazi Party, to be collected and pulped down for new paper."

In this way unanimity was achieved. The best thing to do with *Mein Kampf* is to study it and answer it.

the issue of books, especially translations, which he considers salutary. Even the leisure-time activities of youth are to come under his control, its sports, evening classes and organised movements.

No amount of tact and good sense in the wisest of omnipotent High Commissioners could make this scheme a success. Bayonets can do much, but they cannot educate. The military administration may have to take charge of the material side of the German people's life—food, transport, currency. That is inevitable and in competent hands may bring the good results we expect. But a nation's intellectual life, including its system of education, is a matter too intimate for the dictation of a foreign authority over whose desk an enemy flag will float. Against a foreign control of its education any European people, even a people much less nationalistic than the Germans, would react with suspicion and hostility. The men appointed by the Commissioner would be regarded as quislings and hirelings, and the ideas he sought to foster would be resisted because they carried an enemy's *imprimatur*. If enemies are to learn from enemies they must spontaneously turn their minds towards us—which some of them will do, if we are wise enough to refrain from compulsion.

There are other dangers in this scheme, on which it is unnecessary to dwell: a censorship of opinions, as distinct from an honest military censorship over news and actual incitements to violence, could be only too easily misused to suppress Socialist thinking. If this control were exercised, as some advocate, for a generation, it might well bring about the most reckless nationalist reaction in European history.

Help we can give in many ways to the Germans in their task of self-education. A distinguished authority on education of allied nationality might with advantage be attached to AMGOT, as a liaison officer. But he should have no executive authority. There will be formidable difficulties to overcome; but Germans had a great tradition in the past, which they will rediscover. Their modern progressive thinking was alive ten years ago. They used to keep their minds wide open to foreign thought, until the Nazis forcibly closed them. There are intellectual leaders of distinction

among the exiles, and there are others still in Germany, who lived in retirement and escaped corruption. The re-orientation will have to come from these men through books, wireless talks, newspaper articles, the stage, films, meetings and universities. There are religious teachers who will give it from their own angle. In the workers' parties and trade unions, and above all through the workers' educational movement, the *Volkshochschulen*, which flourished under the Republic, some fresh thinking of a creative order may be expected. To try to clamp it within an Anglo-American framework would be fatal: England and America have not lived through the ghastly experience Germans have undergone: our outlook, our mood, our institutions may not suit them.

Of one thing we may feel certain: in freedom, after defeat, Germans will react, and react with violence, against the Nazi view of life. They will rediscover the morality their oppressors trampled into the dust. Some will turn to religion. In politics many will grasp for the first time what liberalism in the broad sense of the word should mean. The Social Democratic Party left no glorious memory behind it. Socialism may reappear in a new form, with a stress rather on ethics than on economics. The prestige of the Russians may favour Communism. No one could predict with assurance precisely how Germans will react: but react they will. If the military authority tries to suppress all political activity, still they will react, but underground and against us.

One grave difficulty will be that the teaching staff of the elementary schools, always under-valued and under-paid, has been depleted by casualties and will now have to be purged. There were, as I can testify, in the Weimar period some fine types among these teachers, but the best of them were broken or dismissed by the Nazis. The defect of the average teacher may have been that he lacked pride in his profession and confidence in himself. Will the Republic of to-morrow, under an inspiring leader, call for volunteers, willing to take up this work of re-education, not as an ill-paid career but as a patriotic duty? Yet the formal work of the schools is less important than what is done outside them by organised Youth Movements. Some of the exiled teachers

have been thinking out this problem.\* They propose to turn the mind of youth to creative and constructive tasks—for example, to bring help to the millions rendered homeless by bombardment and migration. Activity, and precisely this kind of activity, is the proper cure for the Nazi teaching of brutality. If a Labour Corps is created (as we suggest on p. 108), it should undertake the same kind of work. But the whole German population will have to give its mind for years to come to the task of rebuilding. That also will be re-education.

How, then, are the Germans to be chosen who direct and organise education? Two ways suggest themselves. Germans must do the choosing. One proposal we have already made (p. 49): that from below a provisional German Administration might be built up by indirect election: it would choose a Director of Education. This process could hardly be completed in less than a year from the beginning of the Occupation. It may be too slow. But we might approach two or three of the most distinguished intellectuals among the exiles—for example Einstein, Thomas Mann and Professor Karl Mannheim; we might add to them two or three of the Germans still in Germany who have proved their worth by their courage, for example the Catholic Bishop of Berlin, von Preysing and such liberal Protestant thinkers as Karl Bart and Dr. Tillich. We might then ask this nucleus to co-opt half a dozen more from among the educationalists, scientists and artists they could trust to form a Council for Education. It would choose a Director. A man chosen in this way by Germans of such eminence could hardly be regarded as a quisling. He might conduct this department until an elected government comes into being.

\* A wise and creative pamphlet on this subject is *Gesinnungswandel*, by Minna Specht (Renaissance Publishing Co. is.).



## INTERNATIONAL HELP

WHILE STRESSING German initiative, we should not underestimate our own contribution. The Quakers by their quiet and persuasive influence will help, as they did after the last war. Our soldiers in the army of occupation can help, if they are as human and as kindly as their fathers were in the Rhineland. Socialists may do it among German Socialists, if they have kept their international faith alive. The German Director of Education may wish to call in educationalists from other countries to assist him. There are, however, ways more important than these, by which the thought of the rest of mankind may be brought to bear on German education. Whatever be the organisation we evolve for Europe, it must include a Cultural Centre, which will concern itself with research and education. It might create an international university. It might train an international Civil Service. It might conduct a wireless station, which would by honest news and open-minded talks help Europeans to think out their continental problems together. It might also broadcast lessons to the senior classes of schools. Perhaps this Cultural Centre might commission some scholars to write a history of Europe, which would help us all to see the past objectively, without nationalist bias. Again, it should maintain in every country an observer or liaison officer who should report, as Matthew Arnold did in the last century, on its educational progress for the benefit of us all. He would criticise frankly any faults, but especially any ultra-nationalistic or militaristic tendencies he might discover. In all these ways such a Cultural Centre would assist the process of re-education in Germany. But it would assist the rest of us also, if we were not too proud to accept its guidance and submit to its inspection. All of us, in one degree or another, stand in need of re-education for the difficult adventure of international life. What did we know of our neighbours during the pre-war anarchy that passed for peace? It was our Prime Minister who spoke of the Czechs as "a people of whom we know little."

## GERMAN CLAUSTROPHOBIA

THERE IS yet another way in which the rest of the world can do much for Germany's re-education, if we can overcome our just aversion. On a very small and experimental scale something was done before the war by the exchange of pupils, students and teachers, to promote our familiarity and sympathy with other peoples. This ought to be multiplied a hundredfold, and it matters little whether we organise it directly or through a European Cultural Centre. Of course we shall wish first of all to get to know in this way the rising generation of the allied countries. But however difficult we find it, we ought as soon as possible and on as large a scale as possible to open our doors by way of exchange to German children and students. The children, at least, have done no wrong to neighbouring peoples. One of the explanations of German abnormality in the past quarter of a century was that this people was suffering from claustrophobia. It felt itself shut in. During the greater part of this period currency restrictions made foreign travel excessively difficult. Emigration, since the slump, was severely limited. After this war a flaming wall of hatred will hem the Germans in. The sense of being enclosed ranks among the psychological causes of the war. That is why the demand for *Lebensraum* found an echo even in minds which did not consciously wish for war. A spirited, adventurous English lad can always satisfy his craving for romance by seeking a career in Canada or India or Kenya. A Dutch or French lad was equally fortunate. For the same type among the Germans there were no wide spaces open, save in South America, and that was under a foreign flag. A wise world, if ever our planet earns this name, will have to consider how this craving for romance, which is not the worst oddity of our species, can be happily satisfied. That is, perhaps, to look far ahead. As a beginning, when we face the question of the exchange of children and students as part of the educational problem of Europe, we must include in it the rather peculiar case of the Germans.

Finally, in considering this anxious question, we should re-

member that everything will depend on the social environment, national and international, in which young Germans grow up. Schools and colleges are important and so are books. But all of us are formed by our environment, even if we react against it. The average boy will rarely become a good man, unless at some phase of his development he lives in a group of his fellows which deserves the name of a true society—a happy family circle, an enlightened school, a kindly farm, a workshop in which honest craftsmen make a conscience of what they do, a fraternal church. Under the present economic system how often are the factories, in which most townsmen pass their working lives, societies at all? No common creative purpose unites those who earn wages within them. What the Germans may do to create a better social environment for the coming generation is their affair. But the international environment will also mould it. The German youth which succumbed to Hitler's teaching had no sense that it belonged to an international society. The occupation of the Ruhr, the lack of any concerted action in the slump, the League's failure in Manchuria and Abyssinia destroyed in these young men all faith in justice. They were cynics before they turned Nazi and vowed that they would surpass us all in national egoism. Can we so integrate Europe, can we so link its people for the common good that in Germany, as elsewhere, the young men of the rising generation will have faith in the Great Society? That will be our part in re-education.

## *VI: Problems of Power*

**T**HAT THE aggressor must be disarmed is a thesis on which opinion in the United Nations is unanimous. Since no one disputes it, we have hardly begun to discuss it. The consequence is that not all of us even yet grasp its complexity. It touches all the controversial issues that face us—the future class-structure of Germany, no less than the economic plan and the power pattern of the Europe of to-morrow.

The tendency, unless we question ourselves in good time, will be to repeat and perhaps exaggerate the errors of Allied policy after the last war. After the emotional strain of a long and doubtful struggle, it is as natural as it is unreasonable to crowd all our precautions into the early post-war years, and thereafter to relax them. In the initial period after 1918 our commission of inspection and control was served by a vigilant and numerous staff, which was soon drastically reduced and eventually abolished. Another typical example is that we restricted civilian flying in Germany for the first five years, after which the limitations automatically lapsed. What perverse arrangements! After the last war Germans were exhausted and impoverished. They could not have renewed the struggle for many a long year had they wished to do so; and so far were they from wishing anything of the kind that the prevalent mood was pacific. These conditions are likely to recur after the present war, but the slaughter of young lives has been heavier still and the exhaustion may well last longer and with it a peaceable state of mind. Danger may confront us again, perhaps in ten, perhaps in twenty years. But before we re-enter the climate of peril and crisis, our first mood of excessive severity will have relaxed: the burden of our own armaments, probably of conscription and certainly of taxation, will gall us; trade links and even social links with Germany will have been renewed; the

City of London may have money to lend and some of its citizens will opportunely discover the beauty of magnanimity. By that time or even earlier, the difficulty of maintaining a stable balance of power in Europe may be acute. Will no one ever be tempted to use the Germans to adjust it?

The conclusion is that—apart from temporary police measures—the idea of a lengthy, graded progress by several stages towards equality of status involves grave risks. If our purpose were to exact vengeance or to relieve our pent-up feelings, special severity would characterise the first period; yet in this period there can be no danger because the beaten enemy will be numbed. It has, for example, been proposed that Germans shall be forbidden not merely to manufacture civilian aircraft but even to fly them.\* The first question we would address to those who advance such proposals is this: are they meant to be permanent or will they be abandoned after (let us say) ten or twenty years? A permanent prohibition would be intelligible and there is a precedent for it. In the same spirit Muslim States, in the great days of the Caliphate, forbade Christians to ride horses, though they might mount donkeys; and this they maintained through many centuries. It is unthinkable that a similar prohibition should survive in an age when flight may well become the chief form of long-distance transport. To maintain it for a time would be to inflict humiliation as well as economic injury on the ex-enemy peoples. So far from contributing to the world's safety, temporary disabilities of this kind engender resentments fatal to co-operation; when they disappear the Germans may be in a mood to misuse their newly gained freedom, while we relax our vigilance. The ideal to bear in mind is, then, that we should impose only restrictions so manifestly necessary and just that we are prepared to maintain them permanently. Their purpose must be to ensure the common safety: in so far as they inflict injury and humiliation they will cause unrest. Let us make our legislation for security general—a system of control to which all of us will submit.

\* Chatham House report, *The Problem of Germany*, p. 49.

## DISARMAMENT

AS THE demobilisation of the German army is completed, two urgent problems will face us. What is to be done with the arms it will surrender? Much of the material has a civilian use. Our allies may ask that the more valuable military equipment be distributed among them. The Chinese claim will be the most urgent of all. An alternative solution is to retain the best of it as the common property of the United Nations, either to equip an International Force, or else to stock arsenals under their joint control.

Secondly, what kind of armed force is the new German Reich to possess? Some may answer: none at all. That is a frivolous reply. Neither England nor America will shoulder for many years the task of policing Germany. Will the Russians wish to do it for ever? So soon as she possesses a government that enjoys the confidence of her people it ought to have at its disposal an armed force capable of ensuring internal order. It cannot be left defenceless against anti-democratic conspirators who may arm in secret. Stalin put the plain common sense of this matter when he said (*Times* report, 7th November, 1942): "Our aim is not to destroy all armed force in Germany, because any intelligent man will understand that this is as impossible in the case of Germany as in the case of Russia. It would be unreasonable on the part of the victor to do so. To destroy Hitler's army is possible and necessary."

It may be a condemnation of any society that it should require an armed force for police purposes: in fact, no existing State does dispense with such a guarantee of order.

It may be assumed that the victors will limit the numbers and armament of Germany's military forces as was done in the Versailles Treaty; that the navy will be reduced to a force capable only of policing the German coast and that the *Luftwaffe* will disappear. Probably the manufacture of arms, other than the small arms required for this modest army, will be prohibited in Germany and redundant plant, which serves only a military pur-

pose, destroyed. Further, the observance of these restrictions will be assured, as before, by resident commissions and periodical inspection. All this is painfully familiar. The necessity of measures of this kind is so clear that we need not justify them. The record of what Germany did with her colossal armed power is argument enough. But the memory of what happened after Versailles forbids us to regard these proposals with much satisfaction, so long as they stand alone. Control was not easy, and the heads of the German army did manage in some degree, even under the Republic, to evade the limitations imposed on it. On their side, the Allies failed to carry out their rather nebulous and undated pledge to reduce their own armaments to the German level. The Atlantic Charter also holds out the prospect of reduction, but in even vaguer terms, and goes on to speak of some "permanent system of general security" which awaits us in the uncharted future. At present the proposals for dealing with the aggressive powers stand alone, an isolated wing of a structure that has still to be planned and built. Until the outlines of the whole erection are visible, it is impossible to judge this detail, big and important though it is.

For good or evil, these proposals must influence the political future of Germany. Will the little army which is formed after this war resemble the old Reichswehr? Will it again be a force of robots, trained to obey a corps of officers drawn from the more reactionary strata of the Junker caste? In that event the outlook for peace, political democracy and any salutary transformation of German society will be as precarious as before, because real power, military power, will remain where it always lay. In any future crisis—and in the evolution of the new Germany there may be many anxious crises—both sides, the popular forces and the propertied few, will reckon in advance on the nationalism and the reactionary outlook of this army. A long-service army, composed of men who like the prospect of spending twelve years on unconstructive tasks in a barracks, will always form a caste apart from the general body of citizens and will always obey its officers, if it must choose between them and the civilian government of a democracy.

Other plans call for an open mind. If a popular revolution takes place in Germany, its leaders will doubtless form, from officers and men they trust, an army like the Austrian *Volkswehr* of 1918, loyal to the democracy. But if there is no revolution, can any plan be devised which would recruit men and officers from typical citizens? Men who volunteer will tend by natural selection to be militaristic and ultra-nationalist. Conscription alone would yield a force typical of the whole nation. From the class of each year a small number might be chosen by lot, on the model of the American Selective Draft, to fill the ranks. To ensure equality of sacrifice, the young men who were not drafted for military service might be embodied in a Labour Corps, like the Civilian Conservation Corps of the New Deal, and employed on constructive work: land-drainage, forestry, road-making, harvesting and the like. Part of the young men's time, both in the army and the Labour Corps, ought to be devoted to education, both humane and technical. They should not be called up too young. The Labour Corps must not engage in military exercise. The officers of the army, who would undergo some further training, should be promoted from the ranks. Save for a handful of men at headquarters, no body of professional officers need exist at all: the army would cease to be a career and a life-work. A small army formed in this way would remain civilian in outlook and could not become a class force; nor on the basis of a year's service in the ranks could it be used for external warfare against any highly trained mechanised army. Every means should be adopted to emphasise the difference between this new army and all its predecessors. It might be called a Home Guard (*Heimwehr*) and should wear a uniform which in colour and cut aroused none of the old associations. This suggestion has the merit that it fits into a promising plan of re-education.



## GERMANY'S INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL

**W**E STILL have to face by far the graver and more complicated half of this military problem. Everyone realises that in the world of to-day a nation's industrial potential is as important as its man-power. We need waste no words in applying this generalisation to Germany. What, then, should be done with Germany's heavy industries, and especially with those which manufacture steel, machinery, airplanes and chemicals? The solutions commonly offered may be grouped under four heads: (1) destruction, (2) external control, (3) socialisation, (4) international ownership and control.

Destruction cannot be reconciled with the main objective of the Atlantic Charter, freedom from want. Let us consider what it involves. These great industries employ a high proportion of the urban population of Germany. If they are destroyed, the coalfields cannot be kept busy at anything like the former level. The once thriving cities of the Ruhr become a desert, and the same fate in a lesser degree falls on all the industrial towns of the Reich which used its steel. Not only will the millions who inhabit these places be permanently unemployed; the workers in farm and factory, who previously fed and clothed them, now suffer with them. Without steel no modern community can live. It may be said that Germany can import what she needs. But with what alternative export can she pay for steel in addition to the other raw materials and foods she must import? Her balance of trade\* depended on the products precisely of those industries which it is proposed to destroy. Need we add the reminder that in a civilised world we shall one day cease to think of these industries as the exclusive possession of a hostile Power? These marvellous machines, these rich deposits of coal, this inventive talent, the craftsmanship of these skilled and industrious artisans, the vast interlocking organisation built up during a century by

\*I estimate that on an average 45 per cent. of German exports were drawn from these sources.

intelligence and hard work—these things are an asset that belongs to Europe and mankind, if we know how to employ them in an orderly world. Why should we impoverish ourselves to ruin the Germans? The destruction of German heavy industries might have a consequence which this school of thought has not considered. German technicians are inventive and resourceful. If we forbid them to make steel, they are likely to apply all their ingenuity to the development of plastics. Some experts believe that these new materials can be adapted to replace steel in most of its uses.

All this is so clear that only fanatics will cling to a plan which defies common sense and outrages humanity. What may be fairly urged, however, is that these industries were over-developed. They have suffered heavy destruction; before they are rebuilt the whole problem of the world's output of steel should be surveyed by competent experts, independent of the trusts. We want to know what the world's output of steel should be in the next decade, on the assumption that we maintain full employment everywhere and develop industry as well as agriculture in the backward countries. What should be Germany's share in this total? It may turn out that her equipment is excessive, but that should not be assumed without proof.\* The world can absorb vastly greater quantities of steel than the old economics of scarcity ever allowed it to use during years of peace.

We have rejected the policy of destruction, but to all the other proposals in our classification our attitude is affirmative. Of course there must be international control of all these dangerous industries. Firstly and chiefly, the sort of control we want to see is a positive and creative planning of the world's resources and the purchasing power of mankind, to ensure full employment. That applies no less to industries which make producers' equipment than to those which turn out consumers' goods; and it must include control, qualitative as well as quantitative, over the flow of investment. We saw that it was the slump, deflation

\* There is, however, a limiting factor to be borne in mind. Germany's allotted quota of steel for export must be sufficient to enable her to balance her trading account with the rest of the world.

and the low purchasing power of the German working class which drove the magnates of the Ruhr to back re-armament for their own commercial ends. It is, then, on the creative use of international planning to ensure full employment that we set our hopes. Negative and restrictive controls there also must be, but in a world subject to slumps and the trade cycle they would infallibly break down, if we relied on them alone.

These negative controls have often been explored with much ingenuity, and a brief enumeration should suffice. Firstly, a ceiling, subject to periodical review, could be put on Germany's total output of steel and a quota assigned by her Ministry of Production to each plant. Secondly, her imports of iron ore could be rationed by an international authority in the same way. Thirdly, copper and the rarer metals required to harden steel, most of which she must import, can be rationed and subjected to international control at the source. We assume that during the Occupation she will surrender or destroy all plant exclusively devoted to armaments. Finally, we assume that a thorough system of control and inspection will be set up, which will operate in the plants of the heavy, machine-making and chemical industries. It can be made to work, if we seriously intend that it shall work. The danger of concealment is commonly over-estimated. When under the Republic the Reichswehr did arm secretly, it was on a negligible scale. When Hitler re-armed in earnest, he did it openly.

The reader grasps already that these controls must be world-wide and impartial. Neither iron-ore nor the rarer strategic metals can be rationed on any other plan. Control at the source implies, for example, that all the nickel produced by the monopolistic trust from its Canadian and Finnish mines is allotted to approved destinations and can be traced. The aim of reducing armaments vaguely announced in the Atlantic Charter cannot be realised, unless we are ready to accept a world-wide control over the traffic in arms. Like other manufactured articles armaments are best controlled through checks on their raw materials. Manufacturers of the United Nations and dealers in Allied ports will, in course of time, be as ready to supply Germany or Japan with arms, as they were to trade with both the belligerents in the

Chaco. In short, we cannot keep our enemies disarmed unless we submit ourselves also to control. Efficiency points in the same direction as policy. Germans will submit without any burning sense of humiliation to the control and inspection of their armaments and their industry, if the victors pay an equal deference to the jurisdiction of a world authority. But if our pride revolts from that tribute of respect, it will not be clear that this war has ended in a victory for the international principle over nationalism.

Among the activities which call for international control civil aviation has a prominent place. If it were neglected, disarmament would be a farce. The subject is too difficult and complex for more than the briefest mention here. It is a matter that falls in the first place within the province of the World Authority, as the navigation of the high seas does, and for the same reason. But under it, regional authorities will also have to be constituted and Europe is manifestly one of the appropriate regions. Some good work on this subject was done at the time of the abortive Disarmament Conference by Philip Noel Baker, Pierre Cot and others. The best solution for Europe would certainly be to confer on an international corporation a monopoly of long-distance flying. Short of this, it would be more difficult than it need be to work out an efficient system of control and inspection, which must include the airplane factories and research laboratories as well as the airfields. Military planes are now so highly specialised that the risk of the illicit conversion of transport planes into bombers may be ignored. No one will in this case dispute that the control must be general and impartial. If that is accepted, the ex-enemy countries will come under it with the neutrals and the victors. They constitute, therefore, no special problem. The German factories should at least be socialised and might be internationalised for greater safety.

We have included among the guarantees of disarmament the socialisation of these dangerous industries. As a general proposition it had many advocates before the war, even among Liberals. It was carried out, though in a piecemeal way, by the Popular Front in France. Public ownership will always be more effective than external control—if the owner can be trusted. We could not

rely on socialisation alone as a guarantee that German heavy industry will be content to manufacture ploughshares instead of swords, for the obvious reason that some German government in the future may be captured by a nationalistic party. But for two reasons we should regard socialisation as an immense gain for peace. Firstly it would depose a class which has been an incessant and formidable supporter of militarism and reaction. Secondly, national ownership of these vast industries would divert to consumption directly and indirectly a considerable part of their great income. The home market would be to that extent expanded, and the pressure towards foreign adventure correspondingly reduced. That is not the only gain. A society which throws off an oppressive yoke and makes an advance towards equality will be more pacific, because it will be nearer to contentment and to freedom.

## AN INTERNATIONAL RUHR

**A**T THIS point we must consider another suggested solution—internationalisation. The geological structure of North-West Europe is at variance with the political pattern. The coal of the Pas de Calais, Belgium, Limburg, the Ruhr and the Saar, together with the iron-ore deposits of Luxemburg and Lorraine, form the basis of a vast industrial complex intersected by several frontiers. Would it be possible and desirable to lift, so to speak, these mines and the basic industries they serve out of the political pattern and place them under a single international Consortium? The advantages of such a solution are impressive. It would solve the central problem of peace and disarmament at one stroke. It would relieve Europe from the dread of German preponderance. It would also protect Germany from the dismemberment of her territory and the destruction of her industries. Finally, it would ensure the harmonious and economical use of resources which all these severed industries must share, if they are to work with maximum efficiency. Some technical difficulties would have to be

overcome—varying levels of taxation and insurance, the lack of a single control over the transport of this area by rail and water, and perhaps the obstacle of tariffs. But the chief difficulty may be to secure the assent of the French and the Belgians, though the scheme offers them immense advantages, whether we regard it as an insurance against war or as an advance in the organisation of a great industry.

The Consortium should at the start monopolise within this area the getting of coal and iron-ore, the production of pig-iron, steel ingots and sheets, and probably also of such standardised products as steel rails, girders, tubes, and so on. We offer this rough layman's classification only by way of illustration. We should ourselves urge that the Consortium should be sole owner and manager of the plants, but if the French or Belgians insisted on retaining the principle of private enterprise, it would suffice that it should have a majority holding in their companies. It ought, however, to be sole owner of the German concerns, since it is essential that the political influence of the German heavy industrialists be broken.

Starting on this basis, the Consortium should be permitted to expand like a vertical trust by acquiring at least a majority holding in concerns which use its products, notably in those which make machinery. Krupp's, for example, must be absorbed.

Broadly, our conception is that the Consortium, by its monopoly of the raw materials and half-finished products would be able to control the finished products also: that is to say, such armaments as the French or Belgian, but not the German concerns might be permitted to manufacture under licence. It might be empowered to act as an agent and inspector under the World Authority, subject to a penalty if it failed in due vigilance. It must become a legal personality entitled to sue and be sued in international courts.

The Board of the Consortium should be composed chiefly: (1) of directors appointed by the governments of its area with some regard to the value of their concerns included in its scope. It might be laid down that no single nationality may hold more than a certain percentage of the votes on the Board, i.e., it must be

effectively international. (2) The workers and the managerial and technical staffs must be well represented. (3) Consumers also will rightly claim representation, e.g., the municipalities of the area and the governments of, for example, Italy, China and Denmark, which may be largely dependent on it. It has been suggested that the governments of Great Britain, America and Russia should also be represented as a "make-weight." This seems to me questionable: if it were adopted it ought not to mean the penetration of the Consortium by the Steel Trust. These details are offered only by way of illustration. They may suffice to show that a constitution can be devised which would give to Germans and German interests only a fair minority share in the control of heavy industry. If ever Europe is integrated, it might take over the Consortium as a federal enterprise.

We assume that the governments of the area will hold the stock of the Consortium: any capital it or they may have to raise will be loan capital, conferring no right of control. A ceiling should be set to the profits it may distribute and any surplus assigned, by an international authority, to such disinterested purposes as the promotion of public health and education in the more impoverished regions of Europe.

The arguments, both technical and political, which tell in favour of the creation of such a Consortium to control the heavy industries of North-Western Europe apply also to such an area as the coalfield of Upper Silesia and Teschen, which serves German, Polish and Czech needs. The more completely the heavy industries of all Europe can be internationalised the less danger will they make for peace.

One doubt has still to be faced before we adopt some such proposal for internationalising these industries. Have we any guarantee that they would follow a policy of full production and maximum employment? If they were to pursue a restrictive policy based on high prices and limited output, the effect on the national economic structures of all the participating States would be grave and might be fatal. Germany, for example, could not expand her own internal market, if the Consortium were to pursue the contrary policy, nor could Belgium. Are we then proposing to confer

excessive powers on a composite body responsible to no electorate and subject to no government's control?

There is a real difficulty here. It would vanish only if Europe were to become a true federation. But the risk is less serious than some critics suppose. The Board of the Consortium, if it were composed on the lines of this rough sketch, would be unlikely to adopt a restrictive and monopolistic policy. The members appointed by the governments of Germany, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg would have to consider, first of all, the welfare of their respective countries. The representatives of the consumers would be unlikely to tolerate unduly high prices. Would the directors chosen by the workers and the staff be so shortsighted as to favour a policy that must make for unemployment? It is not possible in this imperfect world to devise a fool-proof scheme; the most advanced of democracies may be seduced into folly. But it may be said with some confidence that this scheme offers a fair field to economic common sense. In this direction the future beckons us. Every step towards a co-operative economy for Europe confronts us with this same choice. Do we want a continental grid for electric power and an international system of trunk railways? Unless we are content to stagnate in provincialism and poverty, we must cross the barriers of the old-world sovereign State.

## POWER AND JUSTICE

SO FAR we have before us only an isolated wing of the international structure we are building. We have assumed, as the Atlantic Charter did, that the disarmament of Germany will be for an undefined period unilateral. Several questions crowd upon us. So long as Germany remains incapable of defending herself in the air or on land against the mechanised armies of her neighbours, who will undertake her defence? The answer is, presumably, that some International Authority, perhaps Mr. Churchill's Council of Europe, will assume this duty.



This answer is not on a close scrutiny convincing. When the French invaded and occupied the Ruhr, British opinion was almost unanimously hostile, but it took no steps to stop them, nor did the League of Nations. Again, when a Polish army invaded Lithuania and appropriated Vilna, the League of Nations rebuked this aggression verbally, but that was all it did. Let us hope that the Council of Europe or the still more nebulous World Authority will be a more effective body than the League. But whatever shape they assume, the old difficulties will remain. Let us suppose that Poland, smarting under the memories of the unspeakable wrongs the Nazis did her and dissatisfied with the territory assigned to her at the peace, were to repeat the Vilna performance by seizing a German province. If she had an air force of even moderate size and a Panzer Division or two, she could do this with ease at the expense of a disarmed Germany. How should we react? Should we bomb Warsaw? That would seem to all of us an outrage. In a dangerous world allies cannot afford to treat allies in that way.

Again, as the years go on, a disarmed Germany will inevitably find herself involved in controversies with her armed neighbours or with the greatest of the Great Powers, which cannot be happily settled by negotiation. What then? Will the disarmed State always have to submit to the armed Power? It may be answered that we shall revive the World Court to deal with justiciable disputes, and we may also create some arbitral procedure to cover the much more serious class of political disputes which do not lend themselves to judicial settlement. There was in the past no recognised means of enforcing such third-party decisions. When the Court has before it a suitor who is hated with good reason by all Europe and is at the same time powerless, will it venture to give a strictly impartial judgment against a popular Power armed to the teeth? It has to ask itself whether in these circumstances a verdict in favour of the weak and unpopular suitor would be obeyed or could be enforced. If the law were clear as day, it might venture on a judgment which few Europeans would like; but in a political question where no indisputable law can be cited, how would it usually act? At the best, it would attempt a cautious compromise, for shame's sake conceding a very little

to the weaker party. In fact, third-party decisions, whether by legal or political bodies, never did favour the Weimar Republic, and in two rather grave matters, the interpretation of the Silesian plebiscite and the veto on the Customs Union with Austria, they seemed to many sober observers doubtfully just. The difficulty would be graver still if Germany were to ask, after a few years, for some improvements in her status or some revision of the Peace Treaty to which, let us say, the Poles or Czechs were opposed. On the merits of the question, both England and Russia might be inclined to assent. But would either of us dare to offend our allies, with the probable result of driving them out of our own orbit into some other? That, rather than any defect in the League's constitution, was the real reason why its machinery was never used to bring about any revision of the last peace settlement. To sum up, it is naïve to expect impartial justice and objective solutions in a world where statesmen and even judges must still be conscious of the Balance of Power.

By this line of reasoning we have arrived at the central problem of the Peace Settlement. So long as the three major world Powers retain for themselves irresistible military and economic power, can we pretend that any institutions they create for the government of Europe will be more than an unconvincing disguise for their dictatorship? In that case shall we ever reach the ideal of a co-operative system in which our former enemies will whole-heartedly collaborate? It may be said that our vast preponderance in power will be exercised with paternal benevolence and enlightenment. It may also be said—who can dispute it?—that the Germans, during ten years of Nazi rule, behaved with a criminal folly which robs them of any claim to the exercise of power. These answers are not satisfying. History warns us that the strong have rarely used their power with disinterested impartiality for the common good. If we close our ears to any protests the Germans may hereafter make against our armed hegemony, can we be equally indifferent to the opinions of other European States? The French, painfully conscious of their losses and humiliations during this war, will be sensitive and restive.

It is now the fashion among Englishmen to point to the British

Commonwealth as the model on which the future World Authority will be built. This is a false analogy which will lead us astray. It was natural in 1940, when England's European allies were knocked out, to suppose that they must cluster round her and accept her leadership with her hospitality. But Russia was not knocked out, nor was China; while the United States grew stronger than before. The British Commonwealth has hitherto relied on a curiously informal technique which dispensed with any written constitution and set no value on institutions. Imperial conferences met only at long and irregular intervals of many years. A common policy was reached in somewhat casual talks between Westminster and each of the Dominions separately. In these the overwhelming weight of the mother-country must have made itself felt at every turn. Forty-five millions of British citizens talked with two or seven or eleven millions as the case might be, and behind the forty-five were the Bank and the Fleet. This unique system may have suited cousins united by common traditions. It is impossible that it should satisfy allies who neither talk the same language nor worship in the same church. England's neighbours do not forget that, down to Napoleon's fall, France was as great a Power as Britain. But the analogy breaks down for an even simpler reason. In the British Empire overwhelming power is focused at a single centre. Among the United Nations it is dispersed in three foci.

It is generally assumed that these three major Powers will remain closely united as allies after the war. That is a sanguine expectation. We cannot know, until a new President and a new Congress are chosen, what standing obligations the United States will be willing to assume. It is, however, reasonable to suppose that America's interest in European affairs will diminish, when Asia becomes her chief field of action. The Soviet Union presents an even more anxious enigma. Will she retire into relative isolation, or will she wish and contrive to co-operate closely on equal terms with the two English-speaking Powers, in Europe and in Asia? All we can venture to say to-day is that the outlook, bleak enough before the Moscow Conference, is brighter since it met.

When Great Powers find close collaboration difficult, they often

resort to a device invented by the expanding empires of the nineteenth century. They delimited their respective spheres of interest and contrived for a time to preserve an armed peace. This may be done again. A widely accepted plan for the future of Europe is to bisect it. A broad Eastern belt will be recognised as Russia's sphere of interest, while Western Europe and the Mediterranean will be an Anglo-American sphere. This is not an attractive conception. The economic unity of Europe, which it was the merit of the Nazis to organise, albeit in a humiliating and authoritarian form, will not be easy to realise under this political dualism. To which sphere will Germany belong? To cut it into two halves would be a monstrous arrangement. Can the Russians, after making the major contribution towards the defeat of its armies, readily accept its inclusion in the Anglo-American sphere? The place of the Poles within one sphere or the other raises another dangerous difficulty. It was British policy to promote the formation of one or more confederacies in this Eastern zone, a plan which the Russians have hitherto opposed. These confederations may command an impressive total of man-power, but their industrial potential will be less imposing. The power-pattern of Europe will be greatly modified if they are formed, but will it be more stable? Conceived partly as buffers between the West and the Soviet Union and partly as segments of the steel ring which encircles Germany, these new and untried combinations will live dangerously, now in the orbit of Moscow and again in that of London. At the other end of the Continent, the French, after the experiences General de Gaulle has undergone, may not find Anglo-American leadership congenial and may gravitate towards Moscow. In such conditions Germany will no longer remain an inert and passive object of our policy. Crushed and disarmed though she may be, one of the two rival foci of power, London or Moscow, will decide the fluctuating balance by adding her weight to its own scale. The two rivals will compete to win her, and in the process she will shake off the fetters that bind her. The present war has settled one of Europe's problems of power only to raise another. Next time the class issue will be clearer.

## A WORLD GUARD

IT is easy as an academic exercise to prescribe a solution for this disturbing problem of power. But few of us are sanguine about this theoretical way of escape and some of us know why it is difficult. The one effective solution is to internationalise the ownership of military power. So long as national sovereign States possess their own armaments, so long will the balance of power remain the absorbing preoccupation of international politics. No reduction of armaments by a proportional scaling down will greatly affect the real problem, welcome though it may be for financial and social reasons. It will be easy to draft a tighter and more workmanlike system of collective security than the Genevan League possessed. For some years after the defeat of our present enemies it will seem adequate and will serve to intimidate any minor aggressor. But the outstanding fact all the time will be these three separate foci of overwhelming power, each towering above its neighbours, each so much more imposing than the shadowy World Authority, which means nothing, unless it reflects their collective will. But for how long will these three possess a single collective will?

The way out, if the reader will tolerate a brief theoretical excursion, is of course to create an international force. That term is often loosely used. If we are looking for a solution which ends power politics, this force must satisfy very exacting conditions. It is subject to a single international authority, which recruits it, pays it, appoints and promotes its commanders and sets it in motion by its own sole decision. That holds equally whether the force be an air arm, a navy or an army. An adequate modern police force for the whole world must combine all three. Further, it is what the French aptly call an organic force: the national contingents which compose it are mixed, and no unit larger than a platoon or a company is composed of men of one nationality. Not merely the force itself, but its component divisions, air squadrons and ships' crews are international. It has its own bases, airfields and arsenals, subject solely to the international authority.

A force which falls seriously short of this definition is in an emergency unreliable. The loyalty of its commanders and the *esprit de corps* of its men are firm enough to supersede national patriotism. They are proud of the force to which they belong and see in it a microcosm, an embodiment of the unity of mankind. The name police force conveys the wrong associations: policemen are often feared but rarely loved. Let us call it the World Guard. The picked young men who have the honour to join it are intelligent as well as physically fit: they are well paid for a short term of service, but they are not mercenaries. Adventure, movement and danger they love; but they harness their romantic instincts to the service of peace.

If ever such a force comes into existence, it follows that all national armies, fleets and air forces cease to exist, save on the modest scale required for the maintenance of internal order. It would be an unpardonable lapse from logic to leave the national Powers with forces capable of resisting the International Authority. The International Force, as Mr. Herbert Morrison \* has pointed out, "need only be of moderate size, though sufficient for the purpose, because it has no competing military forces to reckon with."

If and when we are ready for this radical solution, the problem of Germany is solved. Like every other State Germany has her own internal police force and nothing more. Kiel, like Gibraltar, Dover, Panama, the Turkish straits and Suez are under international authority. From Germany as from every other Member State a few thousand young men are recruited for the International Force and dispersed among its airfields, ships and camps, where they mix with the more numerous Chinese, Indians, Americans and Russians and the less numerous Britons, Frenchmen, Dutch and Poles. A few of their abler officers rise by merit to the Higher Command. The World Guard protects Germany precisely as it protects England. Equality of rights is achieved, and Germans suffer no longer from the inferiority complex which gave Hitler his demonic genius.

\* See his *Prospects and Policies* (Camb. Univ. Press), p. 29.

The words "International Authority" are easily written. What do they mean? It cannot function under the rule of unanimity which has prevailed hitherto, at least in theory, as the principle of all collective international action. Effective work will be impossible, if each member State, or at any rate each major Power, exercises a veto over all its decisions. Our hypothesis is that even the strongest nations have surrendered something of their sovereignty to it. It is the one Great Power. Its governing Council must be capable of swift majority decisions, which will not be easy, unless it is an elected body. In other words, it will approximate to a federation.

This last detail is the most difficult to conceive, but it is essential. Somehow we have to get behind the national sovereign State. It is first of all an embodiment of power. Its basic right and function is to declare and levy war. That every language recognises: an independent State is a Power, a *Puissance*, a *Macht*. It must therefore act in all international relations as a monolithic block, moved by a single will, that of its government. With this whole conception we have to break, if we mean to live in an ordered world at peace. It can be done only in one way. We must go behind the State and call up its citizens to replace it. In other words, the sovereign body must be an elected assembly whether it is to govern a Continent or the World. To a majority composed of other sovereign States, each a law to itself, a Great Power will never bow. But there is no humiliation in accepting the verdict of mankind, conceived as a democratic organism. The secret of this advance lies in the fact that Englishmen, Frenchmen and the rest will not all vote alike. They will rally in several parties, and these parties will soon unite across frontiers. A European Congress will have its Socialist, Communist, Catholic and Peasant parties, its middle-class Liberals and its Big Business group. In no other way can Europe become a human and organic reality, a Great Society which embraces and overshadows its nations. This Congress can be elected in various ways—perhaps on a functional, perhaps on a territorial basis. The simplest way would be to do it indirectly: the popular House of each Parliament elects delegates by proportional representation in a ratio corresponding

roughly to its population, or perhaps to population and resources taken together. The national delegations would not vote in a single block as they did in the League's Assembly. In the same way, the various Continental Congresses might choose a World Council.

Not the least of the advantages of such a plan is that it hastens the date at which the Germans will be admitted to a share in our deliberations on equal terms. It will always be hard to admit Germany, the guilty Power, the aggressor of yesterday. But will there be the same prejudice against German peasants, Catholics who pray in German, or Socialists who read Marx in the original tongue? Common interests and ways of thinking will soon link these groups to their fellows in France and England. This is the hopeful road, though all the traditions of the past will barricade it against our advance.

Is this a *reductio ad absurdum* of the twin ideas of international government and the international ownership of power? Manifestly it is. The world in which we live to-day is not ready for it, nor is it moving in this direction. The Russians will no more dream of scrapping the Red Army to entrust their safety to such a World Guard as this, than the British and Americans will hasten to hand over to it their battleships: nor will any of the three consent to be bound by majority decisions.

An appreciable volume of public opinion favours the creation of an International Air Force. But is it contemplated that national air forces shall disappear? If we take this title literally, the idea is hardly feasible. All warfare is to-day three-dimensional. An air arm must have its land-force to protect the airfields. It also requires aircraft-carriers, which in turn must be protected by destroyers.

The conception which some influential Americans, Mr. Sumner Welles among them, have proposed under the name of an International Force satisfies none of the necessary tests. What is contemplated is that each Power, while retaining its own national armaments, shall designate some part of them—so many divisions, air-squadrons and ships—which it undertakes to place at the disposal of the International Authority, for action against any



future aggressor. These forces, raised, paid and commanded by each national government, will owe their allegiance to it. This scheme will serve well enough to deal with any minor Power, unless it is an ally closely linked with a great Power. It will be adequate for the purpose of intimidating the Axis Powers, disarmed after this war, so long as they remain isolated. But will it avail in case of need for action against any one of the three Great Powers? If ever it has to be used in that way, the result will be not a police operation but a third World War. The scheme is not a genuine solution of the problem of world-power. The three giants, each with its satellites revolving round it, are left still dominating our planet. But even this inadequate scheme may fail to secure the assent either of the American Senate or of Moscow.

Can this compromise, or some variant of it, be used to solve the German difficulty? Doubtless it can. After some years Germany is allowed to build up a modern mechanised force of a limited size, on condition that she places it at the disposal of the *World Authority*. This satisfies the claim she will certainly make for equality of rights. Those who admire such a solution justify it by stipulating that she shall pass through a lengthy period of probation under Anglo-American tuition, until she can be certified as morally regenerate. When she is needed to adjust the sagging balance of power, it will be found that she has made an astonishing advance along the road to virtue. In this solution is there anything more than another round in the perennial game of power-politics? To endow Germany with yet another mechanised army would be a crime against history. The road to equality is difficult; for it lies through the impartial disarmament of all national sovereign States and the internationalisation of Power.

## AN ECONOMIC COUNCIL

**I**F ANY World Guard, organic in its structure, must be relegated to the distant future, can a genuine solution of this type be reached more easily in Europe? The difficulties lie on the surface. Britain, France and Holland are imperial World-Powers. The

Soviet Union includes immense Asiatic territories. Is "Europe" to stretch from Kerry to Kamchatka? When Mr. Churchill sketched his Council of Europe, he introduced yet another puzzling complication into it, when he assumed that the U.S.A. will be a member. But if either America or the Soviet Union were omitted, they might regard the European Federation as a threat to their interests. On the other hand, there is much that favours this solution. Western and Central Europe have a common culture, shaped by the same intellectual influences from Roman times down to the Reformation and the French Revolution, and may again have similar institutions. Whatever form its integration takes, Europe faces problems which must be handled by its peoples in common—transport, their economic interdependence and assuredly their security. Preferably within the wider framework of a World Authority, some subordinate or regional organisation covering Europe must come into being.

The tendency of to-day is to reverse the one-sidedness that marred the settlement after the last war. Then the stress was on politics and on the charters of the jurists. To-day it is economics we emphasise, perhaps because we shrink from the problems of power as insoluble. International commissions of a functional type are now in favour, each dealing with a single aspect of our common life—transport, raw materials, currency, investment, labour conditions. This may be a sound prescription for gradual progress. But all the while, behind this useful structure will lurk the unsolved problem of power. Again the smoking volcano will erupt, but not necessarily through the old crater. Planners always know how to avoid the last war, as soldiers know how to win it. Volcanoes, moreover, cast a shadow even when they are inactive. The fear of an eruption may stultify all our efforts to achieve economic co-operation. That will happen if we isolate a defeated Germany. It will happen as certainly if we divide Europe into Russian and Anglo-American spheres of interest. Would that division represent anything more than an armistice in an undeclared class-war?

I will not speculate on the character or scope of the future Council of Europe. It will evolve, presumably, out of the institu-

tions the United Nations may improvise as the war proceeds. That is a disturbing reflection, for only since the Moscow Conference has the nucleus of a European Council come into existence. Until Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull met Mr. Molotov there, London and Washington carried on intimate consultations. Russia went her own way, victorious. With her next-door neighbour, Poland, she had broken off relations. As a working model of European unity this pattern was defective.

What, then, have we to suggest? The ideal solution is a United States of Europe, a federation in the true sense of the word. But federations cannot be made by the planning of jurists and politicians. They come into being when great masses of men are so conscious of their solidarity that they crave for it an outward political form. They may arise out of close economic collaboration, but they can hardly precede it. They presuppose some near approach to a common political philosophy. That is lacking between the rest of Europe and the Russians. Spain is still Fascist but may not long remain so. For how long will the hatred the Nazis have earned for the German people exclude it from that friendly collaboration of which federation is the constitutional expression? It may be said that the continental federation will come about piecemeal, by the erection first of all of several partial regional confederations. That is arguable: but the motives which inspire some of these plans are not reassuring. They smell of *cordon sanitaire*. Others are barbed wire against Germany, and some are dual purpose fences. The result is that the Russians, and consequently all Communists, are root and branch opponents both of these partial confederations and of a European Federation. Whether a European Federation will be a danger to the Soviet Union depends on our estimate of the balance of class power within it. Will it be dominated by monopoly capital? What are the Great Powers of to-morrow? Are they a number of classless democracies, which voice their common will to practise an economy of plenty in the English, French and Russian languages? Or are they the Steel Trust, Standard Oil and Imperial Chemicals?

Everyone concedes that a federation must possess a common political philosophy. That phrase is an invention of the intellec-

tual's study: it lacks realism. A federation run for Big Business by its lawyers is workable and familiar. A federation run for its workers and peasants by a disciplined party is also workable: it exists. What is doubtful is whether a federation can be formed or can be durable if it is composed of democracies in which the major issue of our times remains undecided. This issue the reader may define in his own way. He may dislike the rough Marxist term: class struggle. He may prefer the English trick of under-emphasis. Let us talk, then, of the contrast between an economy of scarcity and an economy of plenty. Under the words lie crude realities. An economy of scarcity can be pursued when a few men, through a trust-structure, control for a limited owning class the volume of production and employment.

The reader may reply that compromise is possible and even usual: monopolies can be controlled. Assuredly this is so: even when Englishmen were fighting for survival alone, as a matter of course the monopolists were chosen to control the monopolies. Democracies are by definition mechanisms which rely on a pendulum. But even when the pendulum swings emphatically, how much is decided? Mr. Roosevelt has won three elections in succession, but where does power reside in Washington? With the New Deal or with Big Business? Substantial concessions which add much to the well-being and security of the masses can be won while trade expands. When it contracts progress ceases, if it is not reversed, and we are forced to understand that in neither phase was Monopoly Capital deposed from power. So long as it controls the volume of production, it is the master of our daily lives. Our subjection seems tolerable, because we are free to talk and even to vote against it. None the less it continues, with intervals of revolt, in which the outworks are often captured but never the citadel itself. Federation will happen when one party or the other is unchallenged in its ascendancy. It will not happen when the outcome is unpredictable.

There are other and more obvious reasons why Europe will not federate in the near future. The leadership in the difficult work of construction could for some years ahead come only from Great Britain. But under Mr. Churchill's reign her attention will be

fixed chiefly on the Empire. In so far as she must attend to Europe, her thinking may follow strategical lines. The maintenance and security of the Empire depend largely on its relations with the states bordering two seas, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. If we do construct any political grouping in Europe, whatever name or form we give it, it will be composed primarily of the Western States from Norway to Spain together with Italy and Greece. As the years go on, however, England may come to regret her preoccupation with the Empire. India and the Dominions are now her creditors. She is no longer the world's chief money-lender and has actually become a debtor Power. This means that her relations with these former clients are now less decisive for her policy than they used to be. If the Dominions swing into America's orbit, will not Europe and dependent Africa become more than ever important to her? It may then be too late to think of federation. The continental pattern will then be fixed and some political grouping will have taken place without her or even against her. The ideal moment for the unification, which Europe has expected from Charlemagne's day to Hitler's, will arrive at the end of this war and it may never come again. Frontiers will be fluid and traditions relaxed, while men's minds will be attuned to revolutionary change. The destined hour of creation does not strike twice in a generation.

In what form, then, may we hope for the integration of Europe? On the answer to that question depends the restoration of Germany to her due place as a co-operating member of the European family. In some form the United Nations must set up an economic authority for Europe. Boards concerned with production, raw materials, currency, investment, food supply, electricity, railways, civil aviation, navigable rivers and reparations may all come into existence. None of these fields can be rigidly fenced in: each implies some of the others and all together presuppose a master plan. Rather sooner than later we must create a Supreme Economic Council for Europe, which will co-ordinate the work of the Boards and shape the idea they strive to realise. Its work and its thinking will depend mainly on officials, who should hereafter be trained together at an International University to form a Eu-

ropean Civil Service. They must shed their nationalism when they enter it, which they will do the more readily if they study together for a time at a common centre.

An Economic Council would be powerless unless its authority sprang from public opinion. In some shape it must represent the interests of the masses in the incessant struggle that will be waged with the great cosmopolitan concentrations of capital round the tables of all these Boards. The best way to compose it would be on a functional basis proportionate to population. The constituent bodies which elect its members in each country are naturally the trade unions, peasants' and farmers' leagues and co-operatives with chambers of commerce and federations of industrialists. The I.L.O. offers a model, which would have to be completed by the representation of the land workers, technicians and consumers. To arrive at a fair balance will not be easy, but the weight of each group will depend rather on its cohesion and tactical skill than on its voting strength.

Into a Council of this kind Germans as workers, peasants and consumers will enter much more easily than any delegation which represented Germany as a State. If they enter at all, it can only be with equal rights. But no ingenuity in drawing blue prints will ever create a true European Society. That will come into being only when the masses behind the pioneers realise their solidarity across frontiers. Education, the press and the radio have their part to play. The common man must be helped to perceive that his daily bread depends on the work of the European Council. But the chief formative influences which will make it or mar it are the parties round which the workers, farmers and technicians rally. If the old feud once more divides Socialists from Communists, while peasants and technicians stand aloof, Europe will not come into being in our day as a living society.

So far and no farther we can to-day grope our way towards a solution of the central issue of the settlement. The problem of power cannot be solved on the basis of a triple alliance between London, Washington and Moscow; nor will it be finally solved while monopoly capital overshadows our economic life and na-

tional States retain the ownership of military force. May work and planning in common fit us all for the next difficult step, before the creaking alliance breaks up. In this field of planning for ample production and full employment the Germans have a part to play.

## *VII: Work, Wealth and Human Rights*

THE Allied Governments propose—it is believed—to administer Germany for an indefinite number of years. That is a load under which the stoutest will might stagger. I saw the chaos that followed the armistice after the last war. The railways were so disorganised that a journey which should have taken eight hours spread over three days and two nights. All along the way through the densely peopled industrial districts of Saxony not one mill chimney smoked. The rationed food, as wretched in quality as in quantity, kept everyone subnormal. Across the border in Holland the first of many unfamiliar sights that greeted me on my return was a comfortable cat. From hungry Germany this animal had vanished. The mark lost something daily of its power to buy. The workless masses, overstrained and underfed, listened eagerly to calls from broken veterans on crutches for yet another revolution. The melting army had carried away to safe hiding places its rifles and machine-guns. Yet a native administration survived which men still obeyed. This time there will be none. Then there was no devastation, though everything had deteriorated, from the crazy locomotives to the starved soil. This time many a great city will lie in ruins. Then only the soldiers had left their homes. This time millions have been transferred to new factories in Austria and Poland. Then the German nation, with little coal and no imported raw materials, was unemployed. Beside it, this time, six million foreign workers will stand idle among its silent mills.

With this situation the economists of the Occupation will have to grapple. Already in 1938 it has been reckoned that under one head or another the German government ordered from 60 to 70 per cent. of the work done in Germany and paid for it. What the percentage is to-day, who knows? Perhaps 85, perhaps 90 per cent. The dominating economic fact that will face the Occupation



will be that the universal paymaster has given up the ghost. The worst fact of the financial situation will not be the colossal magnitude of the national debt: all the reserves of the insurance funds and savings banks have been raided and appropriated. Immense assets the Nazi State and the owning class possess in the shape of the holdings they acquired in French, Czech and other industrial concerns and insurance companies all over Europe. These were the fruit of plunder, and, when the tangle can be unravelled, they will stand no longer to Germany's credit. What was rightfully hers is her immense capital equipment, but much of it has been destroyed and much is useful only for unwanted armaments. On the staggering Exchequer will fall the sudden weight of doles for many millions of the unemployed. It is to be expected that the currency will collapse and galloping inflation get under way. If that happens farmers will refuse to sell good food for worthless paper. How, with the ports and frontiers sealed, is work to be resumed?

The distinction commonly drawn between a civil and military government is academic and cannot be maintained in practice. A civil government is concerned with the welfare of the governed, while the task of a military administration is to ensure the safety of the occupying army. But if the civilian population were left without food and work, the army of Occupation could ensure its own safety only by shooting down starving and riotous mobs, a job which civilised soldiers dislike. From the first day, if we insist on governing Germany ourselves, the soldiers will have to rely on their own experts, who will need, in facing these desperate economic problems, an unusual combination of daring and experience with theoretical insight. We assume that food will be made available, whether from local or imported stocks, for the occupied towns. It may be necessary, even before our armies or Russia's reach Berlin and take the centralised national administration into their own hands, to improvise, as they advance, the distribution of the "dole" to millions of the unemployed—both German and foreign workers. How else could they buy food? The worst mistake made after the last war was the prolongation of the blockade. This ought not to be repeated. But in the conditions likely to

prevail in Germany and the rest of Europe, private enterprise will be helpless, either to import raw materials or to resume the export trade. For months and years to come, all transactions with the outside world will have to be centralised and controlled. If we have prevented the formation of any revolutionary government, we shall have to arrange and underwrite credit transactions for the supply of raw materials.

In the interests of order, not to mention the mental, physical and moral health of the German population, it should rank among the first purposes of the Occupation to organise the resumption of work. This will be impossible if AMGOT sticks for long to the original conception suggested in the prohibition of all "political" activity. What is "political"? Does it include, as it did in Sicily, the formation of works councils and trade unions? Work has to be paid: it follows that the workers' rights of combination and collective bargaining must be recognised from the start. What work will be available? The means of transport, including shipping and railways, will have to be requisitioned and their workers employed at once. Under some emergency scheme the coal mines should also be taken over. But the sudden stoppage of every branch of the heavy, engineering and munition industries will set the chief problem. Terror will seize their workers, to-day the vast mass of the population, as the blast-furnaces cool and the chimneys cease to smoke. No prompt solution will be available. One obvious remedy is to stimulate the activity of the industries which supply consumers' goods. The lack of clothes, boots and furniture is universal and acute. It has been reckoned that while these industries accounted before Hitler's rise to power for 60 per cent. of Germany's industrial production, their share had dropped in 1942 to 10 or 15 per cent.\* Nor is that all. Reports from refugees suggest that the Nazis have actually converted some of the machinery of the textile mills into scrap for munitions. To bring order into this derelict system and to supply raw cotton, wool and leather will be the work of time.

\* The figures are from the *Kölnische Zeitung*, quoted in *Was wird aus Deutschland?* by Paul Merker, p. 25.

The best expedient will be to organise as promptly as possible the rebuilding of the towns demolished by our bombers. Skilled workers can be drawn from the vast and efficient organisation of builders and pioneers created by the late Dr. Todt—with this caution that it is thoroughly Nazified at the top. But reconstruction confronts us at once with a series of quasi-political problems. It may be possible to clear all sites and re-condition many dwellings without raising such issues. But if most of Hamburg, for example, has to be rebuilt, who is to appoint the town-planners and architects? It cannot be our intention that foreign soldiers shall plan the future of this great city, which has a proud municipal tradition of self-government that ran unbroken from the Hansa republic of the Middle Ages down to Hitler's advent to power. Germany had some of the world's best architects: such men as Gropius (a refugee in America) and Fahrenkamp. Must they be ignored? Again, before Essen and the Möhne dam can be rebuilt and the Ruhr region re-peopled and set to work, the anxious question of the future of German heavy industry must be settled, at least in principle. During the war, under the pressure of aerial attack, an immense migration of industries and populations has been carried out, from the West of the Reich to the South and East. Is this redistribution, or any of it, to endure? That implies that the frontiers of the Reich are known, and that a central authority exists capable of planning Germany's industrial future. That is not a task which any foreign authority, military or civilian, ought to attempt, or will attempt, if our professions of respect for the principle of self-determination are sincere. Finally, any long-range plans for Germany's economic future must be fitted into an international pattern, and especially into a European scheme. It seems, then, that the amount and kind of rebuilding which can be organised at once will be severely limited by political considerations. Anything more ambitious will have to wait until provisional German administrations are constituted, first of all in the cities and then as a National Government in the capital. The sooner it can be done, the sooner some broad plan is sketched for the future economic life of Europe, the sooner will the German people be able to find salvation in work.

The worst thing we can do is to prolong for one unnecessary month the interval during which it will live in limbo, restless and impotent, because it will not know in what region of the future cosmos, in what purgatory or inferno, it must make its bed and build its home.

## REPARATIONS

IN THE planning of the future it will lie with the United Nations to lay down the basic international structure, though even at this early stage spokesmen of the provisional German National Government should contribute their views to the discussion. To that structure the Germans will have to adapt their own economy. One important question has to be decided in our own minds even before the armistice. What is our policy in the matter of reparations and indemnities? Few of us wish to repeat the errors of Versailles. It is irrelevant to ask what treatment the Germans deserve in requital for the hell they let loose upon the earth. This is an economic problem. What we have to plan is the welfare of all the peoples concerned and *not an anticipation of the Last Judgment*. It should be possible to discover wholly beneficial ways in which the Germans can make a considerable contribution towards the recovery of the nations they have wronged, without risking the boomerang effects of the previous essay. It is useless to ask how much they owe—to that it might be difficult to set a limit. But a limiting consideration there is which we must fix in advance. The health, social and economic, of our future European society will be affected, for good or ill, by the condition of this big European population inhabiting its central area. Its capacity to buy will be as important to the Allies as its ability to repair past damage. All of them, in varying degrees, were dependent on its ability to buy their produce. To promote in it a will to co-operate is at least as essential as it may be to extract from it some amends for the past. For both these reasons, we should demand from the Germans nothing, in kind or amount, that would

lower their standard of life below the general European level or prejudice their future recovery.

It will be conceded that it was a capital mistake, last time, to exact an indemnity in money. Payments which involve no exchange of goods or services cannot be effected across frontiers without a disturbance as fatal to the country which receives as to the country which gives. Indemnities and inter-allied debts rank high among the causes of the last world-slump. It is also clear, in the light of experience, that the appropriation of the German merchant fleet and the deliveries of coal were mistaken measures. Those among us who knew anything of the plight of German children after the blockade regretted the forced surrender of milch-cows. To the reparations in kind that are extracted to make good the losses of the Russians and the Poles, there should be a moderate limit in time. They should not stretch over more than a dozen years. One of the worst mistakes of the Versailles Peace was that it proposed to exact payments from Germany year after year through two generations. An eternal tribute cannot be levied, as much for moral as for economic reasons. Children will not pay for their fathers' sins. It is folly to leave any nation without hope. So long as Germans have to make heavy annual deliveries they cannot attain even a moderate level of prosperity. This is true, even if they pay in kind. The reader will reply that if they remain poor, they will not make war. On the contrary, poverty and under-consumption are an infallible cause of war. All the evidence before us proves that the unendurable poverty and insecurity of the masses during the slump at the close of the Weimar period paved the way for Hitler's ascent to power.

The reasonable course to follow is to exact nothing beyond the restoration of stolen goods during the first year—that is to say while German industry is still in ruins. Thereafter, in proportion as normal work is resumed, the annual payments should rise steeply. They should then diminish gradually. The amount exacted each year should be determined by the general index of production. The whole period should not exceed ten or twelve

years from the armistice. It proved to be impossible after the last war to enforce reparations for a longer term.

What, in detail, can be wisely required? One measure is not controversial. The Germans will have to restore what they have looted from the occupied countries. The list is a long one. It includes objects that possess a high sentimental or aesthetic value—national heirlooms, works of art and libraries.

The most feasible and acceptable form which Germany's effort towards reparation can take will be to make good the ruin of Western Russia. Machinery of all kinds must be supplied, together with such building materials as can be transported economically. The great Dnieper dam has to be rebuilt and the destruction of the Donbas coal field made good.

There are two ways in which machinery can be supplied from Germany. Some Russian writers propose that German workshops and factories shall be stripped, more especially those which make machinery, and their entire equipment transported to Russia. This is a barbaric proposal, inspired rather by revenge than by economic reason. If Germany were stripped in this way she could yield nothing further. The reader should pause for a moment before he endorses this demand. How, if most of the machinery the Germans possess is transported to Russia, are the German workers and their children to be fed? Mass unemployment will be the first consequence. All exports will cease. It follows that Germany will be unable to buy food from the usual sources—Holland, Denmark, Poland, Hungary and the Balkans. That will cause starvation at home, but will it bring prosperity to neighbouring countries? Worse still, if the industrial towns for lack of machinery produce little, how will they pay even for home-grown food? This plan will yield in reparations less than Germany could pay and less than her victims have the right to receive.

The excuse for stripping Germany of her equipment is that her machine-making industry is part of her war-potential. It is impossible under modern conditions to draw any clear line between civilian and military industry. The workshop which makes periscopes for submarines also makes microscopes. The plant which makes engines for tanks and bombers can turn them out, after a

brief process of adaptation, for lorries and tractors. Even textile factories turn in war-time to the manufacture of uniforms, tents and parachutes. Deprived of her engineering equipment, Germany could make neither a printing press nor a loom, neither a locomotive nor a crane. Without the capacity to make machine-tools no modern industrial country can live—certainly it cannot thrive.

The rational plan is that Germany shall deliver free, year by year for several years, a specified quantity of new machinery of the latest type, which she shall construct according to the requirements of the countries she devastated. But such a plan calls for caution. Deliveries in kind, even of capital equipment, can cause disturbance, no less than payments in gold. If Germany sends machinery free to Poland, the normal process by which it would be exchanged for potatoes is interrupted. Polish farmers lose a market and Germans go short of food. Against the positive gain to the Poles from the new equipment must be set the all-round loss caused by the delay in the restoration of normal relations of exchange. Less harm would be done if the equipment were exported at cost price on a big scale with easy credit. The Russians, with an insatiable home market and an expanding economy, have less reason to fear that free deliveries can cause unemployment.

Reparations is one of the most difficult and complicated of economic problems. If we again try to solve it, as we did after the last war, with our emotions, first in a mood of anger and then in a mood of regret, we shall once more inflict grave injury not merely on the Germans but on ourselves as well.

It may be possible to organise the rebuilding of the devastated regions by German labour on the spot. If so, it should be done, as we have already argued, by free men working, under Trade Unionist rules, in conditions that ensure their self-respect (see p. 62). There are others beside the Russians who have a just claim for compensation—Czechs, Poles, South Slavs and Greeks. It should take the form chiefly of agricultural, industrial and electrical equipment. The debtor, however, may never be able to pay more than a few shillings in the pound, for he himself has suffered devastation by our bombers. Among all the peoples who have been wronged, the Jews have the heaviest claim of all. It

would be useless to search for the heirs of the millions the Nazis first robbed and then murdered. The better plan would be that Germany should make a substantial contribution to the Jewish community as a whole. The uprooted survivors of the massacre will have to be resettled somewhere. The orphans will have to be educated. A strong case could be made for a grant in kind to promote irrigation and schemes of development in Palestine. This is a debt which decent Germans, when they know the facts, will wish to pay.

## THE UNITY OF EUROPE

**W**HEN, at length, Germany has a provisional National Government which can draw a ground plan for its future economic life, within what European pattern will it work?

Before we attempt to answer this question, we must glance at the scheme which Hitler realised. The New European Order was, as we have seen, a megalomaniac's version of the *Mittel-europa* of the last war. It was designed to serve the power and the glory of the *Herrenvolk*: it meant not merely the political enslavement and cultural degradation of the subject peoples, more especially the Slavs, but their exploitation also: it was built on the bones of slaughtered millions, Christians no less than Jews. It would be true and just to say that in the economic exchanges it involved, the Germans rarely gave a fair equivalent for what they took. The technique by which the Nazis ensured their ascendancy within the New Order was characteristic. They never brought its members together. Germans as holders of big blocks of shares penetrated its companies. In diplomatic dealings Berlin talked with the rulers and ministers of satellite States one by one. In each conversation the imperial power dominated the ally by his bulk, his armaments and his habit of command. No Council representing the associated states was ever allowed to meet. This was an empire which no venerable tradition mellowed and no unquiet Puritan conscience checked.

When this is said, we must recognise that even this evil thing



achieved some relatively good results. Firstly and chiefly, it integrated Europe. It did completely what Napoleon began to do: it made Europe a coherent economic and political whole. Few of those who have lived all their lives in the Old World realise, as the simplest Americans do, that the divisions, the frontiers, the custom houses, the flags and the barracks of Europe account for much of its backwardness in material civilisation and its lower standard of life as compared with their vast federal Union. Secondly, by organising the green agrarian belt of Eastern Europe to serve the industrial region of the Centre and West, Germany certainly exploited its peasants but she also gave them security. The buying of agricultural produce in bulk which Dr. Schacht organised was not a new idea: England did the same thing on a great scale in the last war in her dealings with the Dominions and the Argentine. It gave the farmer the assurance, before he scattered his seed, that his crop would find a purchaser at a fixed price on which he could reckon in advance. In this way the agricultural surplus of Hungary and the Balkan countries, pigs and tobacco as well as wheat and corn, was taken in bulk for the German market. The transaction resulted from a single politico-economic bargain between governments. In exchange, the peasant country received manufactured goods, which were, to be sure, often overvalued and often in arrears. Like the workers of Germany, the peasants of the East won security, but remained impoverished and unfree. Nor is this the end of the benefits which German intelligence carried to the East to balance Nazi barbarity. Communications during the war were rapidly improved, for economic as well as military ends. New and valuable crops, especially the soya bean, were introduced. In Roumania, when the Germans found that its incredibly poor peasants could not cultivate efficiently, because they lacked oxen for their ploughs, they formed groups of fifteen small-holders and gave each unit a tractor for its work. Even in Poland, with all their brutalities, they did much to intensify its backward agricultural practice.

What, then, shall we do, in so far as we can influence the development of the green Europe of the peasants? Shall we decree a return to *laissez-faire*, free competition and the unstable prices

on which the dealer and usurer thrive? Will "traditional England" restore the disreputable and reactionary kings and confirm the Magyar nobles in the possession of their latifundia? Or will our democracies understand—what townsmen are rarely quick to perceive—that the welfare of their Western cities depends on the prosperity of the backward peasant; that orderly marketing and scientific agriculture must go together; and that these vast rural slums, alike in Eastern Europe and in India, are to-day the chief drag on the world's progress? The purpose of the Atlantic Charter cannot be realised unless we so shape our economic strategy as to lift the level of life of these primary producers up to that of the industrial populations.

It cannot be done solely by helping them to cultivate with efficiency. That must, of course, be done and on a great scale. What we have already said about Poland applies to the Balkans also. These Eastern peasants are starved of capital—they need horses, live-stock, implements, fertilisers, and the little they have is of poor quality. Their acres yield only a fraction of what Danish, Dutch and British farmers get from theirs. Such co-operative organisation as they possess could be greatly aided and expanded. Often, in the effort to satisfy the hunger of their own families, they are raising unremunerative crops—always wheat and little else. Their holdings are usually too small and often they are scattered in parcels and strips. They need roads and railways. But the central fact about the East End of Europe is that it suffers from relative over-population. The labour of its millions is wasted for lack of science and equipment: but if labour-saving methods were available, even more of the peasants' numerous sons and daughters would be idle.

The obvious remedy is to plant suitable industries; which could be done, if electric power were available—firstly the processing industries which deal with the raw produce of the country, and then the light industries which make consumers' goods. There are also undeveloped mineral resources: Greece, for example, has both bauxite and the unused water-power which could turn it into aluminium. The nineteenth century doctrine of specialisation and the division of labour has been carried to disastrous extremes

and applied in Eastern Europe, as in India, to justify an exploitation which is imperialist in character, even when a Balkan State retains its nominal independence. Over Europe as a whole it has been reckoned that the income of the average agricultural worker is only 60 per cent. of what the industrial worker earns. Whether it is done by a World Authority or a European Council or by both in harmony, investment ought to be canalised to develop this borderland, both by modernising its agriculture and by the rapid introduction of industries. If ever we achieve a European Federation, it should, at the expense of its richer Member-States, contribute by grants-in-aid to the development of its poorer areas and standardise throughout its territory the services of public health and education. Meanwhile, for lack of faith and leadership, we may have to be content with less ambitious and less effective plans. The most hopeful of the schemes that have already won public favour proposes to create in the Danube Valley a source of hydro-electric energy on the model of the Tennessee Valley Authority. Its power would serve for irrigation, industrialisation and the provision of cheap fertilisers. This is only one instance of what might be done by international planning and co-operation. We have spoken primarily of Eastern Europe, but Spain, Southern Italy and Sicily are also depressed agricultural regions, cursed with a functionless landlord class and in need also of capital equipment for irrigation and industrialisation.

The idea we have sketched in this painfully inadequate way foresees two parallel roads by which East and West shall advance to prosperity together. The West will supply the equipment, the tractors, the lorries, the machinery of the co-operative dairies, the hydro-electric plant, the requirements of the processing and light industries. What must be banished from our minds is the fallacy of monopoly and exploitation. Not even by the industrialisation of the East will the West be the loser. These famished peasants were too poor to be good clients.

Our New Order will resemble the German model only in its central idea—it views Europe as a planned and integrated whole. In everything else it must pioneer in a new direction. The weaker client States cannot be left to deal face to face with an omnipotent

Great Power, their creditor. Investment ought to be regulated by a Board on which they are fully represented. The whole structure of the Council of Europe inevitably follows this representative pattern, whether it deals with currency, railways, or cultural needs. If Germany buys in bulk the agricultural surplus of Bulgaria, the transaction need not follow the lines of Dr. Schacht's masterpieces in the art of barter. The International Bank, with its clearing-house, will encourage a return to triangular trade. If Bulgaria sells all her tobacco to Germany, she will not be compelled to take only German machines in exchange—though it may suit her to do so. For freedom there is a place within a planned order.

Into this European plan, which must be conceived as a whole, German industry, and of course Czech industry also, has to be fitted. It is vital to irrigate the broad plains of the lower Danube, but it is equally urgent to find creative work for the Ruhr. A considerable share in all these projects of development should go to the German heavy, machine and electrical industries, nor should their horizon be confined to Europe. China, India, South America and Africa are a much vaster field for the same kind of development, which Britain and America ought not to monopolise. If they do, they must expect in due course the revolts and rivalries which imperialism always provokes. When the war ends in Europe and we may hope for a partial demobilisation and a partial revival of civilian industry, British Trade Unions and the Labour Party will properly insist on the right of their workers to employment. There will be no one to speak for the German workers, while every Allied industry will have its advocates. Some of these German labourers and craftsmen may have been foolish, as all of them were unfortunate. But need we remember for ever that they shouted "Heil Hitler" when he gave them work after years of insecurity and slump? If we wish that they should be loyal to our New Deal, then let it also find them work. German engineers will not wish to forge cannon, if they are kept busy fashioning looms and ploughs. We are all converts to the gospel of maximum production and full employment. It is economic doctrine, and at home we apply it all round, without stopping to inquire whether

this group of workers or the other ever made a political mistake. We must steel ourselves to think of Germans and plan for Germany with the same cool, scientific common-sense. The longer she has to wait for her share of the world's work, the slower and more doubtful will be her return to moral and social health.

## THE JUNKERS

WE HAVE touched on the relationship which should link the peasants of Eastern Europe with the industries of the West. A similar problem of welfare and power confronts us within the borders of the Reich. How should the democratic Germany of to-morrow deal with that twin ruling class which governed it and armed it for aggression, with the Nazi Party as its ally and its tool? Let us begin with the Junkers. Their power rested on two bases—their great estates and the army. The army must disappear for ever. In the Home Guard of citizens which may be created to maintain internal order, there must survive neither an offensive armament nor a professional officer class. With the old army must vanish the academy for cadets, in which the boys of this caste acquired their exclusive and militaristic outlook. But feudalism will still linger in the minds of the squires, if the great Junker estates remain the decisive social fact in the life of rural Prussia. Are they to be broken up into small peasant farms, or should they be converted into big collective farms on the Russian model? In either event the great landlord must cease to own them.

The problem is complex and in one form or another it reappears all over Europe. It turns largely on the question whether wheat and rye are the crops on which the agriculture of the Continent should concentrate. They were often subsidised for reasons of military security: they ensured Germany against blockade. Again, when the world-market collapsed after the slump, "autarky" came into fashion, because the staggering exchanges made it perilous to import even so cheap a food as wheat. In the primitive world of Eastern Europe the peasant still farms for subsistence

and raises wheat for his own oven. In Prussia, and not in Prussia alone, wheat was a political crop. The Junker could stress his services to defence. He ran the army and he raised wheat by extensive farming: in return he was subsidised and protected by a high tariff. The result was that on occasion bread was sold at three times the world price. The Junker exploited not merely the ill-paid labourers on his own estate, but the whole population which consumed his produce.

The solution of this tangle cannot be easy—neither in Prussia, Italy nor the Balkans—nor will it come quickly. It presupposes firstly military security—freedom from fear, including the fear of blockade. Next, in the case of Germany, foreign markets must be assured to her: she cannot buy wheat from the New World unless she can sell her machinery and her chemical products abroad. If we may make these assumptions, then the case for raising much grain by extensive farming in Prussia is weak. In a densely-peopled country, where big towns provide a market at the peasant's door, the wise policy is to encourage intensive farming on the Danish model. The value of protective foods is understood to-day, as it was not when the Junkers under Bismarck imposed their economy on the Prussian State. Dairy-farming and the raising of live-stock, green vegetables and fruit should be fostered under a system of co-operative marketing and credit. How in detail to do it and finance it is for the Germans to plan. What is obvious, however, is that the political power of the Junkers must first be broken. The State will have to expropriate them and adjust its whole economy to larger imports of grain. When it does this, we shall know that it has turned its back upon the past.

## THE GERMAN TRUSTS

**W**E HAVE still to consider the most crucial of all the problems that will face the Occupation and the statesmen who plan peace. When Hitler's army is demobilised another concentration of power, more enduring and pervasive, will confront us—the

German Trust structure. Powerful in the last war, it is now omnipotent. In peace and war during ten years of Nazi rule the concentration of capital has gone on at a dizzy pace and with it a modification of the social pattern. The workers, bereft of all autonomy in organisation, have been helpless all the time. The "little men" who trusted Hitler, the lower middle-class, the artisans, the peasants of the South who own their farms—these formed the mass of his adherents, as their younger sons were his storm-troops. Not only has this class been tricked; in great part it has been liquidated. This happened everywhere amid total war, but nowhere so completely as in Germany. The final call-up in the early months of 1943 of the older men, hitherto exempted, sent three and a half millions, mostly of these "little men," into barracks and factories. That may well spell the final doom of this class. A higher proportion than ever before of the German population will serve a smaller number of giant monopolies as technicians, clerks and manual workers. Between 1933 and 1940, although Austria and the Sudetenland had been added to the Reich, the number of companies fell from 9,148 to 5,397. A few monsters towered above the rest, for by 1941 half the share capital of Germany was held by 89 companies.\* Even these figures are inadequate, for the companies in their turn were tightly grouped in trusts and cartels. When we talk of restoring democracy in Germany and re-educating its electorate, this social pyramid looms up before us. It may be a cheerful reflection that Germany will recover universal suffrage and the secret ballot. But the majority of voters will be the employees of these few companies. Real power, economic power, will reside in the trusts. An uncensored press Germany may regain. But how much of it will their magnates buy up?

It is too early to guess how Germans will face this fundamental question of power, if AMGOT permits them to discuss it. We have made our own suggestions about the future of the basic industries

\*The separate category of limited liability companies showed the same tendency: less than one per cent. of them held two-fifths of the capital. These figures, quoted by Paul Merker, *op. cit.*, are from the supplement to the periodical *Wirtschaft und Statistik*.

of the Ruhr. It is not desirable that the trusts should be broken up. One or two of them, notably the Hermann Goering Trust, created solely for a military purpose, will collapse and should be liquidated. Trusts represent technical progress. "Trust busting," as American experience shows, even if it were desirable, is rarely a success, since evasion is easy. But it would be monstrous to leave at the head of these vast concentrations of power the patrons, nominees and collaborators of the Nazis, men as guilty as the professional politicians and much more influential. When they are removed, the experts of their technical staffs can carry on, under the control first of the Occupation and then of a provisional German Government, until the final shape of the trust structure is determined.

There will be, during the first years after the armistice, no difficulty in controlling the trusts. Anglo-American authorities will have at their disposal the world's shipping and most of the basic raw materials. A Board of Production, with its European and German branches, will doubtless draw up a plan of what should be produced and fix the priorities according to the needs of the populations under its charge—requisites for re-housing, building materials, clothing, boots, furniture, electrical equipment, machinery, agricultural implements, fertilisers and possibly synthetic oil and rubber. If it retains the right to distribute licences or contracts for the mass production of a few standardised patterns of necessary things, it will hold the German trusts in the hollow of its hand. Some representatives of the European consumers, including Germans, should be set up to advise it.

Control is technically easy: the anxious question is in what sense it will be exercised. On the first part of the answer there may be agreement: it should aim at full employment throughout Europe, including Germany. But manifestly a control so almighty could be used, in the liberated countries as well as in Germany, as an engine of political pressure. By granting or withholding to industrial countries raw materials, shipping facilities and licences to manufacture, or again by speeding up or impeding the flow of urgently needed goods to consuming countries, it could become the dictator of the political development of all Europe. The Liberal



lacks realism who supposes that a promise of free elections suffices for self-determination. The power which bestows work or denies it is the sovereign who shapes the life of a people. For some years, over-lordship over Europe may lie in American and British hands, for although Russia plays a prominent part in U.N.R.R.A., she is not represented on some of the other vital economic controls, notably the shipping control. Both are capitalist Powers and in both monopolistic Big Business is the dominant influence. In both, moreover, the State Department and the Foreign Office are decidedly more conservative than the main trend of public opinion. If both owe allegiance to "democracy," it must be recalled that this word has for nine Americans in ten a connotation it does not possess in Europe. It means "the American way of life," based on the belief that private enterprise and the profit motive are the only reliable springs of economic activity. Nothing else for many Americans is freedom, and it is even a common view that Socialism is incompatible with Western ideals of morality. The right wing of organised labour is hardly more open-minded. Conservative Americans would feel no more shame in using economic pressure to stave off any approach to Socialism than did Mr. Hoover in using the hunger of Europe for this purpose in 1919. It is obvious that by such means a veto can be put on the formation of any provisional government which seems to Washington and London dangerously "red." Will a "pink" government be tolerated, if with this fainter shade there goes any capacity for action? Nor is that all. The same kind of economic pressure might be used, for example, to extort from the Rhinelanders a forced consent to their separation from the rest of the German nation. They would understand that if they bowed to this decree the industries of the Ruhr would be allowed to survive: if not, they would be doomed.\*

It is within this framework, in the dawn of "the American

\*The reader who thinks this a cynical suggestion may be reminded of what happened to Austria in 1933. The League offered the bankrupt a loan on condition that she bound herself not to pursue her aim of union with Germany. After a prolonged struggle the Austrian Parliament accepted the harsh bargain by one vote.

century," that the fate of the German trusts will have to be decided. On the decision turns, for the foreseeable future, the internal balance of power in the Reich. If they survive as giant enterprises in "private" hands, they will dominate it, alike in its domestic and foreign policy. They cannot remain as the Nazis shaped them. Three types of solution are conceivable. The key concerns of the structure may be socialised outright, or the German Republic may effectively control them by acquiring a majority of their shares. They may be internationalised on some such plan as we have proposed.

But a spurious and perilous form of internationalisation is equally conceivable, which hands them over to cosmopolitan Big Business. The heavy and chemical industries may be allowed to survive as private enterprises on condition that the American Steel Trust and the British Iron and Steel Federation acquire a majority holding in the former, while Imperial Chemicals and perhaps Standard Oil (already involved in it) penetrate I. G. Farben. This is, perhaps, a crude way of putting it: a scheme of this kind can be camouflaged under a variety of plausible disguises. It could be linked with reparations, while dilution by other capitalist interests, Czech or French for example, might be permitted. It is by devices of this kind, rather than by annexation, that modern Imperialism effects its conquests. The Rhineland flag or even the German flag floats above the mines and furnaces, but the labour of German workers and the science of German technicians is exploited for the benefit of foreign owners. They will be relatively fortunate if they are exploited to the full. It is more likely that these cosmopolitan trusts will severely limit the output of their German concerns, in order to maintain high world prices and favour the plants which each member exclusively owns in its homeland—if capital has in this age a home.

A similar problem will recur throughout Europe, unless its industrial life is governed by an Economic Council which represents its peoples. But a Council of this kind will be a mere decoration, if the key industries are left in the hands of trusts which make a scarcity and call it wealth. If we allow this to happen in Germany, we may discover in after years that her

workers are not the only sufferers: these trusts can as easily throttle the development of promising new industries in the liberated countries.\* The industrial cartels are not the only form of concentrated power which our economic strategy has to face. Hitler's New Order centralised the whole European system of insurance in Berlin. In this way enormous influence and vast wealth has been massed at one point in German hands. That the victors will not leave it in German hands is certain. Will they disperse the elaborate structure, or will it become a dependency of Anglo-American finance? What provisions, in that case, will be made to tap its unearned gains and bring it under international control? Europe may pass in silence, while the Nazi Reich is shattered, to an invisible empire, which will render no account of its doings to its subjects.

But it is with the German problem that we are concerned in this study. Our attempts to grope our way in the obscurity of the future have brought us back to the point from which we started in our analysis of the past. Democracy broke down ten years ago because a peculiarly dangerous ruling class, the heavy industrialists married to the Junkers, stood in the way of any social reconstruction and any decisive shift of power. The victors of 1918 played their part in rendering the German revolution ineffective. How far the Russians will be interested in this internal German problem we do not yet know. They may prefer to use their bargaining power in other directions. What we can foresee fairly clearly, in the light of their record elsewhere, is the part the Anglo-American Allies will play in shaping Germany's future. If, out of respect for private enterprise, they again stereotype the social structure in the old mould, there will emerge a Republic even less capable of bold creation than the last. Its Reichstag may, indeed, play the party game within the narrow limits of political democracy. Its frustrated Left may possess all the civic

\* This subject and much else that has a direct bearing on the German problem is discussed more fully in the very able Fabian pamphlet *Labour and Europe* (Research Series, No. 71). See also *The Unity of Europe* by Hilda Monte (Gollancz), which deals fully and well with the peasant problem in its relation to industry.

rights it needs for the unhampered expression of its bitterness. But the daily life of a nation of employees will be governed even more absolutely than before by monopoly capital, guaranteed against any challenge from below because it will be linked with the ruling Powers in Washington and London. The forbidden revolution, when it does explode, will take the form of a colonial revolt and it will spread beyond the frontiers of Germany.

## THE CHALLENGE

**T**HROUGHOUT this book we have tried with clear eyes to face the dangers that beset the Occupation and the Settlement. The gloomy suggestions, of which we have made perhaps too many, are not a forecast but a warning. So far as we know, no final and unalterable decisions have been taken, either to prolong the Occupation for many years or to deny the Germans any share, while it lasts, in discussing and managing their own affairs: there may be an intention to dismember the Reich, but even this is not settled; nor is the economic plan as yet a rigid framework. All that is known is that formidable forces, entrenched near the centres of power, are working in these directions. It is easy to drop into a fatalistic attitude of acquiescence. The discussions which will one day end in an unalterable decision go on in secret. When an announcement is made at last, it will be too late to protest. At some distant date, the formal consent of Parliament will be sought, but it will divide on party lines for or against the settlement as a whole, which will not be open to amendment. On the merits even of the most momentous details there will be little discussion and no possibility of a free vote.

Here, then, is the challenge we have to meet. This settlement can be influenced in its broad tendencies by public opinion. But if the thinking of the average citizen is to effect anything, it must be focused now. It will have to operate, moreover, through existing organisations in Great Britain, chiefly through the Labour Party. This will not be easy. The Labour Party never defined

its foreign policy as clearly as its domestic programme. Since it entered the national coalition it has been debarred from adopting any independent foreign policy of its own. Its function, as most of its leading members conceive it, is primarily to watch over the concrete interests of the working class in the British Isles.

The working masses whose long-range interests depend on the Settlement are inevitably divided. *The young are in the army: only their elders can speak.* The workers' parties of Europe have been crushed to atoms, and even the exiles in London who are in touch with the surviving underground movements are impotent in their isolation, since the Socialist International has ceased to function. No sense of solidarity unites the technicians with the urban workers and these are rarely in touch with the peasant-farmers and agricultural labourers. Danger shared in common has in some countries, but not in all, imposed a working alliance on Socialists and Communists, but they remain too often mutually incomprehensible and antipathetic. For the Soviet Union and above all for the Red Army there is among the masses in Great Britain the warmest admiration, but it is not yet reflected in any attempt to reach agreement over policy. Itself broken into halves, the American Labour Movement opposes reunion in Europe. Divided as never before, we are nearing a settlement which will alter our social and economic environment even more drastically than the last:

The sentiment of solidarity among all who work, which was a splendid stimulus to the Socialist pioneers of the last generation, has failed in our day to find either a prophet or a political organisation. It survives, none the less, as an instinct among simple men. When our leaders are big enough to call it into action and give it an embodiment and a voice, it will yet play a part in shaping the world in which all of us will have to work together, if not in peace then in war. It is not as powerless as pessimists suppose. It is alive in the International Federation of Trade Unions. It broke its way through the crust of nationalism, when the Sicilian masses greeted the men of our invading armies. It may smash a much solider barrier when workers in

khaki meet German workers among the wreckage of their homes.

Throughout this essay, we have used only self-regarding arguments of prudence to advocate a tolerable future for the German people. Our own casualties in the last round will be the heavier if we refuse them a ray of hope. They will never settle down to peaceful and constructive work if we dismember their Fatherland. If we impoverish them, we shall suffer by reason of their inability to buy our wares: their industries, which some would destroy, are an asset which should contribute to the welfare of mankind. But there are other arguments silently working in all our minds. Not all the wickedness the Nazis wrought, nor all the evils of the war they forced upon us can destroy our obligations towards our fellows who use the German language to voice the daily needs and homely cares of men. The crime of the Nazis was that they denied our common humanity. One thing is more important than the Settlement itself. It is that we should recover for mankind its obliterated instincts and half-forgotten principles of social morality. It matters little whether we state them in Socialist or Christian terms. What matters is that we apply them, not merely to our friends but to our enemies of yesterday, and do it without delay.

The instant the last shot is fired, our soldiers will feed the hungry and bind up the wounds of the fallen. That instinct has miraculously survived in us amid all the horror and wickedness of these years. It will not desert us in the difficult time that lies before us. But it is always easier to show charity and mercy to men's bodies than to their minds. The statesman who has to deal with the Germans should be at once strategist and economist, historian and psychiatrist, a soldier and a healer. He must know how they fell into this state. He must have the insight to perceive, behind Bismarck's Uhlans and Hitler's storm-troops, the armies of Richelieu and Napoleon, who trampled Germany under their heels. He must remember that England, when her supreme navy won for her people a limitless *Lebensraum* beyond the seas, made an environment for these Germans to which it was not easy for a virile and ambitious nation to adjust itself. He must extend to this difficult and twisted people the lessons which

psychology has taught us in the last generation to apply to individuals. Their minds can be liberated only by activity and responsibility. We cannot govern them into health.

One difficult step forward the United Nations have taken in their thinking about this Power that wronged them. We realise that for its people as for our own we must ensure freedom from want. This represents a remarkable victory over the irrational passions the Nazis have provoked. We have still to think out the most difficult advance of all. No man can be healthy without self-respect. But it is difficult for any one amid the contempt of his neighbours to regain his poise. This problem will test the tact and moral fibre of both our nations. The key to its solution is, on our side, that we shall be ready to use for the common good the qualities that are in German minds as conspicuous as their faults. They have economists, architects and technicians who can play a useful part in planning the welfare of the Continent. As early as possible we should accept the services of the representatives and experts whom Germany appoints to serve on the European Economic Council.

That may serve as an illustration of the general principle which should guide us. Let them contribute all they can. We in our own turn must submit with them to the controls and restrictions which peace and economic order demand. The sooner there cease to be in Europe two orders of citizens—yesterday *Herrenvolk* and sub-humans, to-morrow armed victors and helpless outlaws—the better will it be for us all. If history has a meaning, if the adventure of human life has a purpose, it is that we should integrate into a good society the races and classes which jostle to-day for pre-eminence and power. There is no good society until for all its citizens there are equal rights.





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
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